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Closing the Gap Between Science and Action

“The Conference brought together the best and the brightest from key sectors to listen, learn and work
together. Most importantly, it gave us an opportunity to come up with clear and specific action for
taking on one of the biggest challenges of our time.”
james e. rogers, chairman and ceo, cinergy corp.

“A major recommendation to emerge from the breakthrough dialogue described here is that global
warming must now be viewed fundamentally as a moral and spiritual issue. This will change the nature
of the debate, and draw in believers of all faiths, particularly evangelical Christians, who have heretofore regarded it as an “environmental” matter only. The 86 leaders who recently signed the “Evangelical
Climate Initiative” agree with this basic assumption. That some religious leaders disagree only makes
this report more significant. If one reads and studies these pages, the inescapable conclusion is that we
must all come together as Americans to act in responsible ways to solve this crisis.”
reverend richard cizik, vice president of government affairs, national association of evangelicals

“This conference, unlike most, was able to combine both the clarification of a macro challenge and the
key action steps needed to help resolve that challenge with its complex overlay of political, scientific,
and attitudinal dimensions. One thing stands out: the stakes on climate change are simply too high for
us to continue approaching it as a partisan issue. Republicans and Democrats need to get together on
this as Americans above all. Read this insightful report and let’s get started.”
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With a Foreword by James Gustave Speth

richard b. wirthlin, chief strategist to president ronald reagan; founder, wirthlin worldwide

“The world desperately needs to know what we scientists are learning from our research endeavors.
We can no longer afford to talk principally to each other, in a language understandable only to us. This
illuminating report arose from a path-breaking conference and outlines concrete steps that will help
scientists better explain the real-life implications of our research on climate change to decision-makers
and the public so that needed action can be taken — and not a moment too soon.”

Americans and
Climate Change

“This report makes clear that the science is now in: global warming is for real. Climate change cannot
be understood or responsibly dealt with if either science or environmental concerns are politicized.”
“Addressing the global threat of climate change requires more than just scientific consensus. This
conference allowed the time and resources for exactly the type of meeting of industry, government,
and civil society leaders that is needed if we are to move past talking about this growing threat, and
start taking action. Quite frankly, the future of our economy and our way of life depend on it.”
mindy s. lubber, president, ceres

“This important contribution reflects a unique coalition-building effort. What emerged was a wide
recognition of the opportunities that would result for the United States and the world if only our
government would lead and recognize the reality of global climate change.”
timothy e. wirth, president, united nations foundation and better world fund, former u.s. senator (d-co)

“A fresh approach to the complex and often-controversial issue of global climate change — a collaborative effort, united by a simple, straightforward goal, namely to get things done. Daniel Abbasi does a
skillful job of weaving together divergent views — those of science, business, government, and the
media — so that a framework for change begins to take shape. A wonderfully put together book.”
eileen claussen, president, pew center on global climate change
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“We are now faced with the fact that tomorrow is today. We are con
fronted with the ﬁerce urgency of now. In this unfolding conundrum of
life and history there is such a thing as being too late. Procrastination is
still the thief of time. Life often leaves us standing bare, naked and
dejected with a lost opportunity. The ‘tide in the affairs of men’ does not
remain at the ﬂood; it ebbs. We may cry out desperately for time to pause
in her passage, but time is deaf to every plea and rushes on. Over the
bleached bones and jumbled residue of numerous civilizations are writ
ten the pathetic words: ‘Too late. . . .’”
— Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
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Foreword
James Gustave Speth
Dean, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

Despite credible forecasts and warnings from the scientiﬁc community
about climate change for a quarter of a century, greenhouse gas
emissions have continued to grow, signals of human-induced climate
change have clearly emerged, and a preponderance of scientists studying
the issue project more adverse consequences to come unless stronger
actions are taken.
Yet a substantial political gulf persists between those advocating such
actions and those opposed. Sir David King, Chief Scientiﬁc Advisor to
the British government, wrote in Science in 2004 that “climate change is
the most severe problem that we are facing today – more serious even
than the threat of terrorism.” He called for “early, well-planned action”
leading to the developed economies cutting their greenhouse gas
emissions by 60 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, and warned that
“delaying action for decades, or even years, is not a serious option.”*
But public and policy-maker commitment to action of this
seriousness remains elusive indeed. The U.S. government, citing
remaining scientiﬁc uncertainties, economic costs, and the unfairness of
a global regulatory regime that excludes the developing world, has
rejected the Kyoto Protocol and largely refrained from positive
international engagement on the issue. Today there are signs everywhere
that the climate issue is beginning to gain traction, but the gap between
climate science and climate policy and action remains huge.
What explains this gap? Is climate change merely one instance of a
larger problem, namely, the expanding gulf between the increasingly
scientiﬁc and technical content of public policy issues on the one hand,
and the declining public understanding of science and technology on
the other? Good environmental science and forecasting are absolutely
necessary but, it would appear, far from sufﬁcient. If we want science to
affect real-world decisions and events, how can we best address the
barriers that lie between good science and effective policy and action?
On October 6-8, 2005, the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental
Studies brought a group of 110 leading thinkers and actors together in
* David A. King,“Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate or Ignore,” Science, Vol. 303, 9 January 2004:
176-77.
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Aspen, Colorado, for a conference entitled “Climate Change: From
Science to Action.” Our goal was to examine the gap between climate
science and climate policy and action, with a particular focus on public
understanding as a key intervening variable. Many have validated this as
an area needing more focus and action. For example, General Electric
CEO Jeffrey Immelt and World Resources Institute President Jonathan
Lash asserted in a Washington Post Op-Ed in mid-2005 that the key
missing ingredient in tackling our energy and climate challenges is a
“strong dose of public will.”
Reﬂecting our belief that society’s response to climate change is an
interactive and complex equation, we invited a diverse cross-section of
participants representing eight societal “domains”: Science, News Media,
Religion & Ethics, Politics, Entertainment & Advertising, Education,
Business & Finance and Environmentalists & Civil Society. We created
eight working groups and asked each to develop:




diagnoses of how their respective domains may have contributed
to the gap between climate science and policy and action (due to
such factors as occupational identities, norms, practices,
incentive systems and others); and
ideas and initiatives to help close the gap, both through action
steps within their respective domains and new or enhanced
cross-domain collaborations.

To complement the working group meetings, we engaged numerous
members of Congress, political leaders, and world-class academics on
the role of science in social change theory and practice, human
psychology and climate change, and the state of climate change science.
The event did not presuppose that the science of climate change or
any other issue is monolithic or infallible. While we do believe that key
elements of the scientiﬁc consensus on climate change have not been
effectively communicated and understood, we also evaluated factors that
complicate the authority of science as an objective and universal guide
to action: its complexity, lack of transparency, and resistance to local
input. We discussed these concerns, as well as solutions that could
democratize or open up the scientiﬁc process itself in ways that might
engender a more scientiﬁcally literate and engaged public.
Given that climate change is a global problem, why did we focus on
the United States? There have been many important meetings looking at
other countries’ emissions proﬁles and climate change policies, as well as
at how the international negotiations might evolve beyond the Kyoto
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Protocol (whose emissions obligations end in 2012). Our meeting sought
to avoid duplicating those meetings or efforts. Rather, our focus in
Aspen was on what many regard as the most important outlier in the
world today regarding climate change action: the United States.
The meeting also sought to address broader themes beyond those
related to climate change. Climate change was our focal case and was
front and center in our dialogues, but we also sought to shed light on the
broader issue of the role of science in a deliberative democracy: How can
citizens best engage on the full range of issues with a high scientiﬁc and
technical content? In this context, we discussed whether and how
climate is a distinctive case relative to other environmental or societal
problems.
This report was prepared by conference director Dan Abbasi,
Associate Dean for Public Affairs and Strategic Initiatives at our
School, based on our discussions at Aspen. Dean Abbasi begins in Part I
with an admirable analysis based on the diagnostic ﬁndings and
recommendations of the working groups, and in Part II he describes in
full the 39 key recommendations to emerge from the Conference.
The conferees were not asked to seek consensus. Therefore the
contents of this report should not be construed as reﬂecting consensus
or sign-off. Many of the diagnostic insights and action items reported
here did gain a signiﬁcant measure of support among the conferees,
while others are the input of smaller groups. In some instances, the logic
of an insight or dialogue from the Conference is extended to fashion a
new idea. Our intention in this report is to include a wide range of key
ideas, without regard to their breadth of support, and to allow the
readers (and potential implementers) to apply their own judgment in
evaluating their quality, feasibility and value.
I believe the report presents an enormously valuable agenda for
further research and, especially, action. We saw in Aspen a clear
recognition that society’s response to the climate change issue will
depend on broadening the circle of engagement and devising innovative
new collaborations and partnerships across all sectors and communities.
We hope that readers of this report will participate actively in such
endeavors.
We at Yale’s environment school anticipate playing a role in catalyzing
the implementation of selected action items and in monitoring progress
toward fulfilling the action items outlined on our website
(http://environment.yale.edu/climate). Clearly, many individuals and
institutions will need to step forward and assume leadership roles in
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making these initiatives happen, either by funding or leading their
implementation. Climate change is one of the great challenges of our
time, and, as this report underscores, there is not only much to be done,
but an urgency to take steps that have been too long delayed.

executive summary

Executive Summary
Why has the robust and compelling body of climate change science not
had a greater impact on action, especially in the United States?
From the policy-making level down to personal voting and
purchasing decisions, our actions as Americans have not been
commensurate with the threat as characterized by mainstream science.
Meaningful pockets of entrepreneurial initiative have emerged at the
city and state level, in the business sector, and in “civil society” more
generally. But we remain far short of undertaking the emissions
reductions that scientists say are required if we are to forestall dangerous
interference in the climate system on which civilization depends.
In late 2005, the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
convened 110 leaders and thinkers in Aspen, Colorado, and asked them to
diagnose the reasons for this posited action shortfall and to generate
recommendations to address it. This report discusses ﬁndings from that
gathering of extraordinary Americans.
Part I of this report is a synthesis that highlights eight selected themes
from the Conference, each of which relates to a cluster of diagnoses,
recommendations, and important lines of debate or inquiry. Part II
describes the diagnoses and 39 recommendations from the eight
working groups. The eight themes and ten of the most prominent
recommendations are spotlighted below.

themes from part i
Scientific Disconnects

We are only aware of climate change as a human-induced phenomenon
because of science. Given this scientiﬁc “origin,” the default tendency of
those who seek to propagate the issue throughout society is to preserve
its scientiﬁc trappings: by retaining scientiﬁc terminology, relying on
scientists as lead messengers, and adhering to norms of scientiﬁc
conservatism. Such practices can cause profound disconnects in how
society interprets and acts on the climate change issue, and they deserve
our remedial attention.
From Science to Values

Given the challenges with propagating the science of climate change
throughout society, many people now favor shifting to a values-based
approach to motivating action on the issue. Religious communities, in
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particular, are increasingly adopting the climate change issue in
fulfillment of their stewardship values. Yet a science-to-values
repositioning, whether religious or secular, carries risks of its own that
need to be understood and managed.
Packaging Climate Change as an Energy Issue

Frustrated by the inability of climate change to break through as an
urgent public concern, many believe it is best to ﬁnally admit that the
issue cannot stand on its own. Climate change can be packaged with
other issues that have generated more public concern to date – and
energy security is a leading candidate. This is a promising strategy, but it
also risks deemphasizing climate change mitigation as an explicit
societal priority precisely when it needs to move up on the list.
Incentives

It is tempting to reduce the challenge of promoting action on climate
change to matters of communications and strategic positioning. Yet this
will usually only take us part of the way. Translating awareness into
action depends on identifying – and selectively modifying – the deeper
incentive structures at play in our society. Harnessing climate change
objectives to the material incentives to modify energy supply and use
patterns is an important part of the equation. But a more thorough
domain-by-domain analysis of career and organizational incentives
yields additional levers for fashioning a broad-based set of strategies.
Diffusion of Responsibility

After evaluating the incentives operating within each of the eight
societal domains represented at the Conference, it is now worthwhile to
reassemble the pieces and identify patterns cutting across them. Doing
so yields the sobering insight that we are experiencing diffusion of
responsibility on climate change. While no single individual or domain
can plausibly be expected to take solitary charge on this encompassing
problem, many who could assume leadership appear to think it is
someone else’s prerogative, or obligation, to do so. The result: a
leadership vacuum.
The Affliction of Partisanship

Climate change is a partisan issue in today’s America. The policy
stalemate in Washington, D.C. has left those committed to action
uncertain about whether a partisan or bipartisan strategy is more likely
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to succeed going forward. For all its direct costs, partisanship has also
had profound spillover effects, chilling public engagement on climate
change throughout our society and compelling many people to take
sides instead of collaborating to craft policies and actions as warranted
by the science.
Setting Goals

Those working to promote societal action on climate change need to do
a better job of formulating goals that are capable of promoting
convergent strategies by dispersed and often uncoordinated actors, and
commensurate with a real solution to the problem. In order to guide and
motivate needed actions, these goals should be generated
collaboratively, scientiﬁcally calibrated, quantiﬁable, trackable and easily
expressible. They should include not only emissions targets but also,
given the crucial importance of “public will,” attitudinal targets.
Leveraging the Social Sciences

The facts of climate change cannot be left to speak for themselves. They
must be actively communicated with the right words, in the right
dosages, packaged with narrative storytelling that is based rigorously on
reality, personalized with human faces, made vivid through visual
imagery – and delivered by the right messengers. Doing this will require
that climate change communications go from being a data-poor to a
data-rich arena. Social science methods have not been adequately
applied to date – and that must change, given the stakes.

ten recommendations from part ii
Part II of this report describes in detail the diagnoses of the scienceaction gap that were conducted by each of the eight working groups, and
subsequently reﬁned in mixed-group formats. It also lays out each of the
39 recommendations, providing supporting rationales and in some cases
points of debate. The recommendations represent the output of
concentrated dialogue among a thoughtful and diverse group of
Americans, but sign-off should not be construed, as they were not
submitted to a vote or any consensus-building procedures. The
following constitute ten of the most prominent recommendations to
emerge.
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Recommendation #1: Create a new “bridging institution” to actively

seek out key business, religious, political, and civic leaders and the media
and deliver to them independent, reliable and credible scientific
information about climate change (including natural and economic
sciences).
Recommendation #7: Educate the gatekeepers (i.e., editors). In order to
improve the communication of climate science in the news media, foster
a series of visits and conferences whereby respected journalists and
editors informed on climate change can speak to their peer editors. The
objective is to have those who can credibly talk about story ideas and
craft reach out to their peers about how to cover the climate change issue
with appropriate urgency, context, and journalistic integrity.
Recommendation #11: Religious leaders and communities must
recognize the scale, urgency and moral dimension of climate change,
and the ethical unacceptability of any action that damages the quality
and viability of life on Earth, particularly for the poor and most
vulnerable.
Recommendation #20: Design and execute a “New Vision for Energy”

campaign to encourage a national market-based transition to alternative
energy sources. Harness multiple messages tailored to different
audiences that embed the climate change issue in a larger set of cobeneﬁt narratives, such as: reducing U.S. dependency on Middle East oil
(national security); penetrating global export markets with American
innovations (U.S. stature); boosting U.S. job growth (jobs); and cutting
local air pollution (health).
Recommendation #25: Create a new overarching communications
entity or project to design and execute a well-ﬁnanced public education
campaign on climate change science and its implications. This multifaceted campaign would leverage the latest social science ﬁndings
concerning attitude formation and change on climate change, and
would use all available media in an effort to disseminate rigorously
accurate information, and to counter disinformation in real time.
Recommendation #26: Undertake systematic and rigorous projects to
test the impact of environmental communications in all media (e.g.,
advertising, documentary, feature ﬁlm) on civic engagement, public
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opinion and persuasive outcomes. Use these to inform new creative
work on multi-media climate change communications.
Recommendation #28: Improve K-12 students’ understanding of

climate change by promoting it as a standards-based content area within
science curricula and incorporating it into other disciplinary curricula
and teacher certiﬁcation standards. Use the occasion of the state reviews
of science standards for this purpose, which are being prompted by the
states’ need to comply with the Fall 2007 start of high-stakes science
testing under the No Child Left Behind Act.
Recommendation #29: Organize a grassroots educational campaign to

create local narratives around climate change impacts and solutions,
while mobilizing citizen engagement and action. Kick the campaign off
with a National Climate Week that would recur on an annual basis.
Recommendation #33: The Business & Finance working group at the

Conference composed an eight-principle framework, and proposed that
it be disseminated broadly to trade associations and individual business
leaders (especially at the CEO and board level) as a set of clear and
feasible actions that businesses can and should take on climate change.
Recommendation #36: Create a broad-based Climate Action
Leadership Council of 10-12 recognizable and senior eminent leaders
from all key national sectors and constituencies to serve as an integrating
mechanism for developing and delivering a cohesive message to society
about the seriousness of climate change and the imperative of taking
action. The Council would include leaders from business, labor,
academia, government, the NGO sector, the professions (medicine, law,
and public health) and community leaders. They would be chosen on
the basis of their credibility within their respective communities, but
also across society at large.

To learn more about how you can participate in implementation
of the full set of 39 recommendations, please visit:
http://environment.yale.edu/climate
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Part I
Matching Up to the Perfect
Problem
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introduction
Why has the robust and compelling body of climate change science not
had a greater impact on action, especially in the United States?
From the policy-making level down to personal voting and
purchasing decisions, our actions as Americans have not been
commensurate with the threat as characterized by mainstream science.
Meaningful pockets of entrepreneurial initiative have emerged at the
city and state level, in the business sector, and in “civil society” more
generally. But we remain far short of undertaking the emissions
reductions that scientists say are required if we are to forestall dangerous
interference in the climate system on which our civilization depends.
The problem of climate change is almost perfectly designed to test the
limits of any modern society’s capacity for response – one might even call
it the “perfect problem” for its uniquely daunting conﬂuence of forces:


complex and inaccessible scientiﬁc content;



a substantial (and uncertain) time lag between cause and effect;



inertia in all the key drivers of the problem, from demographic
growth to long-lived energy infrastructure to ingrained daily
habits at the household level;



psychological barriers that complicate apprehension and
processing of the issue, due in part to its perceived remoteness in
time and place;



partisan, cultural, and other ﬁlters that cause social discounting
or obfuscation of the threat;



motivational obstacles, especially the futility associated with what is
perhaps the quintessential “collective action problem” of our time;



mismatches between the global, cross-sectoral scope of the
climate change issue and the jurisdiction, focus, and capacity of
existing institutions;



a set of hard-wired incentives, career and otherwise, that inhibit
focused attention and action on the issue.

In late 2005, the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
convened 110 leaders and thinkers in Aspen, Colorado, and asked them
to develop their own diagnosis of the gap between science and action
from the standpoint of their respective societal “domains”: Science,
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News Media, Religion & Ethics, Politics, Entertainment & Advertising,
Education, Business & Finance and Environmentalists & Civil Society.
This report discusses the ﬁndings reached at that gathering of
extraordinary Americans.
Part I is a synthesis essay that describes selected themes from the
Conference, each reﬂecting an informal post hoc grouping of diagnoses
and recommendations. Rather than adhere strictly to reporting on ideas
generated at the Conference, original commentary is offered on given
topics and context is provided for others. In a few instances, caution and
further research are advised before undertaking implementation of certain
recommendations. The author’s post-Conference vantage point allowed
for detection of patterns and themes across the ﬁndings (e.g., diffusion of
responsibility or the “four paradoxes of urgency”). However, this also
means that the reader should not construe sign-off by the Conference
participants on any particular points, even though all were inspired in some
measure by their various and generous contributions to the dialogue.
Part II of the report is a group-by-group description of the diagnoses
and recommendations developed at the Conference, although the
approach here, too, remains inescapably interpretive since the source
material was rapporteur notes from the deliberations, not tapes or literal
transcripts. We refrained from recording the event in order to encourage
candid dialogue. The reader should not construe sign-off by the
participants on Part II either, though their comments on an earlier draft
have been incorporated.
Some readers may prefer to skip past the synthesis essay in Part I and
go straight to the meat of the recommendations in Part II, or even to the
summary list of recommendations in the back of the report. Others may
value the narrative walk-through in Part I as a thematic foundation for
the detail in Part II.
Four Contextual Points


First, this report does not review the science of climate change. It
begins with the premise that the science is sufﬁciently sound and
concerning to warrant a focus on the next question, which is how
society absorbs, interprets, propagates and ultimately acts on that
science. For those seeking authoritative reviews and updates on
the science, here are a few recommendations:


The National Academy of Sciences’ Marian Koshland
Science Museum website offers an accessible primer on climate change. www.koshland-science-museum.org/exhibitgcc
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Sir John Houghton’s book, Global Warming: The
Complete Brieﬁng, now in its third edition, is a highly
regarded review of the science.



The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
website offers a wealth of authoritative scientific
information, including the IPCC’s three major
assessment reports, as well as speeches, slide
presentations, workshop proceedings, and supporting
technical papers. www.ipcc.ch



The U.S. National Assessment Synthesis team, under the
auspices of the U.S. Government’s Global Change
Research Program, produced a 2000 report entitled
“Climate Change Impacts on the United States.”
www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc



Real Climate is a rich and topical website written by
working climate scientists for the interested public and
journalists that aims “to provide a quick response to
developing stories and provide the context sometimes
missing in mainstream commentary.” www.realclimate.org



The Pew Center on Global Climate Change website
includes basic and topical information on climate change
science, and links to many government agency websites
on the issue, including the data-rich website of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics



Second, this report does not constitute a policy roadmap on
climate change in the United States. While the issue of emissions
targets and pathways is brieﬂy discussed in the section on goalsetting at the end of Part I, the predominant focus here is on
public understanding, will, and motivation as a precursor to
policy and other forms of action. Others are doing brilliant and
intricate policy work on how we should – if public and political
will enables it – create a fair and effective program in the United
States to mitigate climate change, whether through a nationwide
cap-and-trade system or some other framework.



Third, while we assembled a diverse group at the Conference, the
reader should be informed that it was not fully representative of
America. Our goal was to generate creative diagnoses and fresh
solutions in a reasonably intimate setting, not to fashion a
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broader societal consensus on site. We had geographic, ethnic,
occupational, religious, and sectoral gaps, and therefore in no way
presume that our event could be considered a true national
summit on climate change. That said, we believe our model for
candid cross-domain dialogue could usefully be built upon and
expanded in future meetings.


Fourth, we adopted a problem-driven orientation in our
Conference as a springboard to creative thinking about new
solutions, and that approach is sustained in this report.
Accordingly, many pages are devoted to what’s not happening and
why, which then leads into discussions about what needs to
happen next. This leaves less room for celebrating the
considerable progress already underway on climate change in the
United States. This should not be read as a defeatist tone. Perhaps
the most hopeful sign that we are on the right track is when our
society engages in candid, reality-based dialogue about a
problem, because that is the best foundation for solutions that
will really work. Optimism is more implicit than explicit in this
approach – but it is assuredly a critical ingredient.

Signs That Action Is Advancing

References to various success stories underway are interspersed
throughout this report, in part to caution against duplicating them and
also to suggest that they be built upon and augmented wherever possible.
Before starting in, however, it is worthwhile to highlight in one place a few
examples of the range of climate change action underway today in the
United States. This is intended to be illustrative, not comprehensive. It
should hearten those committed to bridging the gap between science and
action. Then we can fasten our seatbelts and plunge, together, into the
maw of the problem and discuss how best to address it. Here are some
highlights:


Senate resolution. The U.S. Senate approved a resolution on June

22, 2005 (by a 53-44 vote) resolving that: “It is the sense of the Senate
that Congress should enact a comprehensive and effective national
program of mandatory market-based limits and incentives on
greenhouse gases that slow, stop and reverse the growth of such
emissions. . . .” Bipartisan legislation is now being crafted along
these lines, and a conference on Capitol Hill is planned for April
2006 to assess the options. (Prospects for near-term action in the
House of Representatives appear less promising.)
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Mayoral pledge. Mayors of 219 U.S. cities, representing 43.7

million Americans, have pledged to meet city-level goals
consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, by signing the U.S. Mayors’
Climate Protection Agreement, an initiative led by Seattle Mayor
Greg Nickels (www.ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/climate).
Advertising. The Ad Council, which produced one of the highestrecall advertisements of all time in 1971, popularly known as “The
Crying Indian,” launched in late March 2006 a major TV, print and
radio advertising campaign on climate change, in cooperation with
Environmental Defense and the Robertson Foundation. It will
focus both on the urgency of the issue and on providing steps that
individuals can take to conserve energy and lower their emissions
(www.ﬁghtglobalwarming.com).
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The Governors of
seven Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states signed a
Memorandum of Understanding in December 2005 to create a
regional cap-and-trade plan to reduce emissions from power
plants. RGGI will also provide credits for emissions reductions
achieved outside of the electricity sector (www.rggi.org).
Popular media. Fox News aired a 1-hour special in late 2005 that
played against its conservative reputation entitled: “The Heat Is
On: The Case of Global Warming.” HBO will air in April 2006 a
global warming special entitled “Too Hot Not to Handle.” Turner
Broadcasting System took on the Herculean task of making
global warming funny in a 2-hour comedy special called “Earth to
America, which aired in November 2005. The CBS Series 60
Minutes did a segment on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
in February 2006.
California. In June 2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
committed to reduce California’s greenhouse gases to 1990 levels
by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. California passed the ﬁrst law in
the nation to cut automobile emissions of greenhouse gases (22
percent by 2012 and 30 percent by 2016), though an automaker
legal challenge is pending. New York adopted the same standard
on November 9, 2005, and other states are following. In February
2006, the California Public Utilities Commission announced
plans to cap greenhouse gas emissions from the state’s power
plants. California, Washington and Oregon are cooperating on a
strategy to reduce GHG emissions called the West Coast Governors’ Global Warming Initiative (www.ef.org/westcoastclimate).
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Other state action. Twenty-eight states now have climate action

plans, including nine with statewide emissions targets. Twentytwo states and the District of Columbia have mandated that
electric utilities generate a speciﬁed amount of electricity from
renewable sources – known as Renewable Portfolio Standards
(www.pewclimate.org/policy_center/state_policy).


Corporate commitments. Scores of U.S. companies continue

to make and execute commitments to reduce greenhouse
gases through a variety of governmental and NGO-based
voluntary programs and registries, ranging from the Chicago
Climate Exchange (www.chicagoclimatex.com) to the Pew
Center’s Business Environmental Leadership Council, with 41
members representing $2 trillion in market capitalization
(www.pewclimate.org/companies_leading_the_way_belc).


Institutional investors. Investors managing over $2.7 trillion in

assets and coordinating their efforts through the Investor
Network on Climate Risk released a 10-point action plan on May
10, 2005, calling on U.S. companies, Wall Street ﬁrms, and the SEC
to provide investors with comprehensive analysis and disclosure
about the financial risks presented by climate change
(www.incr.org).


Civil society. Civil society is increasingly active on climate
change, ranging from the diverse Apollo Alliance coalition on
clean energy (www.apolloalliance.org) to the 25 x 25 initiative to
develop farm-based sources capable of supplying 25 percent of
U.S. energy by 2025 (www.agenergy.info). The new Evangelical
Climate Initiative issued a “Call to Action” in February 2006
(www.christiansandclimate.org).



Energy action. Energy Action, a North American coalition of 30

student and youth clean energy organizations, was recently
launched (www.energyaction.net). Among other activities, Energy
Action is advancing the Campus Climate Challenge, a grassroots
effort to secure emissions reductions on over 500 high school and
college campuses (http://campusclimatechallenge.org).


Rethinking oil dependence. There is a growing convergence

between those who are concerned about the security implications
of U.S. oil dependence and those focused on reducing oil use to
mitigate climate change. In his 2006 State of the Union address,
President Bush added his weight to those concerned about

introduction

America’s current energy use by saying that America is “addicted
to oil” and calling for increasing research into alternative energy
sources. The President has, however, continued to oppose
regulation of greenhouse gases domestically and engagement in
international negotiations to cap emissions.
Encouraged by this range of progress, we now proceed to discuss
some of the key challenges still ahead, and ways to address them.
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scientific disconnects
We are only aware of climate change as a human-induced
phenomenon because of science. Given this scientiﬁc “origin,” the
default tendency of those who seek to propagate the issue throughout
society is to preserve its scientiﬁc trappings: by retaining scientiﬁc
terminology, relying on scientists as lead messengers, and adhering to
norms of scientiﬁc conservatism. Such practices can cause profound
disconnects in how society interprets and acts on the climate change
issue, and they deserve our remedial attention.
Climate change is a quintessentially scientiﬁc issue in that, without
the scientiﬁc method, we would not be aware of it. We would not be
talking about human causality. We would not be assembling the
disparate data points from around the globe and seeing their total
signiﬁcance. Yet when an issue is scientiﬁcally deﬁned, it is not always
clear how long it should remain so as it is propagated throughout
society.
Scientific Word Choice and Metrics

We have not yet found the right words to communicate about climate
change, arguably including the name of the phenomenon itself. Is it
appropriate to factor marketability and motivational power into the very
naming of a scientiﬁc phenomenon, or is that the sacrosanct province of
the scientists? Scientists appear to prefer the term climate change
because it is more encompassing – allowing for non-temperature effects
such as precipitation, chemical alteration of the oceans, as well as a
patchwork of warming and cooling regions.
Polls of the public, meanwhile, indicate that the phrase “global
warming” is more attention-getting and unsettling to people than
“climate change,” even though “warming” on its own has a pleasant,
welcoming ring. Alternative terms have been proposed, including
“climate disruption,” “runaway warming,” or “catastrophic warming.”
Few Americans can distinguish the meanings of weather and climate.
Since they routinely experience rapid weather changes, why should a
change in climate be any more concerning? Longstanding models of
balance and equilibrium in ecosystems have largely been superceded by
new ones emphasizing constant change, chaos, multiple equilibria and
ampliﬁcations of small causes into large effects. Given all this, and the
historical evidence of major climate changes prior to the onset of human
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inﬂuences (from the Cretaceous Thermal Maximum to the Permo
Carboniferous Glaciation), it can sound like a fool’s errand to stop
climate change, or any other change for that matter.
Nonetheless, those seeking to advance societal action on the issue
appear to have resigned themselves to perpetuating the scientiﬁcally
preferred term “climate change,” but should they? It is arguably not too
late to revisit the naming conundrum if we place sufﬁcient value on the
speciﬁc goal of translating science to action.
Apart from its naming, the issue has been loaded up with an
impenetrable construct of jargon – ranging from the scientists’ “positive
feedback loops” or “positive radiative forcing” (“positive” in these cases
actually refers to something bad) to the policy-makers’ tradable
emissions permits denominated in “tons” of carbon dioxide-equivalent
(to the average American, “tons” presumably connote elephants more
than invisible air molecules). Scientists say “anthropogenic” when “manmade” would be more widely understood.
The impact of scientiﬁc conservatism on word choice can be seen in
the varying interpretations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s (IPCC) Second Assessment Report in 1995. The most widely
reported phrase from that report was that “the balance of evidence
suggests a discernible human inﬂuence on global climate.” To those
predisposed to concern about the issue, this statement equated to a
smoking gun. After all, thousands of scientists laboring in distinct
countries and sub-disciplines had come to a consensus that the signal of
human impact could now be distinguished from the noise of natural
variability.
Yet in common parlance, discernible implies tiny, or at least barely
detectable. Can the layperson be expected to hear this smallish word and
immediately thrust the issue to the top of his or her agenda of concerns?
Incidentally, the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report in 2001 strengthened
the language about the human role, saying: “There is new and stronger
evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is
attributable to human activities.” But the point stands: word choices at
any given moment in the unfolding communication of an issue can be
interpreted differently based on the prior dispositions of the person
hearing the message.
A pervasive, and probably underestimated, problem in scientiﬁcpublic discourse is the nearly universal use of the scientiﬁcally preferred
Celsius measure for temperature in communicating about climate
change, even though Fahrenheit remains the ubiquitous measure in the
U.S. and the only one to which average Americans can relate. This
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default usage of Centigrade (the Celsius measure) is problematic also
because the numbers are smaller and the magnitude of current or
projected warming is therefore perceptually diminished. So the IPCC’s
projected range of a 1.4 – 5.8° Centigrade rise in temperature by 2100
sounds notably smaller than its 2.5 – 10.4° Fahrenheit equivalent.
Choose Your Consequence

For those aiming to raise public awareness of the projected consequences
of climate change, a laundry list is available: sea-level rise, extreme
weather events, droughts and water shortages, agricultural and food risks,
infectious disease, ecosystem loss, species extinction, and others.
The Biblical quality of these consequences – ﬂoods, droughts, plagues
– has often been assumed to be an advantage in getting people’s
attention, even though the associations with divine wrath may also
promote a sense of human futility.
An intuitive overview suggests, moreover, that many of the climate
change risks may not be as viscerally unsettling to people as one might
think. Sea-level rise may be perceived as inherently geological and longterm, even if accelerations lie ahead from unexpectedly rapid ice sheet
melting (new satellite observations reported in the journal Science in
February 2006 show that Greenland’s glaciers are sliding toward the sea
almost twice as fast as previously thought). The spread of climatesensitive diseases to new latitudes and elevations sounds troubling, but
disease risk is a probabilistic phenomenon and many people appear to
like their chances in such situations. Food scarcity from disrupted
agriculture and threats to drinking water may cut closest to home, but at
least in the industrial world, the image of plentiful grocery stores is so
deeply imprinted that it may be difﬁcult to shake it loose even if a
particular projection warrants it.
The fact is that there is surprisingly little hard evidence about which
of the many climate change related risks are of greatest concern to the
American population. The risk perception and communications ﬁelds
have largely focused elsewhere (e.g., seat belt usage, drunk driving,
STDs, cancer screening), typically on issues of personal behavior rather
than daunting collective action problems like climate change. And the
major survey organizations rarely probe these depths, instead going only
so far as asking whether Americans think global warming is a serious or
very serious problem as a whole.
Even if we had better data, one may ask whether it is scientiﬁcally
legitimate to select some consequences above others for motivational
purposes, when the science encompasses all of them. If an important
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goal is to translate science to action, however, such choices may simply
need to be made. Communications can be constructed that remain
faithful to the natural sciences, while doing much more to reﬂect our
advancing understanding of how human beings assess risks.
Communicating the Risks or the Solutions

There is, as well, a more basic question, discussed a great deal at the
Conference, of whether communicating the risks associated with climate
change to Americans is the correct route to go in the ﬁrst place. Many
contend that it is time to discontinue “scare-mongering” and alarmism,
and instead portray a hopeful vision of solutions that will create jobs
and pump up the economy. Those seeking to advance action will likely
need to communicate both consequences and solutions. Finding the
right balance and sequence to promote action commensurate with the
science is a task that will need to draw not just on the natural sciences
but also on the social sciences (see more on this theme later in Part I).
Meanwhile, many at the Conference intuitively recognized the
potential value of better understanding and communicating local
impacts of climate change so that Americans would grasp what this issue
could mean for their well-being and that of their children. Recognizing
that this is partly a function of the available science, Conference
Recommendation #2 calls for research priorities on climate change to be
more responsive to society’s information and decision-making needs,
including acceleration of ongoing efforts to observe and model local
impacts at greater resolution levels.
Scientific Conservatism Meets Today’s Weather

Weather extremes and anomalies increasingly provoke societal discussion
about climate change. For example, the unusually warm East Coast
January in 2006 appears, anecdotally at least, to have increased the general
public chatter about climate change. At the time of our Conference in the
fall of 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were utmost in the public’s mind.
Such events present what has become a recurring dilemma: Should
those seeking to prompt action on climate change opportunistically
exploit the spike in public concern? Or should they remain scientiﬁcally
conservative and seek to disabuse people of the notion that individual
weather events or seasons, alone, conﬁrm that human-induced climate
change is happening?
If such public concerns are treated as a “teachable moment,” this may
offer ﬂeeting gains in the public’s propensity to act, while also incurring
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a signiﬁcant risk that when the local weather turns again, concern will
dissipate and even sustain a backlash.
Distinguished University of California scientist Richard Somerville
discussed the recent hurricanes at our Conference and agreed to
paraphrase his comments for this report. He writes that:
“A warmer climate means that, statistically, hurricanes may be
stronger, on average. It does not mean we can deﬁnitely prove
that any particular hurricane owes its strength to climate
change, only that the odds of strong hurricanes have gone up.
There is persuasive scientific evidence from observations,
theory and models that higher sea surface temperatures should
and apparently do increase the duration and the average
maximum intensity, but not the frequency, of hurricanes. There
has clearly been a big observed increase in the duration of
hurricanes and in their average maximum wind speeds in
recent decades. The number of Category Four and Five
hurricanes globally has nearly doubled since 1970.
We know that hurricanes are highly variable, no two are alike,
and next year’s hurricane season might be very different from
this year’s. It is our natural inclination to wait a few more years,
observe more hurricanes, improve our theories and models,
until we have an airtight case to present. Science is inherently
self-correcting, and later research can always conﬁrm, extend or
disprove earlier research. Nevertheless, the best current research
tells us that all the oceans have recently warmed substantially,
that human activities are the primary cause of that warming,
that an increase in the average intensity of hurricanes is the
expected result, and that we have indeed observed a remarkable
increase in the numbers of the strongest hurricanes. No amount
of wafﬂing over probabilities and statistics can obscure these
sobering results.”
This is an example of clear scientiﬁc communication, which is more
the exception than the norm in our society (and of course even this
passage, for all its admirable clarity, is too long to be delivered as a sound
bite on the TV news). Due to the inherent variability of the climate
system, few if any speciﬁc weather events will ever meet the unrealistic
standard of serving as deﬁnitive proof of climate change. But many can
be described as “consistent with” or “indicative of ” what we expect to see
now or in the near future under a disrupted climate. And, as Somerville
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illustrates, such language can be used to describe how speciﬁc events
ﬁt – or don’t ﬁt – a larger pattern.
In this spirit, a number of our Conference recommendations seek to
improve the scientiﬁc literacy and communications capabilities of those
best positioned to portray this high-stakes issue to Americans. Together,
they promote ways for our journalists and editors, teachers, business
leaders, religious leaders, TV weathercasters and the scientists
themselves to have access to timely information that puts today’s
weather events into context using clear language.

Such events present what has become a recurring dilemma:
Should those seeking to prompt action on climate change
opportunistically exploit the spike in public concern? Or should
they remain scientifically conservative and seek to disabuse
people of the notion that individual weather events or seasons,
alone, confirm that human-induced climate change is happening?
The Conference participants did not have time to craft any particular
turns of phrase, but instead called for new institutions, capacitybuilding, training and even coordinated advertising initiatives that will
evaluate these issues with great care and ultimately supply our society’s
communicators with language that is scientiﬁcally accurate without
being too reticent or opaque to gain wider notice and comprehension.
One metaphor that may bear expanded usage is that of the “human
ﬁngerprint,” a clear way of summarizing the meaning of a ﬂourishing
body of research collectively known as “detection and attribution studies.”
This is a key ingredient often missing from the news coverage of
observable effects, namely lucid and concise explanations of how
scientists can, with increasing conﬁdence, attribute the causes of observed
effects to human rather than natural causes. Studies of the temperatures
at different levels of the atmosphere (e.g., tropospheric warming versus
stratospheric cooling), decreases in the day-night temperature range and
land-sea temperature differences, among many others, provide mutually
reinforcing observations that together distinguish the human ﬁngerprint
from natural causes such as solar or volcanic activity.
Nobody should expect Americans to cozy up for bedtime reading of
such studies, but more can be done to translate these ﬁndings for broader
accessibility. Exploring how this should be done is part of the task of the
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“bridging institution” called for in Recommendation #1. In short, this
institution would be a science-led effort to use all media, the Internet, and
other opportunities to translate and direct the scientiﬁc results on climate
change in journals such as Science, Nature, Climatic Change and elsewhere
to the alert, reachable public.
Observable versus Projected Impacts

All the above suggests the potential value of stepping back to a more
basic question: What balance should those seeking to prompt action
strike between information about currently observable consequences of
climate change and the highly concerning projections of future impacts?
Popular news coverage about climate change is strongly biased
toward highlighting emerging evidence that climate change is or may be
underway today, namely, retreating glaciers and melting icecaps,
European heat-waves and floods, and record-breaking hurricane
seasons. Such stories are tangible and vivid. They counteract the public
interpretation of the issue as a long-term threat only, and help to make
it newsworthy. And yet coverage of observable climate change may be
the toughest scientiﬁc turf to play on since it is relatively more uncertain
than projections of future changes likely to transpire if we remain on our
current emissions trajectory.

What balance should those seeking to prompt action strike
between information about currently observable consequences
of climate change and the highly concerning projections of
future impacts?
This may seem paradoxical: Shouldn’t something here today be more
certain than something coming tomorrow? In fact, we have made major
progress in identifying the human fingerprint evident today and
distinguishing it from the natural variability of the climate. Yet our
confidence in projections of future impacts, assuming continued
increases in emissions, is still relatively greater. This point is
encapsulated in a summary table in the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change’s Third Assessment Report from 2001 showing the
scientists’ relative conﬁdence levels in many climate change phenomena
– ranging from drought risk to peak cyclone intensities to the frequency
and maximum temperature of hot days. The conﬁdence level associated
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with each phenomenon’s occurrence is shown to be equal or higher
when considering future projections over the 21st century than
retrospective observations from the latter half of the 20th century. To the
extent that future projections contain uncertainty – and they do – the
scientiﬁc debates center on how rapid and severe the changes will be, not
whether they will transpire if we continue emitting greenhouse gases at
growing rates.
And what do our future emissions look like? To date, humanity has
increased the concentration of the primary greenhouse gas, carbon
dioxide, in our atmosphere by just over 30 percent (i.e., from
approximately 280 parts per million in the pre-industrial year 1750 to
approximately 381 parts per million today). If we stay on a so-called
“business-as-usual” trajectory, the range of illustrative scenarios from
the IPCC show concentrations rising anywhere from 90 percent to 250
percent over that same benchmark pre-industrial level (i.e., 530 to 970
parts per million) by the year 2100. Current concentrations have not
been exceeded in the past 420,000 years – and likely not in the past 20
million years – and they remain on a path of rapid and continuing
increase.
Scientists as Messengers

Sustaining a scientiﬁc deﬁnition of a problem in the public’s mind can have
maladaptive consequences. It partitions the issue into a zone where many
people believe they are unqualiﬁed to come to their own conclusions. After
all, most of us are not scientists. This means that we are relying on the
testimonials of others, even if we recognize them to be underpinned by the
scientiﬁc method, peer review, and a high degree of consensus.
Psychologists have documented how the identity and attributes of a
“messenger” can be especially important in determining how an
individual interprets a given piece of information. Is the source of
information knowledgeable and trustworthy, the typical listener will
ask? Do they share the listener’s interests, or are they operating under the
inﬂuence of some disguised agenda?
If the issue is a scientiﬁc one, people generally regard scientists as the
most credible messengers. Yet when we asked the scientists participating
in our Conference about the expectation that they and their colleagues
will communicate – and do so forcefully when societal well-being is at
stake on an issue like climate change – their answers are often sobering.
They describe a system of career incentives and norms that are
powerfully inhibiting (see more on this below). But they also lament the
lack of training and experience that would enable them to communicate
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effectively beyond their peer group to broader society, even if their
incentives did incline them to do so.
It is crucial, however, to distinguish between the idea that one should
not always rely on scientists as messengers and the notion that scientiﬁc
ﬁndings should not constitute the core content of a message. In fact,
perceptions of scientific consensus appear to be an exceptionally
important driver of public readiness to support action on climate
change.
Steven Kull, Director of the Program on International Policy
Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and a participant in our
Conference, found in a 2005 poll that those who believe that there is a
scientiﬁc consensus are much more inclined to believe that even highcost steps are needed to mitigate climate change. Among those who
believe that scientists are divided, only 17 percent favored high-cost steps,
as compared to 51 percent of those who perceive there is a consensus.

It is crucial, however, to distinguish between the idea that one
should not always rely on scientists as messengers and the
notion that scientific findings should not constitute the core
content of a message. In fact, perceptions of scientific consensus
appear to be an exceptionally important driver of public
readiness to support action on climate change.
The poll also found that when the American public was asked to
“suppose there were a survey of scientists that found that an
overwhelming majority have concluded that global warming is
occurring and poses a signiﬁcant threat,” the overall percentage who said
they would then favor taking high-cost steps increased dramatically
from 34 percent to 56 percent. Accordingly, the “bridging institution”
called for in Recommendation #1 is speciﬁcally tasked with conducting
surveys of scientists, among many other functions.
Science as a Land of Contrarians and Reversals

There are a few complications with this proposal to survey scientists or
to rely on new efforts to crystallize and publicize scientiﬁc consensus
more generally.
First, there have already been many group statements by distinguished
scientists expressing concern about climate change and urging action, as
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well as one of the largest undertakings of joint science ever conducted
(i.e., the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). We need to better
understand the reasons for their apparently limited impact. Perhaps the
public believes that such declarations and peer-reviewed processes are
subject to self-selection and politicization. If so, a comprehensive survey
of all those scientists qualiﬁed to pass judgment, publicized as such,
could be signiﬁcantly more inﬂuential than these previous efforts. Or
perhaps such statements and IPCC reports are indeed convincing to those
who are exposed to them, but they have simply not been disseminated
effectively enough to penetrate public awareness. We need more textured
surveys of the public (not just the scientists) to better answer these
questions, and there are social scientists ready to step up to this task.
A second caution is warranted before undertaking to measure and
advertise scientiﬁc consensus. This is that few messages in our society go
unanswered. One experienced social marketer at the Conference noted
that, in past communications efforts where she had made a special effort
to exhibit a robust scientific consensus as the centerpiece of a
communications campaign, it almost instantaneously drew out those
few scientists who disagreed – and with a ferocity that may have
nulliﬁed the persuasive beneﬁts of the consensus itself.
This may stem, in no small part, from the scientiﬁc temperament as
well as scientiﬁc norms and methods. Science does not advance through
afﬁrmative proofs, but rather through the formulation and attempted
falsification of null hypotheses that progressively whittle away
alternative explanations to the one being advanced. This requires of its
practitioners a contrarian stance, and many of them apply this to
proclamations of consensus. One prominent scientist at our Conference
noted that scientists are “skeptical to a fault.” Whether skepticism is a
fault or an indispensable engine of scientiﬁc progress is a legitimate
question, but the point here is that it can complicate efforts to translate
science into societal action. Scientists have a strong predilection to
emphasize puzzles, uncertainties, caveats and details rather than to
repeat core points of any consensus, even one they believe in.
A third challenge to the survey plan is that science, for all its
authoritativeness, appears to many Americans to be a realm of perpetual
discovery and reversals. Despite the indication in Kull’s poll that the
public is highly susceptible to persuasion by scientiﬁc consensus,
Americans also perceive science as a contentious enterprise in which the
prevailing consensus has often been overturned – often by heroic
iconoclasts whose claim to fame is that they resisted conforming to what
later became regarded as a laughably misguided consensus. It is no
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coincidence that Michael Crichton, a best-selling author with a genius
for appealing to the American psyche, reportedly modeled his
sympathetic scientist in the misleading novel State of Fear on one of the
few skeptics still dissenting from the consensus view that climate change
is a problem. But we’re surrounded by non-ﬁction examples too, all the
way back to grade school. Copernicus cautiously overturned Ptolemy’s
theory that the Earth was the center of the universe, which had
dominated European astronomy for 1000 years. And Galileo famously
lost his freedom for defending Copernicus’ revolutionary idea, before
recanting to avoid execution. Dietary science would appear to provide
Americans with regular exposure to science’s erratic nature: chocolate
and red wine were bad for you, now they’re good for you, etc. The food
pyramid long inﬂicted on us has now been rebuilt. And so it goes.
Watching these debates and reversals from outside – without the
beneﬁt of seeing the excruciatingly careful methods underlying the best
science – the average American can perhaps be excused for taking a
wait-and-see approach while the experts debate their way to resolution.
This perception requires that scientists do a better job of explaining the
changes and updates in their understanding, which are often more
nuanced than the stark reversal perceived by the public.
The “Coming Ice Age” as a Famous “Reversal” of Science

In the case of climate change, a good place to start would be to explain
much more clearly, and repetitively, to the public and decision-makers
alike the real story behind the ice age “scare” of the mid-1970s. That single
episode during the maturation of the atmospheric sciences has served as a
mainstay of editorialists and skeptics sowing confusion about the state of
climate change science today, and has not been effectively put into context.
The somewhat oversimpliﬁed explanation is that three key drivers of
climate change were coming into better focus in the mid-1970s, but
scientists had yet to understand their relative strength: 1) ice age cycles
caused by slow variations in the Earth’s orbit; 2) the reﬂective, cooling
effects of sulfate aerosols from man-made air pollution; and 3) the heattrapping effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations, also from
human sources. Some scientists indeed produced a faulty projection of
the net effect of these three, seeing the cooling from sulfate aerosols as
predominant and speculating that continuation of such a trend could tip
the climate toward an accelerated cooling or even an ice age. The multidecade period of northern hemispheric cooling then prevailing (which
ended in 1976) was also apparently a factor behind these inferences.
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Yet the scientific consensus at the time was responsibly cautious, a
fact that seems to have since been lost to the public amidst the
popularization of the dramatic ice age scenario. In 1975, for example,
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the National
Research Council issued a report called Understanding Climate
Change: A Program for Action, which said: “. . . we do not have a good
quantitative understanding of our climate machine and what
determines its course. Without this fundamental understanding, it
does not seem possible to predict climate. . . .” Climate modeling was still
in its infancy and the report essentially called for more research, given
growing recognition of the history of climatic instability and its
impacts.
By 1979, however, the scientiﬁc case was ﬁrming up that warming
would likely predominate over cooling if carbon dioxide emissions
continued to increase, as evidenced by a National Academy of Sciences
study led by Massachusetts Institute of Technology scientist Jule
Charney (see “Carbon Dioxide and Climate,” Washington, D.C.:
National Academy of Sciences, 1979).
This brief account indicates the measured caution with which
concern about climate change actually emerged, and varies
considerably from the picture Americans might otherwise have of
indecisive scientists ﬂitting impetuously from one doomsday scenario
to another.
Yet it is unrealistic to think that complex explanations like this –
describing an evolving scientiﬁc understanding of the net effect of
competing forces – can be propagated easily through the channels of
our sound bite-oriented media today. And the news media are, like it or
not, the primary source of most Americans’ environmental education.
A Yale Environmental Poll in 2005, for example, found that television
news programs were the most frequently mentioned source for
environmental information, with 67 percent of Americans citing them.
Here is where the Conference’s educationally oriented
recommendations come into play, in an effort to provide venues for
contextual knowledge and understanding. One recommendation calls
for incorporating climate change content into K-12 curricula
(Recommendation #28). While there is a great deal of core material on
climate change that could be covered, one could envision the “ice age”
episode being thoughtfully treated in this context. It might ﬁt not only
in a science course module, but also in a history of science module in a
social studies curriculum. Such material should, if the instructional
design is sound, generate a better student grasp of how science is
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conducted and corrected – and how it can mature to a point where the
ﬁndings really do become a compelling basis for action, a threshold that
many believe we are well past on climate change today.
Another recommendation urges the strengthening of citizen-science
initiatives speciﬁcally on climate change, so that Americans can get
hands-on experience participating in scientiﬁc endeavors and thereby
gain greater insight into how science develops (Recommendation #4).
From Audubon’s Christmas bird counts that have indicated the
changing northerly latitudes of bird migrations to the contribution by
thousands of citizens of their idle desktop computer time to major
climate modeling projects administered by ClimatePrediction.net,
citizen-science is an intriguing and so far under-exploited avenue for
engaging Americans on the climate change issue.
Science Loves the Written Word, but Society Loves TV and Video Games

Scientists prefer the written word, whereas climate change needs to be
portrayed more visually if it is going to resonate with a society
increasingly gravitating away from the written word to the various visual
media, whether TV imagery, animation, web games or other vehicles. A
key image in this mix, at least on TV, needs to be human faces.
Communications about climate change very rarely feature human
faces, and the cumulative impact of this void has been to reinforce the
idea that the issue somehow has implications for polar bears and ice
sheets – but not for people!
Out at the cutting-edge, the emerging ﬁeld of immersive, virtual
reality has been under-leveraged to date in its capacity to vividly and
experientially communicate the implications of climate change.

Communications about climate change very rarely feature
human faces, and the cumulative impact of this void has been to
reinforce the idea that the issue somehow has implications for
polar bears and ice sheets – but not for people!
Recommendation #30 calls for incorporating climate change content
into instructional technologies, broadly construed to include not just
educational simulations like SimCityTM, but also video games and other
entertainment formats more likely to reach and engage the youth
segment. Making climate change fun and engaging may not seem easy at
ﬁrst blush, until one sees what SimCityTM did for metropolitan planning.

scientific disconnects

Google Earth, for example, is a tool that could be augmented with
climate change content. Launched in June 2005, this application has
rapidly popularized Internet-based “virtual globes” by bringing them to
the non-expert’s desktop (NASA’s World Wind is another). Such
innovations should be harnessed to create new opportunities for the
public to visualize the effects of climate change in their locality and the
planet as a whole – and, as Google Earth so elegantly permits, to zoom
in and out between the two, reinforcing our dependence on the larger
planetary system. Rita Colwell, former head of the National Science
Foundation, was quoted in the journal Nature describing geographical
information systems (the professional antecedents of Internet tools like
Google Earth) as “the ultimate, original, multidisciplinary language”
(Nature 439, 16 February 2006: 763). Given the language obstacles to
public understanding of scientiﬁc discourse on climate change discussed
earlier, these image-driven approaches hold out new potential for
communicating not just across scientiﬁc disciplines, but also from
scientists to non-scientists.
As described in Nature, Google Earth and its counterparts go far
beyond a communication tool. They combine a set of rapidly advancing
technologies (geographical information systems, remote-sensing, datamining and global positioning systems) that enable the collection and
integration of location-speciﬁc information. These offer the possibility
of changing and profoundly democratizing the conduct of science.
Consistent with Conference Recommendation #3, volunteer citizenscientists could be recruited to submit data that would be rapidly
aggregated with the inputs of others and visualized into a full picture.
These advances in spatial data representation, moreover, are useful to the
scientists themselves; many are, as reported in Nature, increasingly using
Google Earth to overlay multiple data sets, and to thereby visualize
complex systems (including weather) as an aid to hypothesis
formulation.
Finally, we have considered words and pictures, but what about
sounds? We know that many people are auditory learners. We know that
many Americans believe – to this day – that they helped to cut global
warming risk starting back in the 1970s by giving up their aerosol spray
cans (many Americans confuse the ozone protection and climate change
issues, and in fact CFC propellants are culprits in both, though decades
ago the phase-out was driven by the ozone issue alone).
But one might ask why the environmentally negative impacts of
aerosol spray cans stick so vividly in people’s memory, whereas
greenhouse gas emissions out of car tailpipes don’t? Here’s a simplistic,
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and certainly debatable, hypothesis: maybe it’s that hissing sound.
Aerosol spray cans sound like a damaging gas, and indeed they were.
Greenhouse gases, by contrast, are not only invisible, but silent.
What if we experimented by putting a hissing device on each tailpipe?
What if the thermostat hissed when you turned it up on a winter day?
These are implausible options, but they reinforce a point: we need to
think freshly about what people pay attention to, what drives them to
make connections (bad sounds = bad environmental effects), what they
retain in memory – and ultimately, what drives behavior.

from science to values

from science to values
Given the challenges with propagating the science of climate change
throughout society, many people now favor shifting to a values-based
approach to motivating action on the issue. Religious communities, in
particular, are increasingly adopting the climate change issue in
fulfillment of their stewardship values. Yet a science-to-values
repositioning, whether religious or secular, carries risks of its own that
need to be understood and managed.
Many contend that science can only take us so far. At some point –
and a number of our Conference participants believe we are now there
on climate change – values must be invoked and the normative impulse
must come to the fore.
Indeed, a number of religious communities and ecumenical initiatives
have in recent years developed an emerging moral and spiritual outline
of the climate change issue. Yet this impulse is now expanding: political,
business, scientiﬁc and other leaders increasingly acknowledge the limits
of standard rational discourse in portraying the risks and obligations
associated with climate change and ﬁnd themselves digging more deeply
to ﬁnd an authentic, values-based foundation for responding.
Educators at our Conference, for example, said that climate change
must move beyond the science classroom and into the arts, humanities,
and social sciences, where issues of human values, choices and tradeoffs
are more actively discussed and engaged. Some of our participating
politicians advised that only a moral appeal will break through the
legislative torpor on climate change. Cognitive linguists told us that
climate change must be connected to deeply-framed identities and
values that condition how all issues – scientiﬁc or otherwise – are
interpreted.
This is most apparent in the increasing view that religious
communities in America, especially the fast-growing evangelical
movement, may be the single most pivotal force in the U.S. for
prompting societal action on climate change.
Religious Values and Climate Change

Connecting climate change to religious values, pivotal though it may be,
faces signiﬁcant remaining obstacles. Our Conference recognized the
centuries-long break between religion and science, which persists to this
day in religious suspicion of the scientiﬁc framing of climate change and
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other issues. Scientists are not always seen as credible messengers by
religious groups, in part because they are often perceived to favor a
meaningless, purposeless and Godless world that is anathema to
religious people. The evolution/creationism debate, in particular, has
continued to fuel religious distrust of scientists.
Related to the religious-science divide is the pronounced religious
suspicion of environmentalists. Climate change has largely been framed
as an environmental crisis instead of a moral or spiritual crisis, whereas
religious constituencies are motivated especially by spiritual and social
justice appeals. Many religious groups perceive that environmentalists
are less concerned about human beings, including the risks of job loss.
Accordingly, some religious leaders – though concerned with the
environment – have avoided partnerships with environmentalists and
instead fashioned their own distinctive approach and vocabulary, as in
Creation Care magazine, which is produced by the Evangelical
Environmental Network.

This is most apparent in the increasing view that religious
communities in America, especially the fast-growing
evangelical movement, may be the single most pivotal force in
the U.S. for prompting societal action on climate change.
The religious leaders at our Conference, and others who engaged with
them on what they believe is needed from religious communities,
produced a set of compelling recommendations that could go a long way
toward promoting societal action on climate change. The
recommendations called on religious leaders and communities “to
recognize the scale, urgency and moral dimension of climate change,
and the ethical unacceptability of any action that damages the quality
and viability of life on Earth, particularly for the poor and most
vulnerable” (Recommendation #11). But more than this, other
recommendations explicitly called on the leaders to communicate this
concern, once recognized, to their memberships (Recommendation #13)
and to the nation’s political leadership and broader public
(Recommendation #14).
Religious communities have been at this awhile, of course –
educating their memberships, issuing compelling public statements of
concern, buying renewable energy from organizations like Interfaith
Power & Light, and other activities.
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But there does appear to have been a recent acceleration in activity.
For example, in February 2006, 86 evangelical Christian leaders issued a
manifesto entitled “Climate Change: An Evangelical Call for Action,”
encouraging the education of Christians about climate change and
urging the U.S. Congress to enact legislation establishing a market-based
cap-and-trade system. The manifesto appeared to signiﬁcantly elevate
climate change on the evangelical agenda when it said:
“With the same love of God and neighbor that compels us to
preach salvation through Jesus Christ, protect unborn life,
preserve the family and the sanctity of marriage, defend
religious freedom and human dignity, and take the whole
gospel to a hurting world, we the undersigned evangelical
leaders resolve to come together with others of like mind to
pray and to work to stop global warming.”
Yet despite this strong statement, the evangelical community remains
divided. Days before the release of the manifesto, 22 conservative
evangelical Christian leaders, including particularly prominent ones like
James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, Charles Colson, founder
of Prison Fellowship Ministries, and Richard Land, President of the
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist
Convention, wrote to their umbrella group, the National Association of
Evangelicals (NAE), asking that its leadership refrain from signing the
statement – an appeal that succeeded. Their stated rationale was that
“Global warming is not a consensus issue. . . .” Some of the dissenters
noted that, by comparison, the poverty issue was not as controversial
and that action on climate change could undermine their anti-poverty
agenda by diverting dollars needed to lift the poor.
Although they did not cite it, the dissenting evangelicals’ position bears
similarities to the ranking exercise conducted by the Copenhagen
Consensus initiative, which put a high priority on investing in immediate
poverty alleviation (malnutrition, disease, sanitation) over allegedly
distant, and economically discounted, threats like climate change.
Anecdotally, leaders of foundations have also privately described the
moral difﬁculty of navigating this tradeoff as they make funding
decisions. While they might recognize the seriousness of climate change
and the importance of funding a successful strategy, the same dollar could
be spent directly on pills to save African children from river blindness – a
relatively more concrete, quantiﬁable outcome. This suggests that more
work needs to be done to clarify the exacerbating impact of climate
change on poverty, on one hand, and to advance a coordinated basis for
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setting and measuring concrete progress in addressing climate change so
that it can compete for a place on the agenda.
At the Conference, religious evangelicals spoke as well about obstacles
that relate back to our earlier discussion of whether communications
about the threatening consequences of climate change are less likely to
motivate a societal response than positive messages. Some contended
that the formulation of climate change as an issue requiring sacriﬁce and
changes in lifestyles has undermined its ability to break through to
certain religious communities.
Evangelicals, in particular, are often repelled by gloom-and-doom
messages on matters like population control, which imply a need for big
government. They noted at the Conference that this resistance might be
overcome if the climate change issue were reframed as an opportunity to
live a more morally and spiritually fulﬁlling life.
Given such obstacles, it is not reasonable to assume that all religious
leaders and communities will readily respond to the Conference
recommendation that they recognize the moral dimension of climate
change or that they should establish religion-science and religionenvironmentalist partnerships across longstanding lines of distrust
(Recommendation #19). Some have succeeded in blazing this path –
see, for example, the National Religious Partnership for the
Environment’s 2004 statement “Earth’s Climate Embraces Us
All,” which was co-signed by religious and scientific leaders
(www.nrpe.org/issues/i_air/air_interfaith01.htm).

Evangelicals, in particular, are often repelled by gloom-anddoom messages on matters like population control, which imply
a need for big government. They noted at the Conference that
this resistance might be overcome if the climate change issue
were reframed as an opportunity to live a more morally and
spiritually fulfilling life.
Such cross-domain statements and partnerships should be created or
expanded where and when all sides are ready. But some at our Conference
noted that doing so prematurely may cause the taint associated with
environmentalism to slow down the nascent religious impulse to adopt the
climate change issue. In such cases, it may make sense to start with
exploratory dialogues across these domains on a discreet, low-proﬁle basis.
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The eminent Harvard University biologist E.O. Wilson writes of
having attended such a dialogue – a two-day retreat of the U.S. Roman
Catholic Bishops to discuss the relation of science to religion. He notes
that one professor of theology said there: “Science went out the door
with Aquinas and we never invited her back” (Edward O. Wilson, The
Future of Life, Alfred A. Knopf, 2002: 159). But after days of vigorous
discussion, one of their highest priorities for post-conference study was
environment and conservation. Indeed such study and research can help
pave the way for cross-domain partnerships to develop and thrive, and
accordingly, Conference Recommendation #17 calls for further expanding
the scholarly ﬁeld of Religion and Ecology so as to create a deeper base of
mutual knowledge to supply nascent dialogues and understandings.
Politicians and Values

Values are often cited in the political arena as an explanation for divisions
between people – divisions that are, if not irreconcilable, at least
inhibiting to convergent or bipartisan action. We will discuss the issue of
partisanship and climate change more below. Here we note simply that a
signiﬁcant theme at our Conference was that liberals and conservatives
are motivated by distinct and deeply rooted sets of values, which
inﬂuence their political preferences on climate change and a range of
other issues.
Others contend, however, that appeals to common values provide a
promising avenue for overcoming differences and engendering societal
action on issues like climate change. An example cited at the Conference
was former President Ronald Reagan, who won two terms despite
documented gaps between his positions and the public’s majority
preferences on key issues. His success, therefore, was attributed to his
ability to talk about issues as a door into a deeper discussion of values,
where he was more closely aligned with the American public.
In this view, values are the key driver of the public’s decision-making
and until those favoring action on climate change do a better job of
connecting the issue to values – not just religious values, but lifestyle
values like hunting, which may be threatened by climate change – they
will not advance the issue.
A key recommendation of the Politics working group at our
Conference, therefore, is to “recast climate change as a moral and faith
issue, not a scientiﬁc or environmental one” and to “catalyze a broader
coalition of allies around this moral common ground”
(Recommendation #21).
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Authentic Messengers

One way to produce societal action on the basis of mainstream values may
be to ﬁnd mainstream voices prepared to speak out on climate change –
farmers, hunters, ﬁshermen, rank-and-ﬁle labor union members, local TV
meteorologists, soccer moms, NASCAR drivers, and moderate politicians,
among others. Recruitment must be based on a genuine process of
engagement, however, not an effort to ﬁnd and script puppets. This is
important for ethical reasons. But is also strategically sound: people have
been shown, in laboratory experiments, and in real life, to be adept at
detecting when they are being manipulated, even subtly. They discount
scripted events or speakers and the reliability of the information being
conveyed. So a key need is to ﬁnd authentic messengers on climate change,
those who can speak convincingly and honestly about the issue from their
own perspective, outside the orchestration of a modern issue campaign.
Finding and cultivating authentic messengers will require introducing
prospects to information and perhaps values associated with climate
change, and permitting them to ﬁnd their own voice on the issue, rather
than imposing a didactic model on the exchange. BP, for example, has
aired an effective series of “person on the street” television
advertisements in which average citizens (reportedly not scripted actors)
verbalize their own concerns about the implications of society’s – and
their own – energy use, including in relation to climate change. Putting
aside any debates about BP’s motives, the advertisements struck a chord
because of their authenticity: the citizens describe their uncertainties,
dilemmas, and concerns openly. Communicators working on the issue of
climate change may be able to take a page out of the BP book by taking
more time to listen to citizens’ concerns about being asked to take action
on climate change – what tradeoffs do they fear, what impingements on
their quality of life, what uncertainties would they like to resolve?
A recurring theme at the Conference was that the most persuasive
and trusted channel for propagating information on controversial issues
like climate change is peer-to-peer dialogue. News editors may listen to
esteemed fellow news editors who say they’re missing the biggest story of
our time by not covering climate change – hence the call for
orchestrating editor-to-editor dialogues (Recommendation #7).
Religious congregations may listen to their fellow parishioners speaking
about the spiritual imperatives associated with climate change
(Recommendation #13).
Many concerned with advancing climate change messages believe
that novel voices must be recruited and deployed in order to jolt people
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awake and prompt them to take a fresh look at the issue. On the surface,
this point is distinct from the call for authentic voices. And yet, look
again. One way to read this is that novelty can be a surrogate for
authenticity. It is precisely when a speaker deviates from a predictable
script that we are compelled to take notice, in part because it forces us to
at least consider that the person is speaking authentically from the heart.
This may, in turn, induce people to take a closer look at the issue they’re
talking about.
Observe Caution in Moving from Science to Values

Despite all the recommendations in its favor, we should observe caution
in moving too quickly from science-based communications to moral
and values-based appeals, recognizing not only the beneﬁts but the risks
of doing so.


First, while many values are socially constructed, some are
personal and may not allow for the level of commonality needed
to achieve a societal consensus for action. Even social values often
emerge in an oppositional sense, whether in conscious or
unconscious distinction to the values of others.



Second, values are subjective – by deﬁnition, they do not lend
themselves to objective veriﬁcation. Thus a prominent elected
ofﬁcial at the Conference cautioned against the recommendation
to recast climate change from a scientiﬁc to a moral issue, because
he believes that the scientiﬁc rigor associated with climate change
science, once recognized more fully than it is today, can serve as
an objective basis for eventual convergence among ofﬁcials from
different parties.



Third, people tend to apply extra scrutiny to individuals whose
assertions are made using the language of values. In this sense,
values may be less susceptible to inﬂuence from outside than is
recognized. The pathway to inﬂuence through “information” that
is less value-laden may be comparatively more open.

One might counter that the recommendations call less for changing
values per se, than for tapping into deeply rooted values already held by
the person one is seeking to inﬂuence. That may be valid in theory, but
the distinction in practice can be hard to draw. If you are seeking to tell
someone what the implications of their values are, you are in welldefended terrain and the obstacles to your success may be higher, as they
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should be. Yet the gains, if successful, may be greater – and more
enduring.
What can be gained, by contrast, through an information-based
approach, rather than a values approach? An anecdote from the Conference
is telling, though certainly not conclusive. One of the participating religious
leaders said he had come to embrace climate change as a spiritually crucial
issue, but had done so by being exposed to the science and undergoing
something akin to a “conversion experience.” In other words, it was the
science, not the values per se, that were most persuasive to him, which only
then led to his spiritual interpretation of the issue.
It turns out that the person who exposed him to the science and
prompted the epiphany was a religious scientist, so we cannot in this
particular case cleanly distinguish the scientiﬁc from the religious
inﬂuences. Yet it’s clear that the science was an important ingredient in
the persuasive mix. This leaves us with the insight that we may not need
to frame science and values as mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather
as considerations that can work in tandem. This anecdote also implies
the value of recruiting more such dual-identity individuals to build
these bridges in our society: religious scientists, politician-scientists,
journalist-scientists, religious politicians and other permutations. We
had several such rare individuals at our Conference and they provided
crucial connective tissue.

One of the participating religious leaders at the Conference said
he had come to embrace climate change as a spiritually crucial
issue, but had done so by being exposed to the science and
undergoing something akin to a “conversion experience.” In
other words, it was the science, not the values per se, that were
most persuasive to him, which only then led to his spiritual
interpretation of the issue.

Tradeoffs

Meaningful discussions about values are usually about tradeoffs, not
stand-alone commitments. It is one thing for someone to agree that
climate change is a serious problem, or even to say their values call on
them to do something about it. It is quite another for them to give
climate change a privileged place in a forced ranking of values – or to
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demonstrate behaviorally that they are willing to sacriﬁce something for
it, including through a demonstrated “willingness to pay.”
This was evidenced earlier in our discussion of the perceived
climate/poverty tension. Putting aside potentially overlooked evidence
of the linkages between the two issues, they are frequently perceived as
requiring hard tradeoffs (and they do, in relation to intergenerational
implications). This and other value tradeoffs complicate the application
of values to action in the case of climate change. Economists bring their
arsenal of quantiﬁcation tools in an attempt to reconcile these as much
as possible into one integrated account, but the most intellectually
honest among them concede the limits of their method in quantifying
non-marketed goods and intangibles, and in accounting for potentially
irreversible issues like climate change.

One religious leader at the Conference noted that business
leaders are much more credible messengers to his parishioners
about climate change than environmentalists.
Political scientist Arthur Lupia, a participant at our Conference, has
done celebrated research that relates to this issue of value tradeoffs. He
conducted experiments to ascertain what causes a messenger to be
perceived as credible. In simplest terms, the answer is that speakers
perceived as both knowledgeable and trustworthy are the most credible.
Trustworthiness, however, is not simply a function of character, but
rather the existence of institutional or other contextual penalties
imposed on an untruthful speaker. Listeners are sensitive to the
conditions under which speech is uttered, not just the content. If the
speaker is perceived as facing adverse and probable consequences from
lying (i.e., a tradeoff), then the listener is more likely to give credence to
what they say. (See Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The
Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?
Cambridge University Press, 1998.)
This ﬁnding was exhibited at our Conference in the following way:
One religious leader noted that business leaders are much more credible
messengers to his parishioners about climate change than
environmentalists. Whereas environmentalists are often perceived as
oblivious to the tradeoffs by which climate change policies may produce
job losses in some sectors, business leaders are seen to be clearly
measuring their position on climate change in relation to exactly this job
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loss risk. In other words, the business leader’s expression of concern
about climate change carries real costs and is therefore more credible.
Building on this insight, Recommendation #15 calls for new dialogues
on climate change between business and religious leaders and their
respective constituencies.

packaging climate change as an energy issue

packaging climate change as an energy issue
Frustrated by the inability of climate change to break through as an
urgent public concern, many believe it is best to ﬁnally admit that the
issue cannot stand on its own. Climate change can be packaged with
other issues that have generated more public concern to date – and
energy security is a leading candidate. This is a promising strategy, but
it also risks deemphasizing climate change mitigation as an explicit
societal priority precisely when it needs to move up on the list.
So far we have discussed the challenges and opportunities of communicating the science of climate change and doing more to connect the
issue with the core values, especially religious values, of Americans.
Some at our Conference contended, however, that there is a more
compelling, if indirect, path to promoting societal action on climate
change. In this view, climate change has not been conceptualized or
communicated enough to the general public, and even to many leaders,
as fundamentally an issue of energy. As a result, it has been fraught with
more baggage and complexity than necessary. Some even noted that a
campaign jingle like: “It’s the energy, stupid” could help crystallize this
connection.
If energy is recognized as the linchpin, it becomes possible to reframe
the climate change debate as one about proﬁt-making opportunities (for
many but not all sectors) and interconnections with other valued goals
like energy independence, jobs, national security and even local air
quality. Indeed, the Iraq war, persistently high gas prices, and a growing
awareness of the geopolitical risks associated with importing over 50
percent of our oil, mostly from volatile regions of the world, have
produced a bipartisan energy independence bandwagon that climate
change could jump onto. A 2005 Yale Environmental Poll showed that 92
percent of Americans see our dependence on foreign oil as a serious
national problem, whereas only 66 percent regard climate change that
way.
Accordingly, key leaders at our Conference crafted a summary
statement that garnered broad enthusiasm among the participants
though, as with all the recommendations, not formal sign-off (see box,
next page).
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A Transformative National Effort on Energy

The 2005 Yale F&ES Conference on Climate Change recognized
that there is an urgent need and a compelling opportunity for a
transformative national effort on energy. The rapidly changing
demands of climate stabilization, international competitiveness, national security, and global poverty underscore the
need for urgent national action.
The energy transformation presents a signiﬁcant business
opportunity for almost every sector of the national economy,
including: transportation, fuels, consumer goods and the
agricultural community; ﬂexible fueled vehicles and a renewed
auto manufacturing sector; a modernized national grid system,
linking utilities in a more secure network; an aggressive national
conservation effort, based on excellent initiatives already started
at the state and local level; an initiative on green buildings; and
a major national effort to explore new and far-reaching energy
generation activities.
The achievement of the needed transformation will be greatly
assisted by clariﬁcation by our national leadership of the
policies needed for working in a carbon-constrained
environment (e.g., market-based mechanisms); engaging the
business and ﬁnancial sectors in accelerating reporting related
to their “carbon footprint;” encouraging the insurance industry
to augment efforts to understand and communicate risk related
to climate change; and encouraging the United States to begin
negotiations with the global community on next steps under
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Conference Recommendations #20 and #34 translated key elements of
this vision into a proposed action. Recommendation #20 reads:
“Design and execute a ‘New Vision for Energy’ campaign to
encourage a national market-based transition to alternative
energy sources. Harness multiple messages tailored to different
audiences that embed the climate change issue in a larger set of
co-beneﬁt narratives, such as:
reducing U.S. dependency on Middle East oil
(national security);


packaging climate change as an energy issue



penetrating global export markets with American
innovations (U.S. stature);



boosting U.S. job growth (jobs);



cutting local air pollution (health).”

A number of important private initiatives have been launched to
address the complex issues associated with American energy use, such as
the Energy Future Coalition, Set America Free, Securing America’s Future
Energy (SAFE), the Apollo Alliance, and the National Commission on
Energy Policy. They have drawn news media and public attention for
their breadth of support, including what are widely regarded as unlikely
suspects and unusual bedfellows – showing that this has increasingly
become a fertile arena for cross-domain collaboration.
The initiatives are sector-speciﬁc and in many cases highly detailed in
their prescriptions for action. The Energy Future Coalition, for example,
has helped to forge a promising initiative called “25 x 25”, which holds out
a compelling vision that: “Agriculture will provide 25 percent of the total
energy consumed in the United States by 2025 while continuing to
produce abundant, safe and affordable food and ﬁber.” The initiative is
being led by crop, livestock and tree farmers, as well as horticulturalists,
and energy and policy specialists. Their primary focus is on accelerating
the scale-up of biofuels production, such as ethanol and biodiesel from
dedicated energy crops as well as agricultural waste residues. But their plan
extends to generating energy from wind and solar installations on farms,
as well as from methane gas emissions from agricultural operations.
Given the existence of so many worthwhile initiatives, it is worth
asking whether a new one, as called for by the Conference, is necessary or
not. Answering that requires a fuller assessment of the extent to which
current initiatives are succeeding – and if so, according to what metric?
Do they need to be improved? Would they perform better in fulﬁlling
their objectives if they were more closely coordinated with one another –
or even combined? Or is it better to have different initiatives mobilizing
different constituencies with somewhat distinct emphases in their
messages and prescriptions? Under any of these scenarios, how can we
best ensure that climate change is heavily weighted in their prescriptions,
actions and communications? These are crucial questions that those of us
carrying the Conference recommendations forward must answer.
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The Risks of Issue Packaging – Manageable But Not Trivial

There are clearly beneﬁts to strategically packaging the climate change
issue with energy security and other co-beneﬁts. At the same time, there
are a handful of cautions to observe:


First, there is no guarantee that steps taken to reduce oil imports
will also mitigate climate change. Energy efﬁciency investments
often will. But certain energy supply choices may not. For
example, a race is now on to accelerate the exploitation of U.S.
coal reserves and northern Alberta tar sands. Both will reduce our
dependence on oil imports from unstable regions of the world,
and yet they will exacerbate climate change – unless costly
ancillary steps to capture and sequester carbon emissions are also
taken. This is an inherent risk in any agenda that lists climate
change as an objective, but a subsidiary one – many of the
existing bipartisan energy initiatives referenced above list climate
change in the third or fourth slot of priorities, if at all. If climate
change science is not in the driver’s seat as far as calibrating the
speed and level of our future emissions reductions, we run a
signiﬁcant risk that packaged prescriptions will be inadequate.



Second, energy issues are high on the public agenda today but
could subside, as they have in the past. This seems unlikely, given
signs of heightening geopolitical risks and evidence that oil prices
have ascended to a new and higher equilibrium. But if cheap
energy should come again, or we are able to pull American troops
back from the Middle East, energy could become less of a
preoccupation, taking climate change down with it as part of that
package. Moreover, it is exactly when energy prices fall that energy
overuse becomes more likely, further exacerbating climate change.



Third, subsuming an issue like climate change in a larger
narrative means that one inevitably sacriﬁces some amount of
awareness-building on the climate issue itself. To the extent that
such awareness would otherwise grow cumulatively through
time, it is costly to interrupt that natural process of issue
maturation and growth in societal understanding. At a very basic
level, doesn’t a problem need to be well understood, and explicitly
so, to be solved?



Fourth, climate change is a multi-faceted issue whose causes and
consequences can be portrayed from a variety of angles and in
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relation to many constituencies. This makes it amenable to
audience segmentation and messaging flexibility in a
narrowcasting world (e.g., pitch farmers on the agricultural
biofuels part of the greenhouse gas reduction equation). Yet this
very plurality can be the enemy of public understanding: if an
issue comes to mean many things to many people, how can the
distracted citizen or legislator keep track of it, wrap their mind
around it, and propose to do something about it? This is where
goal-setting becomes important. If the goal is to create a portfolio
of sector-speciﬁc strategies to address climate change, then this
kind of segmented approach makes great sense. If, on the other
hand, one is seeking a concerted national strategy – such as a
stringent cap-and-trade regulation – a greater level of strategic
and messaging coordination is required. This is not to say that
different constituencies cannot have different reasons for
supporting a common policy – they almost always do. But it does
suggest that those managing the packaging exercise described in
this Conference recommendation must be cognizant of this need
for a cumulative and reinforcing focus on climate change among
otherwise disparate initiatives.


Fifth, some contend that it is simply premature and risky to
concede defeat on communicating the climate change issue on its
own terms, since we have not yet applied our best talents to the
task. We have not yet assembled the best data we can on how
public attitudes form, change and persist on climate change (see
Conference Recommendations #25 and #26 about the need to
leverage the social sciences). We have not yet tapped the
enormous marketing and creative talents in America on behalf of
this high-stakes issue. Given this, the climate change issue should
not be packaged with others lightly or out of a sense of
resignation, but only after determining that the beneﬁts of doing
so outweigh the negatives. The various energy initiatives
discussed above should, and will, go forth. The distinct question
we are considering here is the extent to which those pursuing
societal action on climate change should join forces with and
devote resources to the energy independence bandwagon, versus
sustaining parallel efforts more explicitly focused on climate
change per se.
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incentives
It is tempting to reduce the challenge of promoting action on climate
change to matters of communications and strategic positioning. Yet this
will usually only take us part of the way. Translating awareness into
action depends on identifying – and selectively modifying – the deeper
incentive structures at play in our society. Harnessing climate change
objectives to the material incentives to modify energy supply and use
patterns is an important part of the equation. But a more thorough
domain-by-domain analysis of career and organizational incentives
yields additional levers for fashioning a broad-based set of strategies.
We found value at the Conference in digging below the
communications layer to the stratum where incentives shape behavior.
We did not limit this to career incentives, though that became a focus
given the professional identities associated with most of our eight
working groups. Career has become arguably the most identity-deﬁning
feature of life in modern democratic capitalism, and career incentives
almost universally argue against investing time in the climate change
issue – whether understanding it, communicating it, or doing something
about it. Climate change is not in most people’s job description. That’s
both an obvious problem and a vastly underestimated one. In modern
America, job demands have grown to be all-consuming. One takes a big
risk in freelancing beyond their bounds and losing focus on who is
paying you and for what. Employers hire for focus and reward focus.
Part II of this report discusses the incentives in each domain in some
depth, so here only highlights and commentary are provided. The
conversation about incentives is one that could usefully be broadened –
to others in the same domains and beyond them to other domains that
were not represented at our Conference.
Such discussions – of how incentives have impeded action to date –
need not devolve into a negative exercise in hand-wringing. If conducted
with candor and diligence, the insights obtained can profoundly shape
the depth of the subsequent search for solutions.
Incentives often seem implacable, by their very nature. Some are so
interwoven into the fabric of our society that it is almost impossible to
imagine altering them. Many participants at the Conference were ready to
diagnose their own incentive structures, but then recognized the long odds
against changing them and preferred to focus on other, more feasible next
steps.
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Even where incentives appear changeable, one can be forgiven for
asking whether, given the urgency of the climate change issue, resources
would be better invested in more tangible, near-term activities – like
communications campaigns. By the time one succeeds in modifying
incentives in something as slow-changing as the university system, for
example, won’t it be too late to keep greenhouse gas concentrations at an
acceptable level? (What level is that? See the discussion of goal-setting
below.)
And yet it is worth remembering that not all incentive structures are
laws of nature (some are!), but rather are often designed and
administered by human beings. Some of these human beings, therefore,
may be susceptible to the entreaties of determined change-agents. This
will usually be a high-level activity appropriate for change-agents
already in positions of institutional power, or those best situated to
inﬂuence those in power. In other cases, however, such high-level
emissaries may be less important than altering information ﬂows. The
way individuals calculate a response to their incentives may be amenable
to new information. This, for example, is an implied rationale for
Conference Recommendation #34 calling for the business community to
be afforded greater access to new information about the opportunities in
low-carbon technologies.
Academic Scientists’ Incentives: Specialized, Peer-Focused and
Publicity-Averse

What are the incentives of academic scientists to propagate their
ﬁndings throughout society? Scientists are rewarded largely for success
in specialized research and for communicating what they learn to their
peers. Their most striking ﬁndings trickle out to a wider audience, but
the scientiﬁc community, by and large, is a rareﬁed, walled-off world.
Peers are the source of professional esteem, of reviewers for one’s journal
articles, and of the kind of dialogue and collaborative insights that can
be critical to research breakthroughs. Given their proximity to this
incentive-rich network of colleagues, most scientists resist diverting time
to communicating with the media or the public, or injecting their
expertise into the policy fray on issues like climate change. Most are also
sensitive to reputational risks from being seen as too eager to gain public
attention, or from extending beyond the secure core of their knowledge
base amidst policy crossﬁre.
Before presuming that these tendencies should change, it is important
to recognize that many regard them as crucial to the success and
credibility of objective science. This does not mean, however, that the
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disadvantages should not be equally acknowledged when assessing their
implications for the science-action gap on an issue like climate change.
The costs of not having scientists speaking out can be high indeed, given
their very high relative trust ranking in society; a 2005 Yale
Environmental Poll found that 83 percent of Americans trust university
scientists (compared to 62 percent who trust industry scientists and 56
percent who trust their state governor, for example).
Academic incentives are, as noted earlier, tradition-bound and
enormously resistant to change. While many at the Conference thought
changing academia was too steep a mountain to climb, others said its
role as the generator and repository of scientiﬁc knowledge on climate
change justiﬁed mounting a concerted inﬂuence strategy. Accordingly,
Conference Recommendation #3 calls for reaching out at senior levels in
universities – including to the presidents, trustees and tenure-granting
faculty – to identify high-level actions that could modify the ﬁnancial
and reward structures within academia most responsible for inhibiting
scientists from engaging in interdisciplinary research on issues like
climate change and from devoting more of their time to communicating
beyond their peer group.
The key here, as with many incentive structures, is persuading those
in power that they would not be unilaterally “disarming” in a broader
competitive battle if they made a decision to modify the incentive
structures they administer.
Is there, for example, a leading research university that is prepared to
modify its tenure-granting process in a way that values the public
communications exertions and impact of the up-and-coming tenure
candidates? Similarly, is there one that is prepared to truly value the kind of
interdisciplinary research required on climate change, instead of the
traditional level of specialization required for tenure and other forms of
recognition?
If a speciﬁc university, sensing the strategic import of climate change,
answers either question in the afﬁrmative, will it be sending a signal that
will disadvantage those tenure candidates? In other words, if junior
tenure-track faculty seek to adapt to the modiﬁed incentive structure in
this forward-looking university, and nonetheless fail to gain tenure
there, will they still have a chance at other institutions that have not
similarly adapted their evaluative model?
Any university president, provost or university committee that
unilaterally tinkers with the incentive structure that cascades down to
inﬂuence behavior throughout their institution must be cautious about
the potential career harms that could be done, or ultimately the risks to
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the institution as a whole if it populates its faculty with a breed not held
in high esteem elsewhere in academia. These are complicated questions
that cannot be easily answered. But they deserve to be asked, today more
than ever, given the societal stakes on science-driven issues like climate
change. Moreover, the deliberations, once underway, should include not
just those inside academia, but those who fund academia, those who
provide students and tuition to academia, governments who subsidize
academia, and representatives of the broader society that is deeply
affected by what transpires there.

Is there, for example, a leading research university that is
prepared to modify its tenure-granting process in a way that
values the public communications exertions and impact of the
up-and-coming tenure candidates? Similarly, is there one that is
prepared to truly value the kind of interdisciplinary research
required on climate change, instead of the traditional level of
specialization required for tenure and other forms of recognition?

Journalists’ Incentives: Get onto the Front Page

Journalists, for their part, are unlikely to see the climate change story as
their ticket to career advancement. Ambitious journalists will readily
admit that they wake up in the morning aiming to get onto the front
page. What gets them there? Wars, the White House, ﬁres, abductions,
scandals, malfeasance, exposure of villains, and controversy more
generally. Not climate change, except in its most controversial or most
politicized moments. So the most talented journalists tend to gravitate
to other beats, often the political beat since it tends to breed future
editors. There are, of course, exceptions – including some whose
internal compass tells them that this story simply needs to be written
about and others who recognize that the issue may mature to the point
when it will get the prominent coverage it warrants and they’ll be wellpositioned to supply it by having started early.
Meanwhile, it is news editors – not the laws of nature – who determine
day-in and day-out what goes on the front page (albeit constrained, over
time, by market pressures from readers and advertisers). Persuading
editors that climate change is an important topic worthy of recurring
front-page space may well be feasible if a good case can be made, and
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delivered by the “messengers” most credible to them. In this spirit, the
Conference recommended an initiative to foster a series of visits and
conferences whereby respected journalists and editors informed on
climate change can speak to their peer editors, whom the Conference
participants referred to as “gatekeepers,” indicating their control over
many of the on-the-ground incentives operating in the news media
profession (Recommendation #7).
Entreaties from top scientists associated with the proposed bridging
institution (Recommendation #1) – while lacking this peer-to-peer
element – could also be inﬂuential in securing more news coverage and
editorial attention if they succeed in obtaining audiences with key
editorial page editors, managing editors, TV producers, media owners,
columnists, commentators, and anchors, and brieﬁng them on the
stakes.
Educators’ Incentives: Teach to the Test

Teachers are increasingly obligated to concentrate their instruction on
content that is covered by high-stakes exit exams as a result of the
accountability provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). After
an initial focus on mathematics and reading testing, which some argue
has had the effect of de-emphasizing science teaching across the country,
the NCLB law will require state testing on science starting in the fall of
2007. State preparation for this new accountability on science education
provides a valuable window of opportunity for promoting the
incorporation of climate change content.
Until this happens, it is unlikely that most teachers will divert
classroom time to the teaching of climate change. Making it part of the
standards-based curriculum rather than an optional topic will also
mitigate the disincentive teachers face when it comes to teaching
controversial topics that might provoke a parental backlash.
At present, state science standards address earth sciences but rarely
blend in climate change. In some states, climate change receives
parenthetical mention, but to ensure signiﬁcant student exposure and
understanding it needs to be woven in as a signiﬁcant content or subject
area. Conference Recommendation #28 could prove especially
important in favorably modifying the key incentives by incorporating
climate change into state science standards, and by calling for the design
of the climate change curriculum and the training of teachers needed to
fulﬁll those standards.
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Politicians’ Incentives: Limited Accountability on Climate Change and a
Stigma to Boot

No matter how focused on the public interest they may be, the
politicians’ incentive structure is inescapably dominated by the need to
get elected or reelected. Many political candidates, and the operatives
who orchestrate their campaigns, believe that environmental issues –
especially global ones like climate change – offer little opportunity to
carve out electoral advantage. And polling of the public largely bears this
out – only a small minority of the electorate deems the environment a
voting issue (though there is some evidence the Independents in this
group could constitute a swing vote in close elections). In recent
presidential campaigns, nominees who had championed the
environment (and climate change speciﬁcally) throughout their careers
appeared to mute their support because of perceived electoral downsides.

Yet private discussions with campaign operatives reveal that
some indeed perceive a stigma associated with talking about
climate change on the campaign trail, which could render their
candidate susceptible to ridicule or at least to being called “out
of touch” with the concerns of average Americans. Against this
downside, they perceived little compensating upside.
Not everyone agrees with this assessment, contending that the
environment was discussed by the campaigns but not covered much by a
media preoccupied with horse-race coverage and hot-button social issues.
Yet private discussions with campaign operatives reveal that some
indeed perceive a stigma associated with talking about climate change
on the campaign trail, which could render their candidate susceptible to
ridicule or at least to being called “out of touch” with the concerns of
average Americans. Against this downside, they perceived little
compensating upside.
Some polling of political leaders indicates that while they personally
favor action to address climate change, it has not risen to the top of their
legislative agenda, in part because they are unaware of their constituents’
general, though not uniformly urgent, support for action. The public,
according to polling by Steven Kull, also tends to think that their elected
ofﬁcials are doing more about climate change than they actually are. As a
result of this mutual non-awareness, politicians have simply not
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experienced much constituent pressure to act today on climate change.
Consequently, there are relatively few incumbents championing the issue
legislatively today, with a few promising exceptions now seeking to build
on the non-binding “Sense of the Senate” resolution in 2005 favoring a
mandatory cap-and-trade regulation to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
The Conference looked beneath the surface partisanship on climate
change to the underlying structural problems that impede effective
government action on this and other issues. For example, one incumbent
elected ofﬁcial with us spotlighted how the prevalence of safe seats in the
Congress limits the opportunity for issue entrepreneurship on climate
change. When over 90 percent of elected members of Congress face no
plausible threat to their incumbency in a future election, they are simply
less inclined to have to respond to any constituent pressure that can be
mobilized on climate change or any other issue, or to consider the
electoral implications of their inaction.
This implies that those concerned with promoting societal action on
climate change need to also understand and address gerrymandering,
campaign ﬁnance reform, and other determinants of policy outcomes.
Accordingly, Conference Recommendation #24 calls for convening a
group of political scientists, elected ofﬁcials, and campaign operatives to
conduct an analysis and dialogue about the connections between
problems in democratic governance in the U.S. and climate change
speciﬁcally. It would be grandiose to think that this action, alone, could
achieve outright change in these larger political structures, but it could
add an additional rationale to large ongoing efforts to do so (e.g.,
campaign ﬁnance reform), while also ensuring that change agents
focused on climate change craft more sophisticated strategies that reﬂect
the full range of obvious and non-obvious forces at play.
Business and Finance Incentives: Profit and Fiduciary Responsibility

Business and ﬁnancial professionals, for their part, face incentive
structures that, on their surface, are remarkably clear-cut. They are
measured on their proﬁt-making success. Unless and until a particular
business leader sees either a proﬁt-generating opportunity or a probable
cost or risk associated with climate change, their ﬁduciary responsibility
will typically dictate that they ignore the issue, even if a values-based
appeal has succeeded in pricking their conscience about the societal risks.
Within many business organizations, moreover, there are employees
(usually in the government relations department) whose incentives are
sharply deﬁned to minimize regulatory burdens on the ﬁrm by lobbying
diligently against climate change policies. So even if a smattering of
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executives in a corporation grows concerned about climate change, their
organization’s course as a whole may still proceed on auto-pilot in
opposition to climate change action.
A similar type of organizational behavior can cause disconnects
within trade associations. One member business may grow more
receptive to climate change action, while its trade association leadership
remains wedded to the least common denominator position of the most
recalcitrant members. Even apart from this membership inﬂuence, trade
associations face a fundamental incentive to demonstrate how their
unique ability to aggregate and exert the membership’s collective
strength delivers a measurable return by minimizing regulatory
burdens.
The business community is, of course, not monolithic. Some
businesses are large emitters of greenhouse gases and determined to
avoid regulation of any kind, even by funding disinformation campaigns
on climate change science. Some are large emitters who have explicitly
acknowledged the inevitability of regulation and are working to shape it
to their advantage by seeking a predictable price-signal for carbon,
equitability across sectors, and the ﬂexibility to minimize costs (and
avoid stranding their assets) through market-based emissions trading.
Still others are providers of low-carbon technology and assets like
renewable energy or efﬁciency enhancements, and see a proﬁtable
upside from climate change regulation.
So business’ incentive structures, while tied to the proﬁt-making
motive at the highest level of analysis, can and do cause very different
behaviors depending on how the business is situated and how it
calculates risks and opportunities over various time horizons. These
calculations are fundamentally driven by information inputs, and this is
where the Conference identiﬁed a key target of opportunity. Simply put,
participants noted that there is room to do much better in making
businesses aware of the proﬁtable opportunities associated with buying
or selling low-carbon or no-carbon products and services.
Achieving this awareness requires not high-minded exhortations, but
an increasingly tailored approach that begins with the realities of each
business’ capital budgeting and operational framework and proceeds to
supply the analytic and decision-support tools needed to help them
evaluate carbon mitigation technologies on a basis that is
commensurable to other opportunities.
At the Conference, some touted the emissions-reducing efﬁciency
gains immediately available to businesses at a cost-savings, and
expressed puzzlement about why these have not been adopted already.
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But others underscored all the variables that complicate adoption of new
technologies – from ﬁrst-cost obstacles and other ﬁnancing gaps to a
range of other intangible behavioral frictions such as the inertia that
comes from comfort with using the “tried-and-true.” There are, after all,
many positive Net Present Value (NPV) investments that businesses
knowingly do not make – due to limited execution capacity, competition
from other, higher-NPV projects, choices about which activities are
more strategic to the ﬁrm, and many other reasons.
How carbon mitigation ﬁts into all this quickly becomes a complex
picture of the kind that few business leaders have the time to sort out on
the ﬂy, especially in the face of other short-term pressures like quarterly
earnings reports and near-term competitive threats. Accordingly, the
Business & Finance group recommended the creation of an outside
information intermediary to help businesses perform these calculations,
and a set of eight principles to guide them in developing their internal
capacity with respect to carbon-related risks and opportunities.
The ﬁrst of these recommendations calls for the creation and funding
of an R&D-type organization to undertake and disseminate credible and
independent studies of the economic impacts of climate change on a
sector-by-sector basis, as well as of the appropriate solutions
(Recommendation #34). This would be an independent provider of
reliable information free of any advocacy taint, and it would likely do
not only original work but would also aggregate, vet and translate the
many good studies already being done on this subject by academics and,
as available, by private consulting ﬁrms. The envisioned mandate could
also extend to provision of funds to overcome ﬁnancing gaps impeding
adoption of low carbon technologies, including grants to deploy pilotscale technologies for testing and demonstration purposes.
As for the eight principles described in Recommendation #33, these
would help business leaders reduce the enormity of the climate change
issue to a manageable, if still ambitious, to-do list. The principles range
from analyzing the ﬁrm’s carbon proﬁle (including facilities, products,
suppliers) under multiple scenarios and in standardized reporting
formats (i.e., pro forma P&Ls) to developing a company-wide plan to
address the carbon risks and opportunities identiﬁed. To be actionable,
the recommendation would need to be supplemented by detailed
implementation guidance.
Among other beneﬁts, adopting these eight principles would help
American businesses close a growing shortfall with European businesses
in understanding how to measure their potential carbon liability.
American businesses have so far operated without a price on carbon
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emissions, while European companies (and American multinationals
operating there) are now subject to carbon regulation through the
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (the ﬁrst phase of which
runs from 2005-2007). But there are other increasing pressures on
American companies that are starting to affect the way executives and
fiduciaries interpret the climate change issue, from the risk of
shareholder lawsuits to future U.S. regulation that could emerge well
within the life-cycle of investments being made today. Energy price
increases and volatility are already prompting a reexamination of
exposures and trends in the U.S., a process that could usefully be
expanded to include related factors like future carbon liabilities.
The eight-principle framework also calls for education of the CEO
and board members on climate change and its implications. Some may
object that this issue can be handled by a ﬁrm’s risk managers or
government relations department and need not rise to an executive or
governance level. That will remain a valid point of debate as the
principles are promoted and considered for adoption. But consistent
with an overarching Conference theme, the lack of action on climate
change stems partly from the fact that it has often been kept in a silo.
Integrating the issue more fully at the strategic level, at least in
businesses where it is potentially material, should help create a more
robust private sector discourse on, and eventually response to, the
climate change issue. Moreover, executives who are informed may be
more likely to adopt another of the eight principles, which calls for
businesses to engage externally in policy dialogue and to dissociate from
scientiﬁc disinformation campaigns.
One of the most compelling and comprehensible cases for scaling up
the adoption of low-carbon and no-carbon technologies by businesses
across the world comes from S. Pacala and R. Socolow of the Carbon
Mitigation Initiative at Princeton University. Rather than acting as
enthusiasts for any particular technology, they categorize a range of
proven technologies in relation to the overall reductions needed to
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. Others have noted
the disconnect between their somewhat cheerful admonitions that this
can be done and the dauntingly heroic technological scale-up they
prescribe. Nonetheless, their assertion in the journal Science bears
quotation:
“Humanity already possesses the fundamental scientific,
technical, and industrial know-how to solve the carbon and
climate problem for the next half-century. A portfolio of
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technologies now exists to meet the world’s energy needs over
the next 50 years and limit atmospheric CO2 to a trajectory that
avoids a doubling of the pre-industrial concentration. Every
element in this portfolio has passed beyond the laboratory
bench and demonstration project; many are already
implemented somewhere at full industrial scale . . . . It is important not to become beguiled by the possibility of revolutionary
technology. Humanity can solve the carbon and climate
problem in the ﬁrst half of this century simply by scaling up
what we already know how to do” (Science Vol. 305, No. 5686:
968).
Environmentalists’ Incentives: Balancing Mission and Organizational
Perpetuation

At the mission level, environmentalists face strong incentives to address
climate change, especially if they subscribe to the notion advanced by
Professor John Holdren of Harvard University that climate is the
“envelope” within which all other environmental issues are contained. For
example, even conservation-oriented groups that have traditionally
refrained from advocacy on climate change or other issues in favor of land
acquisition are increasingly recognizing that the very ecosystems and
habitats they have preserved from developers are at signiﬁcant risk from
climate change.
Yet this hierarchical mission logic has arguably failed, so far, to harness
the environmental community to a disciplined and organized response to
the issue. For all the dedication that some environmental groups have
shown on climate change, there is today a widespread belief that their
cumulative impact has not as yet been adequate to the need. The
Conference’s incentive analysis helped to illuminate some of the reasons.
First, at the career level, the individuals who lead and work inside
environmental organizations have increasingly taken on a professional
cast, featuring technocratic skills such as legal, policy and scientiﬁc
analysis. No doubt these skills generate measurable and important
results and they align well with private and governmental sector career
pathways, thereby allowing access to top talent. Nonetheless, some
contend that political organizing skills are often missing in these
organizations, along with, in the words of one Conference participant,
the “moral energy” needed to mobilize a broad constituency for action
on an issue like climate change. As we’ve discussed, climate change is
especially well-suited at this strategic moment for values-based
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engagement, but some doubt that environmental groups have the
particular talent base and culture to leverage this dimension of the issue.
Second, once these relatively high-cost and specialized skill-sets are
accumulated in an organization, it is natural to seek the arena offering
the most bang for the buck. This has generally meant that the major
environmental groups focus on speciﬁc policy and legislative issues at
the federal level. While this has often been a good, high-leverage bet in
the past, the locus of activity on climate change has arguably shifted –
for some years now – to state and local action.

For all the dedication that environmental groups have shown on
climate change, there is today a widespread belief that their
cumulative impact has not as yet been adequate to the need.
Third, environmental groups must attend to the ongoing realities of
organizational perpetuation. This includes the need to build
membership and raise money from donors and foundations. In
undertaking these activities, environmental groups have a strong
incentive to frame climate change as an environmental issue, whereas
the issue’s society-wide implications for human well-being could enable
pursuit of a much broader constituency base than those traditionally
responsive to environmental appeals. Some contend that the historical
evolution of the environmental community, including the imperative to
answer to its existing constituency base, renders it unable to effectively
recruit and engage that broader constituency.
Moreover, there is an inescapably competitive element to the pursuit
of organizational perpetuation. On one hand, the environmental
community includes thousands of niche organizations that each
specialize in a subset of issues, localities or even strategies (e.g., litigation
versus land acquisition). If one issue is targeted by too many of these
niche groups at once, then the pressures of membership and donor
competition tend to provide a corrective – leading back toward
specialization or toward organizational demise as the donors cull out the
weaker, redundant groups.
On the other hand, the major environmental advocacy groups have
arguably converged and grown more similar to one another as a natural
result of organizational maturation and expansion. As a result, many of
the key groups now have overlapping memberships, share the same suite
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of strategic capabilities, and ﬁnd themselves jockeying for a competitive
edge that will distinguish them.
The niche groups often assume that others are better positioned to
address an issue of the scope of climate change, by virtue of their size or
strategic capabilities – leading the niche groups to sustain their original
focus on other issues. Some of the major groups, by contrast, have
decided to expand their work on climate change, which then inclines
them to focus on creating a superior and independently brandable
strategy. Competition can, of course, stimulate better strategies, but it
also risks internecine competition for limited donor and membership
support.
Both responses, therefore, present potential problems for the quality
of the overall effort. Many of the niche groups end up depriving the
climate change effort of their local constituency and skills, at a time
when localization is especially needed to generate public engagement.
Meanwhile, the major groups compete and duplicate one another,
sometimes frittering away resources on competition that could be better
spent pursuing coordinated goals.
Many at our Conference, including major donors and foundation
representatives, said that environmental organizations have simply not
done a good enough job of working in partnership with each other on
climate change – whether combining resources or crafting a common,
mutually reinforcing, message on the issue.
So what can be done? These diagnoses imply a range of potential
solutions from the grand to the highly pragmatic. At the grand end of the
spectrum, at least one Conference participant suggested that global
warming should be the animating issue behind a new environmentalism
– one in which entire ecosystems are understood to be at risk, new values
are infused, bigger goals set, organizational walls broken down, and
entirely new levels of integration undertaken between environmental,
energy and economic planning. Redeﬁning the issue in such ways would
require stepping back and forging a new vision, including of the
organizational forms, skill-sets and missions of the “environmental
community.”
Recommendation #36 could serve as a ﬁrst step in the direction of
executing on such a vision, while still being practicable in the very short
term. It calls for the formation of a Leadership Council composed of
senior representatives from a variety of segments of society (business,
labor, academia, government, the NGO sector, medicine, law, public
health, and community leaders) that would “serve as an integrating
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mechanism for developing and delivering a cohesive message to society
about the seriousness of climate change and the imperative of taking
action.”
One could imagine an environmental group-only variant of such a
Council focused on climate change, and indeed environmental NGOs
have reportedly debated the potential value of such a coordinating body
in recent years. Such a Council could usefully address some of the
shortcomings discussed above by mitigating at least the most counterproductive forms of competition and forging a basis for coordinated
action. Some, however, contend that this model of a loose Council
would not be able to counteract the centrifugal forces diagnosed, and
therefore that a new and more centralized organization is imperative.
Making a Council successful will require a clear-eyed response to this
concern. In the end, real tradeoffs will be required, including a major
commitment from the organized environmental community to effect a
large-scale shift of time, talent and money to the climate change issue
and strong backing for this by foundations and other funders.

Many at our Conference, including major donors and foundation
representatives, said that environmental organizations have
simply not done a good enough job of working in partnership
with each other on climate change – whether combining
resources or crafting a common, mutually reinforcing, message
on the issue.
Meanwhile, Conference Recommendation #36 seeks to correct for
some of the limitations of the environmental groups we’ve discussed by
ensuring that the new Council, if formed, would be cross-domain in
composition right from the start – drawing in leaders from many
segments of society beyond the environmental community.
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diffusion of responsibility
After evaluating the incentives operating within each of the eight
societal domains represented at the Conference, it is now worthwhile to
reassemble the pieces and identify patterns cutting across them. Doing
so yields the sobering insight that we are experiencing diffusion of
responsibility on climate change. While no single individual or domain
can plausibly be expected to take solitary charge on this encompassing
problem, many who could assume leadership appears to think it is
someone else’s prerogative, or obligation, to do so. The result: a
leadership vacuum.
Science and the Media

Evidence for the “diffusion of responsibility” thesis emerged most
explicitly in the concurrent and then mixed discussions of scientists and
news media professionals at the Conference. The scientists indicated that
they and their peers are reticent at best about dancing with the media
and, even when they are willing to try, often lack the media skills and
training to do it effectively. Meanwhile, news media professionals said
that they don’t see it as an appropriate role for themselves to draw the
scientists out or coach them on how to make their work on climate
change more accessible or conventionally newsworthy. They express
sympathy for the problem, but are deeply wary of being seen as
conspiring with any subject, including scientists, to get their story in the
media. Few, if any, see it as their job to do media training – that, they say,
is what public relations ﬁrms are for.
Media and Politics

Furthermore, news media professionals admit that they are unlikely to
move climate change out of the “ghetto” of their respective newspapers’
science pages and put it on the political pages unless there are politicians
championing the issue and generating a drumbeat of high-proﬁle
activity. Political leaders, for their part, are prone to follow the agendasetting function of the news media: if a story is not already being covered
with some volume and prominence, politicians are disinclined to
respond to it and to instead favor topical issues that are being covered.
Politicians see this as more than a matter of choice: their constituents
expect them to comment and act on what they, in turn, are reading
about in the media.

diffusion of responsibility

Business and Politics

Business leaders watch political leaders closely to anticipate and decode
signals about their regulatory intentions on climate change and other
issues. While the lack of national political leadership is frequently
described as a key obstacle to meaningful action on climate change, some
business leaders at the Conference noted that this predominant focus on
the political vacuum may “let business off the hook” a bit too easily.
Meanwhile, political leaders are often unprepared to seize the initiative
and move forward with a regulatory program if business leaders –
particularly those in their district or on their donor rolls – have not
indicated a comfort level with the affordability of that program. This
dynamic may, for example, have prompted Massachusetts Governor Mitt
Romney to back away from supporting the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative in late 2005 in the face of business concerns about its costs. (Note:
the program moved forward without him as seven other Northeastern
Governors signed a Memorandum of Understanding and launched the
rule-making phase.) This political deference to business preferences has
caused many to believe that until the business community signals a
sufﬁciently broad readiness, the national government will not move
forward on signiﬁcant climate change policy action in the United States. So
the path forward appears stymied by the “who goes ﬁrst” problem.
Low-Carbon Products and the Chicken-or-Egg Problem

There is also a market-speciﬁc variant of the “diffusion of responsibility”
phenomenon. This can be seen in the relationship between business and
its customers with respect to low-carbon or carbon-neutral products, a
consumer category that has not really taken off yet despite nascent efforts
to sell “green energy” and “carbon offsets.” The eight-principle framework
discussed earlier (Recommendation #33) calls on business to educate its
customers about climate change, specifically about “the carbon
composition of products through websites, labels and bill stuffers, as it
relates to the relevant business.” This would require businesses to
voluntarily disclose the climate change implications of their products and,
in effect, create a market attribute by educating their customers. While
businesses are attuned above all to their customers, participants at the
Conference noted that, so far, few of them are hearing or experiencing
demand from customers for low-carbon or no-carbon product offerings.
This presents an instance of the “chicken-or-egg” problem: Should
businesses create a market or wait to respond to a market? Many Americans
say on surveys that they are prepared to pay a little extra for environmental
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beneﬁts (5-15 percent is one documented range for the “willingness-to-pay”
premium, though a cautious distinction must be made between this stated
willingness and actual behavior). Whether consumers will pay or not, a
prior question is how often they even have the choice to buy a low-carbon
or no-carbon product, reliably and clearly signiﬁed as such. If businesses
wait for consumer demand to be expressed, they’ll be waiting a long time
because vehicles for expressing this demand are scarce.
This is not a unique case in the history of capitalism – businesses
routinely need to decide how far to get out ahead of their customers.
Occasionally, they take the risk of going beyond proven markets and
launching a breakthrough product. The point, here, is that climateneutral products are in this very chicken-or-egg zone right now. Will
consumers become concerned enough about climate change to demand
climate-friendly products and buy those few existing offerings that allow
them to express this demand in sufﬁcient volume to get the attention of
businesses? Or will businesses decide to lead by launching climatefriendly products more broadly, labeled as such?
Businesses will be more inclined to lead and create the market once
they’re convinced their choice will be validated by consumer uptake and
associated proﬁts. This might even provide them with a differentiating
advantage, which has long been a justiﬁcation for eco-friendly branding.
But another approach is for an outside body to initiate a certiﬁcation
program and logo and then promote its adoption by businesses. This can
become self-perpetuating once businesses realize they’ll be at a
competitive disadvantage if they do not sign on. Accordingly, Conference
Recommendation #35 calls for the launch of a certiﬁcation program and
logo that would signify climate-friendly products. This has been
undertaken on related issues, from EPA’s Energy Star logo for energyefﬁcient appliances, which offers collateral beneﬁts for climate change
mitigation, to the Forest Stewardship Council, which certiﬁes wood
products that use sustainably harvested timber.
The recommendation recognizes, however, that there are also dozens of
proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt entities already retailing “carbon offsets” or green
energy produced from renewables. Some analysts have raised concerns
about unevenness in the veriﬁcation standards and quality of these offsets.
For one thing, some of them are much stricter than others about
administering “additionality” rules so that the offsets are genuinely
incremental to what would occur on a business-as-usual basis — in other
words, they really help address climate change. Relatedly, Renewable
Energy Certiﬁcates (RECs) have often been incorrectly regarded as

diffusion of responsibility

equivalent to carbon offsets, even though RECs are often issued to
comply with state government mandates requiring a minimum of energy
sourced from renewable sources – meaning that they may not be causing
any additional reduction in greenhouse gas emissions beyond what
would happen under business-as-usual regulatory compliance.
So while there is no shortage of emerging certiﬁcation and logo efforts,
there may be an opposite problem: too many of them, which diffuses
resources across many initiatives rather than concentrating them on one or
a few that could break through to attain consumer awareness. This
proliferation of initiatives can simply be confusing to the consumer.
Therefore, Recommendation #35 also calls for rationalizing these efforts and
assessing their climate impacts. The result could be either launching a new
and better one or spotlighting and combining the best of the existing ones.
Dialogue as an Antidote to Diffusion

One of the key beneﬁts of our Conference format was that it permitted
mutual and simultaneous recognition of inaction on a domain-bydomain basis. Put simply, it becomes harder to tell yourself that
someone else will lead on climate change if you’re in a room with them
and they’re looking back at you saying the same thing about you.
What this showed is that innovative dialogues can help counter the
“diffusion of responsibility” phenomenon. Such dialogues will not
always be enjoyable – to succeed, they probably need to contain explicit
and uncomfortable discussions about past buck-passing as well as a
readiness by all participants to consider expanding the boundary of their
responsibilities at a time when Americans are already famously timestarved. Unlike many of the Conference recommendations calling for
the launching of campaigns or new entities, the diffusion of
responsibility problem requires a more open-ended type of activity in
the form of organic, unscripted, and authentic dialogues between people
who don’t normally connect. The organizers of these dialogues must be
prepared to let unpredictable dynamics unfold. Some of the proposed
dialogues should be public, others private.
Along the way toward new assumptions of responsibility, such
dialogues could help break down the long-standing stereotypes so
prevalent in debates about environmental issues today. E.O. Wilson, in
writing about the lack of public will to tackle the biodiversity problem,
has lamented “the total-war portraits crafted for public consumption by
extremists on both sides” (Edward O. Wilson, The Future of Life: 152). Yet
he suggests that they are not an insuperable barrier to success: “The
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stereotypes cannot be simply dismissed, since they are so often voiced
and contain elements of real substance . . . But they can be understood
clearly and sidestepped in the search for common ground” (ibid).
The Conference recommended a number of dialogues and interfaces
(religion-business; religion-science; science-news media through the
bridging institution, etc.) that could help counter the diffusion of
responsibility and create new kinds of connective tissue in our society in
relation to climate change. Moreover, there is no reason to limit future
such meetings to the permutations recommended by the Conference.
Nearly every one of the domains represented at our Conference could
usefully meet bilaterally or in multi-domain groups, as well as with other
domains that were not represented – all with a focus on ﬁnding new
forms of collaboration on climate change, and clarifying who will lead.

Put simply, it becomes harder to tell yourself that someone else
will lead on climate change if you’re in a room with them and
they’re looking back at you saying the same thing about you.
One of the participants who joined us in Aspen looked back on the
Conference with a couple months hindsight and said, echoing Marshall
McLuhan, that the “meeting was the message” – meaning that the diverse
assemblage of representatives from different segments of our society working together to candidly diagnose their own accountabilities for a major
problem, and to propose remedies, was unusual and inspirational. Indeed,
the Conference modeled a kind of integrative behavior that often seems
scarce in an era of heightened partisanship and specialization. This participant suggested that “mini-Aspens” could usefully be convened around the
country, modeled loosely on our Conference and drawing in a diverse
group of predominantly local representatives to address climate change.
New Coordinating Mechanisms to Counter Diffusion

Dialogue can serve as an important catalyst to joint understandings and
action – while no panacea, its status in our solution set should be
regarded as secure. Dialogues that recur over time may, as well, become
candidates for at least loose institutionalization, as in the multi-domain
Leadership Council discussed earlier (Recommendation #36).
The enormity of the climate change issue and the need for action on
all levels precludes a single, umbrella-style approach to coordinating all
concerned individuals and entities in America. It would simply be too
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unwieldy. But in a tacit admission that the different elements of
American society have not played “team ball” in addressing climate
change to date, the Conference recommended that new kinds of
coordination be tried. These range from the bridging institution that
would coordinate and translate scientists’ voices on climate change
science (Recommendation #1) to the proposal for a new overarching
communications entity that would help overcome the fragmented
communications efforts on the issue to date (Recommendation #25).
In each case, the Conference participants debated whether a new
entity is required or whether existing ones should be augmented.
Building a new entity can be a resource sink and a way to defer real
action. And, of course, any development plan for a new entity must
begin with a thorough evaluation of the capabilities of existing entities
that currently perform some part of the newly proposed mandate. For
example, how distinct is the proposed Leadership Council from the
existing Apollo Alliance, a broad coalition that has formed a 10-point
plan to produce 3 million new jobs while promoting adoption of clean
energy that reduces greenhouse gas emissions? The American
Association for the Advancement of Science and other organizations,
including advocacy-oriented NGOs with a scientiﬁc focus, already
perform some of the key functions of the proposed bridging institution,
though rarely with a singular climate change focus.
Duplication must be minimized. At the same time, the very real
bureaucratic obstacles and other challenges of kick-starting new
initiatives within existing institutions must also be acknowledged.
Along the spectrum from the loose coordination of a council to a
centralized institution exist many intermediate formats capable of
enhancing the level of societal coordination on the climate change issue.
Recommendation #29, for example, calls for a mechanism that could
allow strategic diversity to ﬂourish while also providing the minimum
required level of coordination so that the various strategies being pursued
might cumulate to a larger total impact. It urges the organization of a
mass grassroots educational campaign to create specifically local
narratives around climate change impacts and solutions. An important
strategic innovation embedded in this recommendation would be to
initiate the campaign with a National Climate Week that would recur on
an annual basis, possibly in September during the hurricane season. This
week would then serve as a focal period of activity, which would reduce
the burden of top-down orchestration of the grassroots campaign since
all organizations could be urged to independently plan events during this
week but otherwise be left largely to their own devices.
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the affliction of partisanship
Climate change is a partisan issue in today’s America. The policy
stalemate in Washington, D.C. has left those committed to action
uncertain about whether a partisan or bipartisan strategy is more
likely to succeed going forward. For all its direct costs, partisanship has
also had profound spillover effects, chilling public engagement on
climate change throughout our society and compelling many people to
take sides instead of collaborating to craft policies and actions as
warranted by the science.
This report has already touched on the issue of partisanship, but it is
so critical to explaining the science action gap that it deserves its own
thematic category. It has also discussed other important societal divisions
that could usefully be bridged, such as that between the religious
community and scientists. But the division between our political parties,
at both the leadership and rank-and-ﬁle levels, is clearly one of the
deepest fault lines in today’s America. It is impeding societal action on
climate change and many other issues on which we can ill afford delay.
Despite glimmers of bipartisanship in the U.S. Senate and in some
Statehouses, climate change today remains the subject of a long-running
stalemate. The direct costs of partisanship are displayed most
ﬂamboyantly in the theater of Washington, D.C., where even tentative
forward steps, such as the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act,
have been held up for years. Partisanship has, by most accounts, grown
more intense and uncivil in recent years. If this can be reduced, whether
by a natural down-cycle or some intentional campaign to boost civic
responsibility among elected ofﬁcials – at least on the issues where we
can least afford it – it could go a long way toward advancing progress on
climate change.
When Did Climate Change Become a Partisan Issue?

The story of partisanship and climate change is a topic that deserves more
analysis and probably book-length treatment to answer fully. But it is
worth exploring a key inﬂection point from our recent past. Partisanship
on the issue intensiﬁed during the 1997 debate over the Kyoto Protocol,
according to an important study conducted by political scientist Jon
Krosnick, a participant at our Conference (see Krosnick et al.,“The Impact
of the Fall 1997 Debate About Global Warming on American Public
Opinion,” Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000: 239-260).
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The Clinton Administration initiated a concentrated campaign to
build support for the Kyoto Protocol on October 6, 1997, at the White
House Conference on Global Climate Change. Krosnick’s content
analysis documents how the volume of media coverage intensiﬁed
during the October-December period of that year, in tandem with the
Administration push. Interestingly, polling of Americans before and
after this period shows that the percentages of Americans who believed
global warming was occurring (77 percent), would continue to occur (74
percent), was a bad thing (61 percent) and constituted a serious or very
serious problem (32 percent) stayed roughly the same.
Underneath this aggregate stability, however, Krosnick found that the
debate had dramatically polarized the population by party, not just in
terms of preferred policies but also perceptions of the problem’s
scientiﬁc validity.
Before the Clinton Administration push and associated media
coverage, for example, the percentage of strong Democrats who thought
global warming was happening (73 percent) was only slightly higher
than the number of strong Republicans who thought so (68 percent) –
a 5 percent gap. Afterward, this 5 percent gap surged to 18 percent. This
pattern was replicated on other questions.
Other more recent data shows that the partisan gap has persisted on
the issue of climate change. Steven Kull’s 2005 PIPA survey found that 62
percent of Democrats perceived a scientiﬁc consensus on climate
change, as compared to just 41 percent of Republicans.

Before the Clinton Administration push and associated media
coverage, for example, the percentage of strong Democrats who
thought global warming was happening (73 percent) was only
slightly higher than the number of strong Republicans who
thought so (68 percent) – a 5 percent gap. Afterward, this 5
percent gap surged to 18 percent. This pattern was replicated on
other questions.
An important question here is whether attitude change is stickier in
the opposite direction: once an issue has become polarized, can that
polarization be reduced on roughly the same timeline, or a faster one?
How would one accomplish this? By varying the partisan identiﬁcation
of the key messengers, for example? This and other mechanisms can and
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should be tested through research in political science, psychology and
other social sciences.
Strategic Uncertainty: Pursue a Partisan or Bipartisan Approach?

Concerted efforts to reduce the polarization, however, will likely only
proceed if there is sufﬁcient agreement among party leaders that doing so
is worthwhile. Interestingly, it appears that such agreement may not exist.
A key strategic problem on climate change, then, is not only the
partisanship itself, but disagreement about how best to respond to it. At
the Conference, we witnessed forceful disagreement between those who
prefer to treat climate change as a partisan issue and others who see the
path forward as one of bipartisan compromise. Each approach suggests
distinct strategies.
The partisan strategy calls for articulating and perhaps expanding the
distinction between the parties on climate change, and then harnessing
the issue to draw votes, achieve victory, and eventually establish a mandate
to assert one’s preferred policy over the objections of the other party.
A bipartisan strategy, on the other hand, would suggest formulating a
middle-ground policy approach that compromises enough on both
sides to establish a basis for near-term legislative advancements on
climate change.

A key strategic problem on climate change, then, is not only the
partisanship itself, but disagreement about how best to respond
to it. At the Conference, we witnessed forceful disagreement
between those who prefer to treat climate change as a partisan
issue and others who see the path forward as one of bipartisan
compromise. Each approach suggests distinct strategies.
Which is more feasible? Which is more likely to attain meaningful outcomes in terms of actually mitigating climate change?
(Unfortunately the answers to these two questions often diverge.)
The proponents of the partisan approach note that this issue has
become so intractably aligned with the partisan divide that any
concessions are unlikely to be reciprocated, resulting in further
marginalization of the climate change issue. Instead, they say the only
way to proceed is to exercise raw political power, wake up the public
about the urgent nature of the issue, create a major public demand for
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action comparable to that which stimulated major environmental
legislation in the 1970s, pursue outright victory at the polls, and prompt
a general realignment in Washington, D.C.
Those favoring a bipartisan approach, on the other hand, prefer to
separate the climate change issue from any partisan agenda so that the ﬁrst
and most feasible steps toward meaningful action can be passed into law
at the earliest possible date – some call this a “purple” strategy (i.e.,
blending blue states and red states). The bipartisan roots of environmental
progress are seen as favoring this model, and spotlighting that history to
the rank-and-ﬁle is seen as one way to mobilize bipartisan support today.
While the Conference participants were not asked to reach consensus,
the prevailing sentiment seemed to favor the bipartisan model. This
became explicit in the case of the “New Vision for Energy”
Recommendation (#20), which many thought would attain its goals
more readily if bipartisan support for it were cultivated.
But the preference for bipartisanship at the Conference was not
unconditional. Pursuit of bipartisan legislation on climate change that is
capable of passage in both chambers of the U.S. Congress, perhaps an
elusive goal in today’s power conﬁguration, should not be permitted to
devolve into a recipe for minimalist or token goals. Rather, any such
legislation should be calibrated according to scientiﬁc evidence of what
emissions reductions are needed, and over what time frame. Ultimately,
testing the “bipartisan possible” against the science is the most
intellectually honest way to choose between a bipartisan and partisan
strategy. If the bipartisan bill that proves feasible is patently inadequate,
it might still be pursued as a transient tactical maneuver, but this should
not thereby rule out pursuit of a sharper partisan strategy and a robust
civic engagement strategy if that is what is ultimately required to
generate action that is commensurate with the science.
Spillover Effects Chill the Societal Dialogue

Perhaps the most underrated consequence of partisanship is that the
aura of controversy it creates has seeped far beyond Washington D.C.
and chilled our society’s overall engagement with the climate change
issue, in ways large and small.
This starts at the cocktail-party level. Many people are conﬂict-averse,
and in polite company, they instinctively avoid raising issues that have
partisan content because of the risk of damaging relationships between
family members or friends. Climate change appears to have fallen into
this category of risky issues, which impedes the ﬂow of information and
the values-based dialogues that might otherwise occur. A lack of cocktail
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chatter may seem like a trivial matter, but if one substitutes enough
dysfunctional silences where conversation might otherwise have
occurred, the vibrancy of our democracy is undermined and our ability
to contend with issues like climate change is compromised.
Moving to the workplace, many Americans are prohibited by the taxexempt status of their organizations (or other dictates of protocol or
decorum), from lobbying and, more importantly, are discouraged from
saying anything that might even be perceived as such. In this way, also,
partisanship and controversy cast a long shadow. School teachers
reportedly exhibit reluctance to teach the issue for fear it will provoke the
ire of parents. Climate scientists risk character assassination – and
possibly their funding – if they enter the public domain and speak out on
the public policy implications of their ﬁndings.
The politicization of the climate change issue has also reverberated
through the business community. We heard at the Conference that some
business leaders have been privately told not to take a forthcoming
stance on the issue by elected ofﬁcials who are important to their ability
to get things done, such as the issuance of permits for new facilities.
Some noted that this begins to sound like a sort of “upside down”
democracy, where politicians are lobbying their constituents rather than
the other way around.
Defusing Partisanship – At Least on Climate Change

The Conference did not presume to solve the issue of partisanship in
America, but did pose several ways to potentially detach the issue of
climate change from the larger stalemate.


First, it recommended a purple strategy to promote transformation of our nation’s energy system (Recommendation #20).
This report has discussed the compelling argument that the
ongoing reevaluation of U.S. energy strategy may be the best
wagon to which the climate change issue could be hitched,
provided the cautions mentioned earlier are heeded.



Second, given the problems of taking partisanship head-on,
Recommendation #23 calls for a work-around whereby party
elders no longer in ofﬁce would convene to explore and develop
areas of common ground on the climate change issue. Then, and
only then, they would privately caucus with incumbents in their
respective parties to seek to ameliorate the partisan dynamic at
play on the climate change issue.

the affliction of partisanship



Third, two other recommendations viewed religion and morality as
pivotal to shaking up the partisan entrenchment on climate
change. Recommendation #14 urges that the religious community
communicate the urgency of addressing climate change to the
nation’s political leadership and Recommendation #21 advises that
climate change be “recast” as a “moral and faith issue, not a
scientiﬁc or environmental one,” and that a broader coalition of
allies be catalyzed “around this moral common ground.”
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setting goals
Those working to promote societal action on climate change need to do
a better job of formulating goals that are capable of promoting
convergent strategies by dispersed and often uncoordinated actors, and
commensurate with a real solution to the problem. In order to guide
and motivate needed actions, these goals should be generated
collaboratively, scientiﬁcally calibrated, quantiﬁable, trackable and
easily expressible. They should include not only emissions targets but
also, given the crucial importance of “public will,” attitudinal targets.
We found among the Conference participants a widespread view that
those working to promote action on climate change can and must do
better in coordinating their efforts around common goals. There are
acknowledged exceptions that are handling the goal-setting task with
admirable skill. For example, the 25 x 25 initiative discussed earlier has
coordinated a coalition of interests around the quantiﬁed and easily
expressible goal of having U.S. agriculture provide 25 percent of the total
energy consumed in the United States by 2025. Meanwhile, 219 American
cities (and counting) have pledged to fulﬁll the Kyoto Protocol’s
emissions reductions target, in recognition of the value of a salient and
widely referenced policy goal over a customized one. Policy advocates
have, for years now, coordinated around the policy goal of passing the
McCain–Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act in the Senate to institute
a cap-and-trade program to limit greenhouse gas emissions to 2000
levels by 2010. Others have worked for decades to raise CAFE standards
for automotive fuel efﬁciency.
These continuing efforts deserve support from those concerned
about climate change. But they arguably have limitations as the basis for
a sufﬁciently broad and long-term strategy for the nation, either because
they are sector-speciﬁc (agriculture or automotive), too short-term
(Kyoto expires in 2012 unless extended), too incremental to be
scientiﬁcally defensible, etc.
An integrated national goal could indeed package and build on the
best of these ongoing efforts. But to get to a robust national goal that has
the features described above will require more by way of cross-domain
dialogue that reflects and reconciles science, values, economics,
communications and all the other considerations covered above.
The fact is that meaningful differences remain in the nature and
stringency of goals advocated by those concerned about climate change.
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In some cases, this appears to be a function of key stakeholders not
having enough information – scientiﬁc, economic and otherwise – to
judge what an appropriate goal should be, or an ability to integrate these
types of information.
One reason that goal-setting among those working on climate change
is often untethered from science is that most scientists have been
reluctant to speak out or to impose what they see as value judgments by
declaring certain levels of emissions as “dangerous.” Exceptions include
prominent NASA scientist James Hansen who has recently said that if we
do not keep additional warming under 1° Centigrade (1.8° Fahrenheit),
we may cross dangerous tipping points. His estimate is that this implies
a window of 10 years to begin signiﬁcant emissions reductions. The
White House has allegedly sought to restrict Hansen’s outspokenness, a
controversy that has drawn much media coverage including a March
2006 story on 60 Minutes.
A second key challenge impeding the application of science to goalsetting is that data on the impacts of climate change are still incomplete,
often unquantiﬁable and difﬁcult to link to speciﬁc greenhouse gas
stabilization targets. The IPCC’s report in 2001 conceded that “. . .
comprehensive, quantitative estimates of the beneﬁts of stabilization at
various levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases do not yet exist.”
Moreover, the impacts data that do exist are rarely organized around
time frames that map to the needs of policy-makers aiming to specify a
path of emissions targets.
Without such “bright lines” supplied by the scientists, other factors –
especially economic or political feasibility – tend to drive goal-setting.
The Four Paradoxes of Urgency

A recurring theme among those seeking to create “public will” and
action on climate change is that of “urgency.”
Urgency is an inherently subjective concept and yet a pivotal one
given that it often mediates the connection between intention and
behavior. What is it? It is a condition or sensation associated with a
“pressing necessity” (American Heritage Dictionary). It is one of those
“know it when you see it (or feel it)” concepts. Those who sense the
urgency of climate change are impatient for action. Those who don’t
sense the urgency don’t get what all the fuss is about. So how “urgent” is
the public about climate change?
Steven Kull’s 2005 PIPA poll found that a full 76 percent of Americans
believe that global warming is a problem that requires action, with only
21 percent opposing any steps with economic costs. But he also found a

81

82

americans and climate change

signiﬁcant split on the matter of perceived urgency: 42 percent of the
total said the effect of global warming “will be gradual, so we can deal
with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost,” and 34
percent said the problem is “pressing” and “we should begin taking steps
now even if this involves signiﬁcant costs.”
A June 2005, ABC-Washington Post poll revealed substantially the
same ﬁndings: “Nearly six in 10 Americans think global warming likely
is underway and as many accept that human activities play a signiﬁcant
role. But – like the Bush Administration – most part company with
scientists’ calls for prompt action. That lack of urgency stems from
perceptions of the hazards: While a vast majority, nearly eight in 10
believe global warming will pose a serious threat to future generations,
far fewer – just one-third – think it’ll affect their own lives. The majority
who see the risk as a distant one overwhelmingly prefer more study to
immediate action.” The poll also noted that only 38 percent of
Americans view global warming as an “urgent problem that required
immediate government action.” At least four paradoxes associated with
urgency are worth considering.
Paradox #1: How to Be Urgent About the Unknown

A major wild card in society’s calculations on climate change is the
potential for non-linear climatic surprises ahead. Scientists broadly
agree that the climate system is unpredictable and rife with unknown
thresholds, that it can ﬂip like a switch from one state to another in
abbreviated periods and that we do not – and probably cannot –
develop precise estimates of the likelihood and timing of such events.
One of the most prominent such scenarios is a potential weakening or
collapse of the thermohaline circulation that brings warm Gulf water to
the North Atlantic and keeps especially Western Europe habitable. But
there are many others. Scientists have increasingly expressed surprise
about the acceleration of certain events, from the collapse of the massive
Larsen B ice shelf on the Antarctic Peninsula over a 35-day period starting
in January 2002 to more recent NASA satellite observations indicating the
quickening of the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. In 2005, scientists
returning from a massive Siberian peat bog indicated that its permafrost
layer was melting rapidly and could release enormous quantities of
trapped methane, a potent greenhouse gas (the west Siberian bog alone is
estimated to contain approximately 70 billion tons of methane, a quarter
of all the methane stored on the land surface worldwide). Other scientists
are now assessing how acidiﬁcation of the oceans from absorption of
carbon dioxide may imperil the viability of ocean life.
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Some economists argue that we need only take gradual action to
reduce emissions since, by their calculations, the marginal costs of
investing in near-term emissions mitigation outweigh the present value
of net future beneﬁts and costs delivered for that investment. Putting
aside intractable debates about the right discount rate, this line of
argument typically moves too quickly past the issue of non-linear
surprises. Some simply dismiss such scenarios as “not probable.” This
omits that many of these scenarios are not improbable either. Scientists
often refrain from assigning probabilities to non-linear scenarios
because probabilistic methods are not appropriate for some of them and
the models are not equipped to predict them.
So given all this, we have something of a paradox. It is difﬁcult to
create urgency about avoiding something unknown and unknowable –
and to craft communications that motivate action on this diffuse basis.
And yet, as far as we know, we may be currently and inadvertently
crossing thresholds we do not recognize – entraining irreversible
consequences.
The “precautionary principle” asserts that we should err on the side
of caution in the face of this uncertainty, but this principle has not
shown a capacity to galvanize public will to date.

It is difficult to create urgency about avoiding something
unknown and unknowable – and to craft communications that
motivate action on this diffuse basis. And yet, as far as we know,
we may be currently and inadvertently crossing thresholds we
do not recognize – entraining irreversible consequences.
Urgency is difﬁcult enough to generate on any problem characterized by
cause-effect time lags, but this challenge is compounded with climate
change because the lags are themselves of uncertain duration and the
severity of the consequences at intervals along the way still poorly
understood.
Conference Recommendation #2 seeks to address the impact of this
information limitation, to the extent possible, by urging that research
priorities on climate change be reoriented to “be more responsive to
society’s information and decision-making needs” including greater
emphasis on non-linear consequences and feedbacks that could inform
society’s level of urgency on climate change.

83

84

americans and climate change

Paradox #2: Urgency Is a Relational Function Between Science and
Power Plants

Even if potential non-linear impacts could be quantiﬁed and projected,
this would not complete our equation. That is because urgency, when
translated from a sensation to action, is not only about the science but
about the timing of investment decisions and the inertia of our capital
infrastructure.
The lock-in of investments in long-lived centralized energy
infrastructure assets will commit us to decades of rising emissions from
those sources, putting aside the unpalatable option of premature
retirement of capital down the line. This is obvious to many who work
on the climate change issue or in the energy industry. Yet it has been the
source of epiphanies for powerful leaders seeking to calculate the relative
urgency of action on climate change.
A quick anecdote illuminates the point. One leader in the “carbon
ﬁnance” arena described a private meeting with an elected ofﬁcial who
is active in the legislative maneuvering on climate change. In the course
of that conversation, the ofﬁcial had an epiphany that intensiﬁed his
sense of urgency.
The turning point was the ﬁnancier’s mention of ongoing plans to
construct nearly 120 traditional pulverized coal-ﬁred power plants in the
U.S. alone over the coming years (sending U.S. coal use up at least 40
percent over the next twenty-plus years). China reportedly has plans to
construct four to ﬁve times that number. These plans create a surprisingly
narrow window of opportunity to act if one wants to reduce emissions.
Note that this urgency-inducing information is about investment
cycles. As such, it is distinct from scientiﬁc information about what
greenhouse gas concentrations and near-term pathways may be
“dangerous.” In other words, the urgency equation requires inputs of
both kinds to produce an appropriate answer. It is about matches and
mismatches between the dictates of science and the dynamics of capital
formation and deployment over time.
Some at the Conference reported having heard others in the business
community say they’re “deeply concerned” about the climate change
issue and “when it starts happening, we’ll address it.” This sentiment
misses on two scores: it fails to grasp the time-lagged nature of climate
change and, just as problematically, the tight relationship of the science
to the lock-in problem associated with infrastructure and other inertial
drivers of our society’s greenhouse gas emissions.
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Paradox #3: Communicating Urgency Explicitly May Diminish Urgency

As discussed earlier, social psychologists have documented how people
ﬁlter and discount messages they receive based on various attributes of
the messenger, such as perceived trustworthiness and knowledgeability,
not to mention cultural, gender, attractiveness and other traits. In
separate strands of inquiry, scholars study the persuasiveness of the
messages themselves, independent of the messenger. Then they explore
how the interactive effects between the messenger and the message
inﬂuence the listener.
At the Conference, we heard anecdotal evidence, pending more
rigorous veriﬁcation, that messages of urgent concern may be even more
heavily ﬁltered and discounted than messages lacking that feature,
particularly if delivered by distrusted messengers. One religious leader
indicated that messages of “urgency” on climate change often provoke a
backlash among his constituents. Urgency is especially prone to being
discounted as unreasoned alarmism or even passion.
Climate change is an issue that is so grand in its scope and
consequences that it can become identity-deﬁning for those most
involved in advocating on it. In the aftermath of a 20th century deﬁned
by ideological extremism and movements, many Americans today have
an understandable suspicion of any and all claims of urgent needs for
societal transformations (including to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas
emissions), as well as to those who advocate most passionately for them.
What this suggests, paradoxically then, is that the best way to generate
urgency may not always be to explicitly or overtly communicate urgency.
Urgency may instead be a condition or sensation that people must
internally generate. Trying to impose it on them may, at least in some
cases, be counterproductive.
This likely varies based on the trustworthiness of the messenger, but at
this point we are speculating – further social science research is needed.
Paradox #4: Which Comes First: The Urgency or the Goal?

Should “urgency” drive goal-setting or be derived from the goal once its
attendant demands are clear? Urgency is an imprecise and elastic guide
to action, one that is difﬁcult to operationalize:


urgency can mean that we must get started now on emissions
reductions, at whatever stringency level is feasible to negotiate
and implement – the key is just to get going.
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urgency can mean that we must put a binding long-term plan in
place now, even if the early-year targets are lenient and the
stringent targets do not hit until many years out.



urgency can mean that we must, now at last, grasp the true
dimension of the climate change challenge and undertake a bold
rethinking that will disdain incremental steps and be steadfastly
unsatisfied with anything less than substantial emissions
reductions commensurate with the science, including a safe
margin for error.

The common denominator across these meanings is that something is
expected to happen now, but this says little about exactly what that is.
Urgency does inﬂuence the strategic instruments one will be inclined to
favor. For example, those with a sense of urgency will, even if they have
not formulated specific goals, tend to favor the Conference
recommendations calling for advertising campaigns over slowerburning education initiatives.
Recognizing the catalytic power of a sense of urgency, Conference
Recommendation #6 calls for the convening of “one or more dialogues
free of economic and political compromises to undertake a fundamental
redeﬁnition of the climate change challenge in light of its urgency.”
This recommendation implicitly says that we are now boxed into an
overly narrow set of concepts, assumptions, and feasibility calculations.
By assembling those who have different perspectives on the urgency of
climate change and different views about the right next step, new frames
of reference could be developed and convergent actions identiﬁed.
Such dialogues could be highly useful, as long as they conclude by
circling back to the core organizing need of specifying an actionable
goal. While our Conference did not seek to attain consensus on
appropriate national goals, its recommendations call for fostering a
number of venues where disciplined goal-setting could usefully be
undertaken with the right stakeholders and processes.
Given its importance, some general points and context on goal-setting
will now be provided, distinguishing between emissions-reduction targets
and attitudinal targets.
Emissions Reduction Targets

In formulating climate change goals, we are naturally inclined to start with
“targets and timetables” for emissions reductions (and allow for marketbased trading to reduce overall compliance costs) since this has become the
dominant strategy in the global response to climate change to date.
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This “cap-and-trade” model is embodied in the Kyoto Protocol, which
imposes an aggregate reduction target of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels
averaged over the 5-year period 2008-2012, with each country’s target
varying based on case-by-case negotiations.
Within this basic framework, there are many other design options
and variations to consider (for example, sector-by-sector targets or
emissions-intensity reductions indexed on a per unit of GDP or per
capita basis, rather than caps on absolute emissions), but these are
beyond the purview of this report.
Given our focus in this Conference on the U.S., it is also worth noting
that the U.S. government has continued to refrain from ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol and instead announced on July 28, 2005, an alternative
technology development and diffusion strategy that forgoes any
overarching cap on emissions. Known as the Asia Paciﬁc Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate, it includes Australia, India, Japan, the
People's Republic of China, South Korea, and the United States.
Against that background, our Conference did not spend a great deal
of time debating different emissions target levels as a whole. But the
Business & Finance group’s eight-principle framework included a goal
that we will unpack here to illuminate the context and issues associated
with goal-setting on climate change (Recommendation #33). The
group’s goal reads: “Support a long-term goal for global greenhouse gas
emissions from all segments of the U.S. economy at or below today’s
levels by 2050.” This goal is:


pegged to 2005 emissions as a baseline, which is somewhat less
stringent than the Kyoto Protocol’s 1990 baseline, when emissions
were lower.



a longer-term target than Kyoto, thereby following most leading
policy-designers working on climate change in recognizing that a
vital attribute of an effective goal on this issue is that it be long-term.
As S. Pacala and R. Socolow put it, in favoring a mid-century target:
“The next 50 years is a sensible horizon from several perspectives. It
is the length of a career, the life-time of a power plant, and an
interval for which the technology is close enough to envision”
(Science Vol. 305, No. 5686: 968).



a point-year emissions target that leaves open what the emissions
path and interim targets between now and 2050 should be,
though the implication is that one would want to avoid
signiﬁcant increases in the meantime since that would force
deeper reductions later, as 2050 approaches.
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ambiguous, and therefore open to a crucial negotiation, on
whether 2050 emissions should be held to today’s levels or
reduced, potentially by the 60 percent or greater amount that
many experts now believe will be needed by that time (see more
on this below).



silent on what should happen after 2050, whereas many experts
contend that the second half of the century will need to be a
period of signiﬁcantly reduced emissions, converging on net zero
emissions, if we are to stabilize concentrations in the atmosphere,
rather than simply add to them at a level rate.

While our entire Conference, and this goal, intentionally focused on
the U.S., we should note that a major challenge ahead is how to ensure
inclusion of all major emitting countries – including developing
countries – in a climate change goal, since failure to do so will not solve
the problem. That, of course, is the most famous oversight in the Kyoto
Protocol, which served as a fatal Achilles heel for its opponents to exploit
in domestic advertisements that said, to great apparent effect: “It’s not
global and it won’t work.”
Various ingenious models for bridging developing countries into a
post-Kyoto compliance regime have been advanced by experts in
market-based mechanisms such as Robert Stavins of Harvard University
and others. They include, for example, proposals through which
developing countries would incur increasingly stringent emissions
reductions targets at trigger points along the trajectory of their increases
in average per capita income. This would allow them an allocation of
atmospheric capacity sufﬁcient to advance their developmental needs
over time, while eventually bringing them into line with the global
imperative to stabilize concentrations.
The present U.S. Administration has objected to the Kyoto Protocols
as draconian. Indeed, given the emissions growth since 1990 (2004
emissions in the U.S. were 15.8 percent above 1990 levels), achieving the
Kyoto targets in the short time remaining would be difﬁcult, if not as
economically damaging as the Administration has contended. As a
reference point, Canada, which has ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol has also
experienced rapid economic growth since 1990 and seen its emissions
rise 24 percent. It is now struggling with how to comply with its Kyoto
obligation, and some say that its failure is all but inevitable.
What is striking, then, is that the Kyoto targets are both challenging
and, in scientiﬁc terms, inadequate. Those who have advocated for Kyoto
ratiﬁcation and compliance have therefore been in the uncomfortable
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position of calling for a costly solution that won’t solve the problem.
Robert Stavins’ verdict on Kyoto: “Too little, too fast.”
On the other hand, the proverbial journey of a thousand miles begins
with the ﬁrst step and the Kyoto Protocol is directionally correct, unlike
our current business-as-usual trajectory toward ever-growing emissions.
Had U.S. ratiﬁcation occurred soon after its 1997 completion, Kyoto
would have entered into force much sooner than February 2005. U.S.
ratiﬁcation, moreover, would have sent a signal to its domestic market,
the most entrepreneurial in the world, and we would have been on a
lower emissions path. Furthermore, earlier ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto
Protocol would have meaningfully underscored the seriousness of the
industrialized world about addressing climate change, potentially
drawing developing country participation into the next phase. Kyoto was
not designed to “work” in terms of solving the problem by itself – its very
timetable makes clear that it was but a ﬁrst step.
As it is, the post-Kyoto regime is now a matter of great suspense, and
the latest round of negotiations – at the Montreal “Conference of the
Parties” in December 2005 – was ambiguous in terms of building
conﬁdence that the world is on track for an effective goal-setting effort
on climate change.

What is striking, then, is that the Kyoto targets are both
challenging and, in scientific terms, inadequate. Those who have
advocated for Kyoto ratification and compliance have therefore
been in the uncomfortable position of calling for a costly
solution that won’t solve the problem. Robert Stavins’ verdict
on Kyoto: “Too little, too fast.”
What should the goal be? Experts usually start from a maximum
acceptable temperature increase consistent with minimizing the risks of
a wide range of damages, and work back from that to atmospheric
concentration levels for greenhouse gases that would, based on current
modeling, be likely to keep temperatures under that targeted ceiling.
If we stay on a business-as-usual trajectory, the scenarios from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show atmospheric
concentrations rising anywhere from 90 percent to 250 percent (i.e., 530
to 970 parts per million) over the benchmark pre-industrial level of 280
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parts per million by the year 2100. (The current concentration is
approximately 381 parts per million.)
In 2005, the European Union formally reafﬁrmed its view that the
global mean temperature increase should not exceed 2° Centigrade (3.6°
Fahrenheit). Models indicate that preventing this level of temperature
increases will require stabilization of carbon dioxide levels at somewhere
between 450 and 550 parts per million by 2100, or less than a “doubling”
of the pre-industrial level. But this remains a probabilistic game
complete with bands of uncertainty and unknown triggers that could
cause abrupt climate changes along the way.
So given this stabilization goal and its associated uncertainties, then
the issue turns to what the pathway to that goal should be (i.e., how
stringent should the near term targets be, and what is the extended timepath of targets thereafter?).
One of the most thoughtful discussions of the need to begin
greenhouse gas emissions reductions without further delay (and by how
much to reduce them) can be found in Malte Meinshausen et al., “MultiGas Emission Pathways to Meet Climate Targets” (Climatic Change,
Vol. 5, No. 1-2, March 2006). Consistent with our earlier discussion about
the limited dissemination of scientiﬁc ﬁndings, it is probably safe to
assume that most readers of the present report do not have this issue of
Climatic Change on their bedside table, so we reprint the conclusion of
this important article here, with emphases added:
“Achieving climate targets that account for, say, the risk of
disintegrating ice sheets (Oppenheimer, 1998; Hansen, 2003;
Oppenheimer and Alley, 2004) or for large scale extinction risks
(Thomas et al., 2004) almost certainly requires substantial and near
term emission reductions. For example, to constrain global-mean
temperatures to peaking at 2° C above the pre-industrial level with
reasonable certainty (say > 75%) would require emission reductions
of the order of 60% below 1990 levels by 2050 for the GWP-weighted
sum of all greenhouse gases . . . If the start of signiﬁcant emission
reductions were further delayed, the necessary rates of emissions
reduction rates were even higher, if the risk of overshooting
certain temperature levels shouldn’t be increased (den Elzen and
Meinshausen, 2005; Meinshausen, 2005).
Thus, since more rapid reductions may require the premature
retirement of existing capital stocks, the cost of any further
delay would be increased, probably non-linearly. There are a
number of other reasons why one might want to avoid further
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delay. Firstly, future generations face more stringent emission
reductions while already facing increased costs of climate
impacts. Secondly, the potential beneﬁts of ‘learning by doing’
(Arrow, 1962; Gritsevskyi and Nakicenovi, 2000; Grubb and
Ulph, 2002) were limited due to the more sudden deployment
of new technology and infrastructure. Thirdly, a further delay of
mitigation efforts risks the potential foreclosure of reaching certain
climate targets. Thus, a delay might be particularly costly if, for
example, the climate sensitivity turns out to be towards the
higher end of the currently assumed ranges (cf. Andronova and
Schlesinger, 2001: Forest et al., 2002: Knutti et al., 2003).”
Let us ﬁrst acknowledge that this excerpt, while authoritative, is not
emblematic of the accessible language we must increasingly see in
communications to the general public about climate change goals. This is
a journal article intended primarily for scientists and other inside
specialists. Someone needs to translate and carry this kind of work to key
constituencies and the general public – see Conference Recommendation
#1 calling for a bridging institution capable of fulﬁlling this need.
Meanwhile, in interpreting the authors’ bracing conclusion, it is
worth noting that even the +2° C global average warming (+3.6° F)
ceiling cited here may prove too lenient to prevent ice sheet melting,
widespread coral bleaching, ecosystem disruption, agricultural losses
and other adverse consequences. That +2° C rise would be over three
times the warming experienced in the 20th century.
Moreover, the 60 percent reduction by 2050 called for here is a globally
averaged reduction target. The industrial countries, and especially the
United States, would, in all likelihood, have to make deeper cuts to allow for
inevitable acceleration of developing country emissions. Thus, the longterm target announced by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in
June 2005 to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases to 80 percent below 1990
levels by 2050 is close to what could be expected for the United States as a
whole under the prescriptions advanced in the article.
As noted earlier, the February 2006 U.S. EPA draft of the National
Emissions Inventory estimates that U.S. emissions grew 15.8 percent
from 1990-2004, so any targeted cuts below 1990 levels, as called for
above, would need to account for the fact that we are already well above
1990 levels today – further compounding the reductions that would be
needed.
Of course, the relative urgency of undertaking near-term emissions
reductions in line with this article’s conclusion is not without
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controversy. For example, some economists have argued that the
optimal emissions reductions plan is to start modestly. Then, if damages
rise more quickly in the future than expected, stringency can be
tightened. In this view, short-term targets are often favored over longterm ones since it is posited that humanity can learn in the interim and
shouldn’t foreclose future options. One might counter that this does not
account adequately for the path-dependence of our emissions trajectory
and the likelihood that future reduction costs will be higher once highemitting infrastructure is locked in. Moreover, in the absence of longterm targets, and the price signal they send, businesses may lack the
regulatory predictability needed to guide long-term capital budgeting,
including investments in low-carbon infrastructure.

Meanwhile, in interpreting the authors’ bracing conclusion, it
is worth noting that even the +2° C global average warming
(+3.6° F) ceiling cited here may prove too lenient to prevent ice
sheet melting, widespread coral bleaching, ecosystem
disruption, agricultural losses and other adverse consequences.
That +2° C rise, incidentally, would be over three times the
warming experienced in the 20th century.
Another line of argument from those advocating modest rather than
urgent action is based on studies showing potential beneﬁts of climate
change at certain latitudes, usually in polar and mid-latitude regions, at
least up to 2.5° C (4.5° F) of warming in the latter case, with damages
expected to set in if temperatures go higher than that. These
methodologies frequently sum up these potential beneﬁts with warminginduced damages in other regions, such as the sub-tropics. One might
counter that it is simplistic to sum positives and negatives across
geographies like this. Won’t sub-tropical damages cause global
ramiﬁcations, environmentally and socially, including for those living at
latitudes supposedly beneﬁtting from the changes (mass immigration
pressures and other potential consequences)? Moreover, such projections
may reﬂect exaggerated conﬁdence in humanity’s ability to engineer a soft
landing precisely after the interim pleasantness leading up to 2.5° C
concludes, but before the potentially dangerous changes kick in thereafter.
It is also important to discern whether such studies analyze the
benefits or damages beyond a single sector, such as agriculture;
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extrapolating from one sector to economy-wide implications is rarely
warranted. Scientists and economists have, in fact, distinguished
different sectors based on the shape of their “damage curves” in relation
to different temperature levels. Some find that while agriculture,
terrestrial ecosystems and forests may yield interim productivity gains
up to some, difﬁcult-to-estimate temperature threshold before turning
negative, other sectors like coastal and marine ecosystems are more
likely to experience damages even during initial temperature increases.
Finally, calls for modest and short-term goals may fail to reﬂect the
risk of non-linear, abrupt change or potentially irreversible thresholds.
The standard, linear economic method of quantifying and discounting
future damages cannot really capture these largely incommensurable
risks along the way.
The point here is not to presume to resolve such long-running and
complex debates in these pages, but to spotlight brieﬂy how important
it is for American society to engage much more fully on the myriad
dimensions of this enormously important goal-setting exercise.
Currently, this is largely a debate of inside specialists, in part because the
technical nature of the content creates obstacles to public participation.
But the relevant work – in its scientiﬁc, economic and other variants –
can and should be translated into more accessible terms so that
American values and interests can be engaged, honest tradeoffs debated
and choices made about how we will address the challenge of climate
change. We need to broaden the debate and bring it out into the light.
Attitudinal Targets

Targets and timetables can be proposed by policy specialists and pursued
with the beneﬁt of intricate trading schemes, but ultimately they will
only be implemented if there is an adequate base of public support and
“will.” Given this, we now turn to a relatively neglected area of goalsetting in the climate change arena, that of measurable attitudinal
targets, which may be crucial precursors to the setting of emissions
reductions targets and other actions on climate change.
It is not, of course, easy to ascertain with any precision what attitudinal
base of support one needs in order to pave the way for a certain emissionsreduction target, since this depends centrally on the conﬁguration of
constituencies at play at a given moment. One would intuitively expect
that more stringent emissions targets (i.e., those likely to impose greater
costs or lifestyle adjustments) would require more stringent attitudinal
goals, meaning, for example, a greater percentage of Americans saying
they think climate change is a serious or very serious problem.
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Pollsters typically gauge support levels for certain policy actions by
seeing if they hold even if the respondent is told that signiﬁcant costs
would be entailed. While this presumably helps to ferret out the most
committed supporters of a policy, the reliability of oral representations
about a readiness to incur costs is questionable, as opposed to behavioral
evidence that they actually do agree to incur it.
So what kinds of attitudinal targets could be considered, speciﬁed and
measured? One target might be to increase the percentage of Americans
who say, in a cross-sectional, nationally sampled poll, that climate change
is a serious or very serious national problem from the current
approximation of 30 percent up to 50 percent by a target date. Agreement
on such a goal might suggest a broad-based, grassroots strategy rather
than a leverage-point strategy targeting inﬂuentials. One might still
decide that some sub-segment of the general population would be more
persuadable, and therefore worthy of focus, as long as a change in that
segment’s attitudes would be sufﬁcient to contribute measurably to the
targeted increase in the national concern level overall.

One target might be to increase the percentage of Americans
who say, in a cross-sectional, nationally sampled poll, that
climate change is a serious or very serious national problem
from the current approximation of 30 percent up to 50 percent
by a target date.
An alternative model might be to set attitudinal targets that are
reliably known to be predictive of behavior. For example, Jon Krosnick
has written extensively about the “issue public” concept, which refers to
that segment of the population that says an issue is personally important
to them. Note that a person’s answers have been shown to diverge
signiﬁcantly depending on whether they are asked to indicate what is
important to them personally versus important to the nation as a whole.
Members of the issue public are, in effect, those who get married to the
issue and engage in “attitude-expressive” behaviors like writing to their
elected officials and the news media, joining or donating to
organizations, factoring the issue heavily into their voting, etc.
The issue public on climate change, when last measured by Krosnick
in early 1998, was around 11 percent (and it had grown from 9 percent –
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a statistically signiﬁcant increase – during the course of the initial Kyoto
Protocol debate). So one coordinating goal that those seeking to promote national emissions reductions targets might set would be to
increase the climate change issue public from 11 percent to 15 percent.
This may sound small, but would add over 10 million Americans to this
activist segment.
Decisions on which goal to adopt (i.e., increase the proportion of
Americans saying climate change is serious/very serious versus increasing the size of the issue public) are not idle. Rather, they may drive
strategic choices. A strategy to target those who might be candidates for
entry into issue public membership would look quite different from a
broad-based strategy to raise the level of concern about the issue among
the general public: its messengers, tone, arguments, and other features
would be “ratcheted up” to appeal to those with a stronger set of views
on the issue.

So one coordinating goal that those seeking to promote national emissions reductions targets might set would be to increase
the climate change issue public from 11 percent to 15 percent.
This may sound small, but would add over 10 million Americans
to this activist segment.
Beyond this, there is an exceptionally wide suite of other options for
identifying a speciﬁc cluster of beliefs and then doing careful pre- and
post-intervention measurement to test the impact of information dissemination or other inﬂuence strategies on behalf of climate change science.


Energy beliefs. One could compare what speciﬁc energy policies

Americans currently support to those that would have the biggest
impact on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions – and then
undertake targeted communications initiatives to attempt to
induce these to align more than they do today.


Consequences. One could identify which of the many conse-

quences of climate change are of greatest concern to different segments of the population through a highly textured survey and
then convey speciﬁc and accurate information about that risk on
a narrowcasting basis.
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Geographic. Specific attitudinal targets could be set on a

geographic basis. For example, some at the Conference believe
that the U.S. South could be especially pivotal in promoting
national action on climate change. This is related to both partisan
and religious cleavages in our society, but also adds additional
cultural content. Many in the South reportedly see the North as a
“know-it-all,” culturally alien region, a factor that has impeded
the South’s assimilation of information about climate change
perceived to be largely sourced in the North, or at least heavily
associated with liberal Northeasterners or Californians. Southern
uptake of the climate change issue would, if it is to occur,
probably need to be based largely on a local rationale that is true
to the cultural, religious and other traditions of the South itself.
Some believe that the Katrina tragedy may prompt greater
receptivity to evaluating the issue.


Certainty beliefs. Krosnick has also investigated the substructure

of beliefs on global warming and distinguished between existence
beliefs (i.e., what percent of Americans believe that global
warming exists), attitudes (i.e., what percentage think global
warming will be, on balance, good or bad?), beliefs about human
causation and efﬁcacy, and others (see Jon Krosnick et al., “The
Origins and Consequences of Democratic Citizens’ Policy
Agendas: A Study of Popular Concern about Global Warming,”
forthcoming in the journal Climatic Change, 2006). The variable
that turns out to have the greatest impact on an individual’s belief
about the national seriousness of climate change is the “certainty”
with which he or she holds the other beliefs (i.e., how certain are
they of the existence of global warming, the role of human
causation, the efﬁcacy of remedial steps). This suggests that a
potential civic engagement strategy might invest less in
persuading those who don’t believe global warming exists that it
does exist, and relatively more in strengthening the “certainty”
with which those who already believe some aspect of climate
change hold that belief, perhaps through provision of accessible
scientiﬁc information.
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The facts of climate change cannot be left to speak for themselves. They
must be actively communicated with the right words, in the right
dosages, packaged with narrative storytelling that is based rigorously
on reality, personalized with human faces, made vivid through visual
imagery – and delivered by the right messengers. Doing this will
require that climate change communications go from being a datapoor to a data-rich arena. Social science methods have not been
adequately applied to date – and that must change, given the stakes.

Part I has already invoked the work of social scientists, including that
of academic survey specialists who are well equipped to provide a more
textured and ultimately actionable picture of the drivers of attitude
change than standard pollsters. This needs to be extended to other scholars whose work may be relevant to society’s engagement on climate
change. A variety of disciplines – including psychology, linguistics, communications, sociology, political science and interdisciplinary ﬁelds like
persuasion theory – have developed robust insights into the process of
attitude formation, change, and persistence that could be harnessed in
seeking to boost civic understanding and engagement on climate change.
For example, cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky produced a rich body of Nobel Prize-winning psychological
work on how people make everyday judgments under conditions of
uncertainty, and the simplifying shortcuts they use (see Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Some of these shortcuts serve people well, while others produce systematic biases and errors. Much of this work awaits extension and application
to the issue of climate change and could help illuminate the following
kinds of questions. How do people draw inferences when evaluating
information or risks associated with climate change? What errors do they
make in interpreting the probabilities of climate-related forecasts? How
can optimism and other emotional or intuitive factors shape their decisions, in comparison to rational processing of the facts? What determines
what people recall from their memory when making current decisions
about climate change? When comparing two policy options or personal
actions intended to mitigate climate change, which few features do people choose to base the decision on and why?
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Much of the research on these questions also demonstrates that the
way choices are framed can inﬂuence the decisions individual make. By
tapping into this existing work and formulating new applied research
questions, those seeking to promote civic engagement on climate change
may be able to do a much better job of framing scientiﬁc and other
factors for maximum understanding and motivation.
Enthusiasm has grown since we adjourned the Conference for building
on our efforts to connect social and natural scientists in a problemcentered model – with climate change as a worthy case. This has spawned
additional dialogues about how to promote such cross-fertilization,
whether through joint panels at the annual meetings of scientiﬁc
associations or deeper integration through new research programs.
So why do more social science? Perhaps the most compelling
rationale is that it likely constitutes a good investment. The Conference,
for example, recommended the creation of a “new overarching
communications entity or project to design and execute a well-ﬁnanced
public education campaign on climate change science and its
implications . . .” and further called for funding it with $50-100 million.
Applying just a small portion of that sum to ﬁrst conducting rigorous
social science research should help ensure that the proposed campaign
will have the desired impact on public engagement. Such research
should go far beyond the routine use of qualitative focus groups or
broad-brush polling and into laboratory and ﬁeld experimentation to
test cognitive and social psychological mechanisms. Further
reinforcement for the value of such research comes, by implication, from
past campaigns on climate change, which have apparently had limited
impact despite considerable multi-million dollar funding in some cases.
Accordingly, a key foundational recommendation of the Conference
is to undertake systematic and rigorous research to test the impact of
environmental communications in all media on civic engagement,
public opinion, and persuasive outcomes, and to apply the ﬁndings to
inform new creative work on multi-media climate change
communications (Recommendation #26).
Yale’s Environmental Attitudes & Behavior Project is presently
working with collaborators, including a number of the scholars who were
at the Conference, to develop a research program that will apply social
science theories and methods more effectively to the problem of climate
change. This is not the place to sketch out the research agenda, but it is
actively taking shape today, based in part on new insights and
collaborations formed at the Conference. The following examples
illustrate the type of research questions being formulated and considered.
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Threat-Based versus Solution-Based Appeals

Environmentalists are reportedly anxious to shed their stereotype as the
chicken-little, sky-is-falling, gloom-and-doom, scare-mongering skunks
at the garden party. That’s understandable, and it is based on a belief,
echoed by many at the Conference, that a more positive, can-do approach
will better motivate Americans. Better to appeal to Americans’ highest
hopes than their fears, right?
This surely has some validity. Yet when one hears such advice, it is
always worth asking what data it is based on. Yes, environmentalists’
popularity on national polls has receded a bit in recent years. But not
enough research has been done to understand why. Could it have more
to do with larger political realignments than an overly negative
environmentalist message?
The point here is that armchair theories about what motivates people,
or a general desire to shed an image, are not a solid enough foundation
on which to reposition a movement or an issue. Existing theory and data
should be tapped to help explain the psychological and cultural
mechanisms that inﬂuence how environmentalists are perceived as
messengers, as well as the persuasive impact of their use of threat-based
versus solution-based appeals regarding climate change. It is important
to distinguish, through controlled testing, the persuasive impact of the
messengers from that of the message content – as well as interactive
effects between them.

The point here is that armchair theories about what motivates
people, or a general desire to shed an image, are not a solid
enough foundation on which to reposition a movement or an
issue.
Social scientists have conducted extensive testing on the efﬁcacy of
so-called “fear-based appeals” in health messages intended to induce
public compliance with medically favored behaviors. Many such
findings and methods could be extended to research on human
responses to climate change messages. Should public communications
about climate change emphasize the threatening consequences of
inaction or the practical solutions to the problem? Or a blend of the
two? If a blend, how should they be sequenced? How does this vary, if at
all, based on the target audience? Some health communications research
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has observed that threat-based appeals can induce timely behaviors, but
can also be discounted or even ignored outright if the recipient of the
message is not supplied simultaneously with information on how they
can effectively contend with the threat.
Crafting the optimal message requires research; it should be
meticulously based on accurate scientiﬁc information about the threat
to begin with and calibrated in relation to the existing concern level of
the audience and their perceived ability to do something about the
threat. Findings are often situational to the speciﬁc threat, the point-intime and the speciﬁc audience, and social scientists can usefully be
recruited to assist in finding answers that are of great value to
communications practitioners.
Adaptation and the Loss Aversion Effect

The Conference participants debated whether adaptation messages
should be featured more prominently in climate change communications.
Before considerating its motivational impact, the central ethical argument
should ﬁrst be recognized: both adaptation messages and the actual
adaptation behaviors themselves have merit in that they would help
vulnerable populations who will need to contend with climate change,
regardless of whether causation is human-inﬂuenced or not.
But beyond this, adaptation planning could serve as a back door to a
more reality-based dialogue about mitigating climate change in the ﬁrst
place. It would move climate change from an abstract to a concrete issue
and once people were engaged in preparing for the consequences of that
amount of climate change to which we are already committed due to
past emissions, they would naturally begin to ask how still more climate
change could be avoided (hence the pathway to discussion about
reducing emissions).
This could help level the playing ﬁeld so that the much-discussed
economic costs of climate change regulation would be compared not to
the status quo but more fairly to the costs of inaction, including the
burdens of human adaptation to unabated climate change. At the
Conference, there was sufﬁcient support, qualiﬁed by some reservations,
for a recommendation calling for increased emphasis on adaptation and
preparedness for climate change (Recommendation #22).
Given that this remains an area of debate and the recommendation
was based largely on intuition, we can turn to the social sciences to do
rigorous testing about how people might actually respond to adaptationoriented messages and behaviors. Kahneman et al., for example, observed
a robust phenomenon they dubbed “loss aversion,” which showed how
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individuals’ preferences can actually reverse based on their perceived
reference point, in violation of basic tenets of expected utility theory.
Let’s start with a simple example whereby the “loss aversion” principle
becomes manifested in an “endowment effect.” Let’s say I give you a
coffee mug worth $10. I then ask you how much someone would have to
pay you to relinquish it. It turns out that statistically signiﬁcant numbers
of people in this situation ask for more to relinquish the mug they
already possess (say $12), than they are willing to pay to acquire that same
mug if they didn’t already have it (say $7). This valuation asymmetry is
based on their reference point (i.e., whether they possess the mug or
don’t) and it deﬁes standard economic analysis, in which the mug would
be valued equivalently regardless of whether one possesses it or not at
that moment. How people set their reference point (which is often but
not always their perceived status quo) and what can induce a shift in it,
then becomes a pivotal issue in explaining the decisions they make.
Extending this asymmetry to a more complex case, people who
regard themselves as having already lost something (i.e., as being in a
“domain of losses” relative to their reference point) will often choose a
risky option over a sure gain, even if the probability-adjusted payout of
the risky choice is lower than the sure gain. What draws them is the
probabilistic chance that the risky choice will allow them to restore their
losses all the way back to their reference point, typically the status quo
ante. By contrast, those who perceive that they are positioned ahead of
their reference point and therefore in a “domain of gains” will typically
choose a sure gain over a risky choice offering a higher probabilityadjusted payout (i.e., they make a risk-averse choice).
So what does all this have to do with adaptation? If Americans
perceive their reference point to be the status quo of a fairly stable,
hospitable climate, these ﬁndings could be interpreted to posit, subject
to testing, that they would be less likely to invest in costly emissions
reductions efforts with a higher probability-adjusted payout in the
future than to take what they regard as a sure gain (i.e., keep the money
they would have otherwise invested in emissions reductions). If, on the
other hand, they can be induced to recognize that we are already in a
domain of losses by virtue of past emissions and the adaptation
“overhang” they have created, then Americans may be more inclined to
invest in more intensive emissions reductions efforts that hold out the
chance of stabilizing greenhouse gases at a non-dangerous level in the
atmosphere. Without testing, we cannot know whether adaptation
messages, or actual engagement in adaptation planning, would induce
this kind of reference point shift and prompt Americans to favor more
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stringent or more “urgent” emissions reduction policies, but it bears
rigorous investigation.
This exploratory sketch is not meant to suggest that this or any other
body of cognitive research can be applied to climate change in a paintby-numbers fashion. Extending and applying social science work
requires the caution, rigor and expertise of social scientists, working in
tandem with real-world practitioners. But the point is that we have not
begun to scratch the surface of what such investigations could yield in
terms of promoting civic engagement and action on climate change, so
there is much promising work ahead.
Dynamic Responses and Canceling Out

Given the partisanship and controversy that has afﬂicted the climate
change issue, it is important to better test and understand how individuals
respond to being cross-pressured by opposing or otherwise varied
arguments. There is little question that Americans are somewhat confused
about environmental issues. For example, a 2005 Yale Environmental Poll
found that 53 percent of Americans agree with the statement: “There is so
much information and disagreement in the media that I don’t know who
to believe about what is best for the environment.” Since most climate
change policies do entail costs to some in society, any initial success that a
concerted communications campaign on climate change experiences is
likely to elicit counter-advertising as to why the proposed actions should
not be taken. As a result, the longer-term success of any climate change
communications campaign will likely depend on the extent to which the
focal messages of the campaign are able to survive counterattack.
Rigorous pre-testing can reveal the kinds of argument that are most
robust. Social science can reveal how arguments and counter-arguments
cancel one another out in the minds of the public, depending on their
relative volume, quality and other comparative attributes. This should be
done not only upfront before a communications campaign is launched,
but also in iterative updates that allow recalibration of messages based on
unfolding evidence about the audience’s response to cross-pressures.
Issue Cycles

How can climate change emerge amidst the severe competition for space
on the national agenda? We know that it ranks relatively low on the
public ranking of issues of concern, but don’t yet know enough about
the factors that could cause climate change to move ahead of other
issues. We tend to believe that media coverage is a big factor, but social
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science evidence for the media’s “agenda-priming” capability is mixed
and, in fact, a signiﬁcant body of research has found that media coverage
has “minimal effects” on public opinion. This may be, in part, because
those in an audience whose opinions prove to be most susceptible to
media inﬂuence – i.e., those whose concern is most appreciably boosted
by an issue communication – tend to be the least informed on an issue.
More importantly, their concern level, in turn, tends to be relatively
unstable, subsiding just as quickly as it spiked (see Richard E. Petty and
Jon A. Krosnick, Attitude Strength: Antecedents or Consequences,
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, May 1995). So if the goal is to build a
cumulative base of public support for action over some period, reliance
on media-based messages alone may be unwise.
Findings like these, if robust across multiple studies, can signiﬁcantly
reorient one’s investments in how to communicate about an issue like
climate change. Channels that are perceived to be high impact may prove
less so, once the stability of the achieved attitude change over time is
evaluated. Climate change is at a stage in its maturation as an issue where
it requires the most sophisticated possible research about public attitudes,
motivation and behavior. Armchair speculation is not sufﬁcient.
A number of political scientists have portrayed the dynamics of how
issues cycle through the national agenda. Anthony Downs described a
ﬁve-stage cycle, with the spike in “issue-attention” occurring in the
second stage when a dramatic event brings a particular issue to the
public’s attention. This occurred for climate change in 1988 in the United
States, during the worst drought in 50 years and an exceptionally hot
summer – punctuated by NASA scientist James Hansen’s testimony to
Congress. Unfortunately, later stages of Downs’ cycle also appear to have
been borne out, as the costs and threats associated with solving a problem
diminish the public’s ardor to undertake remedial action – and ﬁnally the
public succumbs to relative boredom if not complete obliviousness about
the issue that had previously gripped it (see Anthony Downs, Political
Theory and Public Choice, Edward Elgar Publications, July 1998).
More recently, political scientist Frank Baumgartner, a participant at
our Conference, has borrowed from biology’s punctuated equilibrium
theory to describe the episodic intensiﬁcation of public attention and
action on issues like climate change (see Robert Repetto, Editor,
Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy,
Yale University Press, May 2006). This is driven by a set of mutually
reinforcing factors, many of them resistant to intentional orchestration,
that must be better understood if we are to fashion a successful model
for civic engagement on climate change.
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introduction
Part II of this report describes each group’s answers to their two-part
charge:
1. Diagnose how your domain may have contributed to
the gap between climate science and policy and action
(due to such factors as occupational identities, norms,
practices, incentive systems and others); and
2. Develop ideas and initiatives to help close the gap, both
through action steps within your domain and new or
enhanced cross-domain collaborations.
This overarching charge was customized further to each domain by
the supplemental questions that open each section below. Time did not
permit full answers to these big questions, but we hope that by including
them in this report, readers will be inspired to attempt their own
answers and to share those with us at our interactive website:
http://environment.yale.edu/climate. This website is intended to become
the hub for tracking, and attracting participation in, implementation of
the 39 action recommendations.
The results reported below reﬂect core input from those representing
each domain, who initially met in separate working groups. But they
also draw on insights from those in other domains, who were
subsequently mixed in to reﬁne, extend and reality-test the initial ideas,
as well as to add their own new ones. We did not seek to attain
consensus, but rather to draw out and report on the full range of views.
Therefore, once again, the reader is reminded not to construe individual
or collective sign-off by the Conference participants on any speciﬁc
points or recommendations.

science

Science
questions
Should scientists take more forceful roles in conveying climate change science?
In what ways do scientists limit their roles deliberately due to occupational
norms, identity, and incentives?
Should such constraints be modiﬁed in light of the special features of the
climate change problem itself (e.g., irreversibility, encompassing scope) or
persistent indicators of public and policy-maker confusion on the issue?
Why hasn’t past outreach by scientists on climate change had more
impact in promoting action commensurate with the problem – for
example, their communication of ﬁndings of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the National Academy of Sciences?
What new arrangements or other innovations are needed to ensure that
good science is injected into public discourse and the policy process?

diagnosis


Word choice. Scientists often use words in ways that vary from

public usage. As a result, scientiﬁc ﬁndings are not framed in a way
that is accessible to non-scientiﬁc decision-makers and the general
public. Some examples:


“Positive feedbacks” are a major concern in climate
science because they reflect exacerbation of the
original warming caused by greenhouse gases, but to
the public, “positive” sounds good. A phrase like
“vicious cycle” would be more understandable.



“Radiation” is used in climate science to refer to heat
dynamics, but to the layperson this term connotes
cancer treatment, nuclear weapons, or Chernobyl,
the world’s worst nuclear accident.



Discussions of conﬁdence levels and probabilities
perpetuate a sense of controversy, even in areas
where the scientiﬁc consensus is quite strong. On the
positive side, the IPCC statement that most of the
observed warming of the past 50 years is due to
human impact was viewed by many as an example of
clear communication.
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Puzzles, not consensus. Scientists’ predilection is to emphasize

puzzles, uncertainties, caveats and details that the public cannot
absorb, rather than to adhere to standard principles of
communication that emphasize repetition of known, core points.




The length and complexity of some scientiﬁc reports
is a big barrier. For example, the reports of the IPCC,
including its summaries, are scientiﬁcally impeccable
but too lengthy and complex for most decisionmakers or consumers in the general public – they
need the ten-page version.

Conservatism. Scientists are fundamentally conservative and risk

averse when it comes to engagement beyond their standard peer
group audiences. They are typically hesitant to initiate or even be
drawn into efforts to communicate to policy-makers, the media,
or the general public, often out of concern that their work will not
be communicated accurately. Given this concern, scientists are
especially reluctant to get out ahead of society and articulate the
need for urgent or drastic steps.


A substantial part of scientists’ conservatism stems
from the culture and norms of their profession, as
reflected in the lack of academic incentives to
communicate science to the general public. Most
focus, instead, on communicating their work to
other trained scientists. They are discouraged from
diverting precious research and career-building time
to outreach activities. And many are sensitive to risks
to their reputations from being seen as too eager to
gain public attention for their research or to take a
position on a contentious matter of public policy. This
sensitivity is increased further by the attendant risk of
magnifying any methodological or other scientiﬁc
errors they make in front of a larger audience, with
greater risk of backlash and embarrassment.



Even those scientists who do attempt to overcome
this incentive structure and project their ﬁndings to
a broader audience frequently lack the training to do
so effectively. There is a lamentable lack of early
training for young scientists in communicating to a
general audience.

science





Scientists who work in disciplines or sub-disciplines
that are especially prone to flux express extra
reticence to speak out. In such cases, it can be
difﬁcult to translate qualiﬁed or tentative ﬁndings to
broader audiences or to make them relevant to the
public – say, at the ecosystem impact level – where
they can inform action.



Scientists’ afﬁnity for expressing their ﬁndings in
written form can be a problem, given the public’s
increasing move toward visual media.

Lack of rewards for interdisciplinary work. The scientiﬁc reward

structure in research universities and institutes encourages
depth and specialization, not interdisciplinary work. The research
agenda is set by individual scientists pursuing their own curiosity,
interests and career needs, not by broader public or policy needs.


Because scientiﬁc uncertainty tends to be greatest
amidst competing theories at the cutting edge that
gain notoriety, the public may think such
uncertainty is also characteristic of core science,
including the uncontroversial parts of climate
science.



The IPCC is an inspiring example of interdisciplinary and collaborative work, but it draws
essentially on volunteer time, which many scientists
with pressing academic commitments cannot afford to
give.



A number of climate change research areas of
enormous societal importance have not attracted the
critical mass of scientists or funding necessary.


Research on climate change impacts is, in the
view of some, in a deplorable state, especially on
the local scale, which is critical to increasing
public engagement and policy action.



Other understudied areas include the ongoing
release of methane from melting permafrost,
which could have enormous climate change
impacts, but has not yet attracted a critical mass
of scholars or funding.
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recommended actions
Recommendation #1: Create a new “bridging institution” to actively
seek out key business, religious, political, and civic leaders and the media
and deliver to them independent, reliable and credible scientiﬁc
information about climate change (including natural and economic
sciences).


Trusted voice. This institution would serve as an independent,
forceful, trusted voice that articulates the science of climate

change. Its team would attempt to remain entirely separate from
vested interests or advocacy groups engaged in the climate change
arena. It would similarly seek to avoid the perception that it is an
advocacy group itself, despite inevitable efforts to portray it as
such. It would do this by strictly guarding its objectivity and
communicating only the most unimpeachable, peer-reviewed
science.


Top scientists. Top scientists would commit in the founding
phase to seek audiences in an organized way through this new
institution.



Proactive. The group would be highly proactive and take its

“show” on the road: to editorial boards, managing editors,
congressional staffers and members, governors, CEOs, mayors,
university presidents, CEOs of media organizations, network
anchors, columnists, and TV producers. It would take a retail, not
wholesale, approach to the task and orchestrate a series of
personal, often local, connections.


Responsive. In addition to its proactive work, this institution

would be available to respond to incoming inquiries on climate
change science from the public, the media and all organizations
with an interest in independent information to assist them in
understanding or addressing climate change. As such, it would
serve as a one-stop shop. Given the potentially large volume of
inquiries, special attention would be given to avoiding
bottlenecks and maximizing response time, including an efﬁcient
information architecture, online and phone access, searchable
databases, multi-media resources, outstanding cross-referenced
expert guides and other elements.

science

The Bridging Institution’s Mandate


Educate institutional leaders and the general public about the
basics of climate change and methods by which consensus has
arisen.



Disseminate new ﬁndings much more quickly than is possible
through peer-reviewed journals.



Conduct rapid response to invalidate myths or other
disinformation.



Clarify the climate change dimension of topical events (e.g.,
Hurricane Katrina).



Serve as a support network for other scientists not necessarily
associated with the institution who speak out on climate
change.



Conduct surveys of scientists on climate change issues.



Produce consensus statements.



Develop an information dissemination plan using the most
effective communication vehicles, including websites, press
releases, news feeds, weather channel information, etc.



Encourage media outreach by scientists and the capacitybuilding required to succeed, including training scientists to
speak in language that is understandable to different
audiences. In particular, provide media and communications
training, (e.g., by building on the success of such programs as
the Aldo Leopold Leadership Program).



Models. Several existing institutions have been cited as either
models (e.g., COMPASS) or potential homes (e.g., AAAS) to
which a sub-unit tasked with this mandate could be appended.
COMPASS stands for Communication Partnership for Science
and the Sea, and was launched in October 1999 to “increase the
use of scientiﬁc information in marine conservation policy and
practice by making academic science less fragmented, and more
applicable, available, and understandable to a wide audience.”
AAAS stands for the American Association for the Advancement
of Science and is an international non-profit organization
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dedicated to advancing science around the world by serving as an
educator, leader and professional association. It publishes the
prestigious journal Science.


Anticipating the task. The institution would help scientists
anticipate the communications/outreach task earlier in the process

of framing their research questions, not as an add-on.


Dominated by scientists. The institution would be dominated by
scientists, but would draw in and leverage talents from other

domains. It would enlist other credible, non-scientiﬁc opinion
leaders, business leaders, and other respected individuals to
communicate climate science.


Continuously updated. Details of the content of what the
Institution would communicate would be continuously updated as

new ﬁndings arose. However, there would be some important
standard elements:





Discipline in repeating core elements of the scientiﬁc
consensus on climate change.



Pointing out the limits of emergent knowledge (e.g.,
combating simplistic thinking about sequestration as
a cure-all for greenhouse gas emissions).



Exploring and designing metaphors for communicating about the global environment (e.g., a global park).



Shifting the burden of proof so that public
expectations of certainty would be conditioned over
time to give way to a risk management paradigm.
Some have urged that we should go further, beyond
the risk management paradigm, which raises its own
contentious problems of balancing hard-to-quantify
risks and benefits, and toward a precautionary
paradigm, which was a crucial underpinning of
eventual action on phasing out CFCs that deplete the
ozone layer and would be better suited to motivating
signiﬁcant action on climate change.

Strategic dialogues. The institution would invest in strategic
dialogues to acquire a better understanding of why or why not key

leaders in different segments of the public embrace climate
change as a major issue, and what kinds of scientiﬁc information
on climate change each would want or need.

science



Reframe the focus. Based on these audience and constituency
understandings, the institution would reframe the focus of
climate change communications or the tactical language used. It
would pre-test speciﬁc word choices to assess how audiences hear
them, and be especially careful to anticipate colloquial
interpretation of scientiﬁc terms.



It would develop new
communication tools to disseminate information about local
impacts and other climate change information to the general
public (e.g., a webpage for impacts with a map/zip code function
so that the general public could easily access information on how
climate change could affect them).



Climate Index. The institution could create a Climate Index that
integrates various indicators of climate change into an
understandable form (e.g., temperature rise, heat stress, intense
precipitation events, sea level). Enlist scientiﬁc expertise to make
it credible, but also especially amenable to localization to the
extent that the indicators permit.



Overcome reticence. The institution would also be charged with
seeking to address, and overcome, the factors that induce
scientists’ reticence in communicating, by modeling more
outspokenness, but also influencing leaders of scientific,
governmental and university institutions to change norms,
internal culture, and incentives.



Harness existing NGO mechanisms. Existing NGOs should not

New

communication

tools.

be underestimated as highly leveraged points for disseminating
climate change science, especially given that so few NGOs
currently have resident scientific expertise. Scientists could
individually approach NGOs to serve on committees or boards,
in ways that are consistent with their objectivity, but also harness
existing relationships and communications mechanisms the
NGOs have built. The new institution should be kept entirely
independent of advocacy or non-scientific organizations,
although the latter could be users of its output.


Mentoring. The institution would organize mentoring efforts by

which senior scientists who have successfully navigated the
communication of cutting-edge science could help younger
scientists do so more effectively.
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Obligating outreach. Help promote scientists’ readiness to talk to
the media by making outreach obligatory among those receiving
grants from the National Science Foundation, NASA, the
National Academy of Sciences and other institutions.



Support training. Support institutional capacity for media and

outreach training. The institution should provide training and
augment the capacity of other institutions to provide this,
speciﬁcally in relation to climate change. The institution should
provide a menu of options for its own training, such as two-tothree day programs or two-week summer programs. These
programs should be led by the giants in the ﬁeld. The institution
should also reach out to the AAAS about its media training
sessions that few attend and those at other universities (e.g.,
fellowships and courses at Scripps Institute, Woods Hole, Lamont
Doherty, MIT, Stanford). How can these be expanded and how
can others be recruited to attend?


Content of media training. Media training courses for scientists
should include how to testify, how to write Op-Eds, how to
anticipate how words will be reported (e.g., relative emphasis on
certainties and uncertainties), how to cover different aspects of
science, and how journalists work.


Heroes. In particular, help journalists identify stories
that connect science to culture (e.g., scientiﬁc heroes
doing work on climate change).



Training. Provide training, above all, for scientists to

talk in a comprehensible way. Journalists are not
inclined to train scientists or coax clear language out
of them, but to take their subject as they ﬁnd it. So the
burden is on the scientists, or others who want
scientists to succeed, to communicate more effectively.
Help identify words that scientists can use to portray
the climate change issue in a more compelling fashion
to journalists and the general public (e.g., climate
disruption instead of climate change). Moreover,
scientists must be trained not just to get facts out, but
how to introduce and sustain them in the face of a
polemical response. Make sure this is covered in
media training, especially given the rise in contentious
media formats that value debate above all else.

science



Personalize the story. Highlight the personal dimension
of the climate change story, even at the highest levels of
power (e.g., how the relationship between President
George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on
the climate change issue has taken on added interest
following their Iraq War alliance).



Narrative Drive. Identify the “gee whiz” mysteries in

climate change to provoke audience interest and
engagement. This could exacerbate the problem of
highlighting uncertainties more than the large zone
of scientiﬁc consensus. But if handled well – as it was
in the TV series Strange Days on Planet Earth, for
example – it can also draw the audience into a more
active stance on the issue.


University experts lists. Leverage existing assets like university
“experts lists.” Do they all have climate change represented fully?
Are all relevant scientists cross-referenced on all climate-related
topics, including extreme weather events, droughts and other
topical impact stories?



First step toward establishing the institution. Convene a

workshop of possible funders, scientists, and other key players
and users to benchmark existing institutions with a similar
mandate and to develop a blueprint of what the new institution
(or a new unit of an existing institution, like the American
Association for the Advancement of Science or The Science
Media Centre in London) might look like.
Recommendation #2: Reorient research priorities on climate change
to be more responsive to society’s information and decision-making
needs, including greater emphasis on impacts, local consequences,
timing, non-linear risks, adaptation, and solutions.


Broaden the circle. Create mechanisms to broaden the circle of
influencers and decision-makers determining the research
agenda beyond scientists themselves.



Focus more research on:


Climate change impacts, especially at the local level;
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Non-linear consequences and feedbacks that could
inform society’s level of urgency on climate change,
such as methane releases from permafrost melting or
reduced surface reﬂectivity from polar ice melting;



Adaptation and preparedness, extending from the
sciences into applied technical and engineering work;



Solutions (both mitigation and adaptation);



Integrated visions of alternative futures that are
scientifically coherent and could inform public
understanding of the implications of alternative
societal actions;



Establishing scientifically calibrated temperature
targets and endpoints in light of impacts research,
and backing up from these targets to actionable
prescriptions;



Applied social science that can inform how natural
scientiﬁc ﬁndings are communicated to society.

Recommendation #3: Strengthen citizen-science initiatives on

climate change so as to build greater public engagement with the
conduct of climate change science.


Closer engagement. This should produce closer engagement

between scientists and society, not just in terms of disseminating
scientiﬁc results and broadening input into the research agenda,
but speciﬁcally by engaging the public in the research process
itself. This initiative should begin by assembling and synthesizing
the results of the many citizen climate change efforts now
underway. It should then encourage scientists to collaborate on
developing best practices guidance or another quality control
mechanism for citizen science, so that these efforts are considered
scientiﬁcally (and not just politically) legitimate.


Technical example of citizen-science: distributed computing.

Members of the general public have been contributing the idle
processing capacity of their personal computers – through the
Internet – to a massive set of distributed computing
experiments organized at www.climateprediction.net. These

science

experiments require consent by the users and afford them a
sense of involvement in the projects, as well as access to the
ﬁndings. The scientists, meanwhile, gain access to much more
computing power than they would otherwise be able to
harness. This innovative work has produced genuinely
important – and, in some cases, troubling – ﬁndings. In a
study published by Oxford climate modeler David Stainforth in
the January 27, 2005 issue of the scientiﬁc journal Nature, a
model that ran on 26,000 idle computers found that six socalled “perturbed parameters” could interact in a non-linear
fashion to produce higher climate sensitivity to greenhouse
gases than had been found in any previous study – up to 19.8°
Fahrenheit (or 3.6° higher than any previous study). This is not
to say this high sensitivity is likely (they were silent on
probability), but such models help to establish a range that
extends out to the worst case.


Non-technical example of citizen-science: bird counts. A
leading non-technical example of citizen-science to build on is
the Audubon Society’s Christmas Bird Count database, for
which 106 years of records submitted largely by amateur
birdwatchers have been captured – and are now computerized.
Public participation has increased steadily over the years.

Over the past 40 years, there have been 1,000 to 2,000 Christmas
Bird Counts per year with up to 200 species per location.
Numbers of each species are counted, so there is good information on changes in abundance, not just presence versus absence.
Many birds are considered “charismatic species,” and as such
their familiarity to many Americans makes them ideal for
communicating the effects of climate change.
In fact, the Audubon data from the mid-1960s shows that many
species of birds are wintering farther north, providing
additional evidence that the warming at northerly latitudes is
inﬂuencing the behavior of species in relation to their habitats.
The Audubon data is robust, representing a wide variety of
species with many ecological niches. Audubon researchers are
now aiming to undertake a veriﬁcation of the ﬁnding about
northern range extensions by analyzing all the species on the
Christmas Bird Count over the 40 year period (about 400-450
species with sufﬁcient sample sizes). They will also undertake
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selective lookbacks earlier in the century for key indicator and
representative species.
Recommendation #4: Identify and execute feasible, high-level actions

that could modify the ﬁnancial and reward structures within academia
most responsible for inhibiting: a) interdisciplinary and problemoriented research on large-scale, urgent issues like climate change; and
b) faculty and PhD student engagement in public communication,
policy-making and other public service arenas. Recruit key inﬂuencers
to meet with university presidents, university funders, and other
inﬂuencers in furtherance of this objective.


Exert pressure to change incentive structures. These incentives

have a profound inﬂuence on constraining interdisciplinary
research as well as public outreach by scientists. While it is
generally accepted that it is difficult to change academic
institutions, the significance of the stakes makes high-level
entreaties to accomplish changes worthwhile.


Enlist university presidents. Attempts should therefore be made
to enlist university presidents, perhaps through their associations
and journals, and other informal peer-to-peer dialogues, to
conduct significant re-evaluations of how their institutions
discourage outreach at present, and how this could be changed.
Some also look to foundations and other funders to expand the
nascent outreach components required for research grants.



Leverage foundation support. Foundations and other philanthropic

organizations are widely recognized as vital funders of the university
enterprise. As such, they could exercise considerable inﬂuence in
driving changes in incentive structures, both directly by reaching out
to key university ofﬁcials and by attaching requirements to their
grants requiring, for example, signiﬁcant public communication
and outreach work by the grantees. They could similarly put a
greater priority on funding the kind of interdisciplinary research
that is so critical to climate change science.


Reduce risks to faculty. Identify ways to reduce or eliminate
career penalties and risks to university faculty and other
researchers from communicating their work.

science



Protect them from overt intimidation by those who
would prefer that they refrain from informing
contentious debates with research ﬁndings.



Also seek to counter the “gotcha” risk that breeds
norms of excessive caution in scientiﬁc academia;
some feel that the risks of being caught in a small
mistake are typically exaggerated in relation to the
importance of getting the general principles right.

Recommendation #5: Identify mechanisms to preserve and advance

the integrity of the publicly-funded scientiﬁc research enterprise,
especially on climate change. Shine a public spotlight on the process by
which the federal science agenda is developed and funding choices are
made.

Recommendation #6: Convene one or more dialogues free of
economic and political compromises to undertake a fundamental
redeﬁnition of the climate change challenge in light of its urgency.


Delineated issues. Deﬁne a sharper outline of the major issues
and urgencies associated with climate change.



Kyoto limitations. Clarify that policy instruments such as the

Kyoto Protocol, while a useful ﬁrst step, are ultimately insufﬁcient,
given their model of constant emissions based on recent baselines
rather than substantial reductions converging on zero net
emissions in the future.


Scientific credibility. Harness scientiﬁc credibility in exposing

the scale of the problem.


Public interest. Redeﬁne the imperative of governmental action

that more fully reﬂects public interest, rather than special-interest
constituencies.
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News Media
questions
How have the frequency, context, tone and placement of news coverage
on climate change science shaped policy-maker and public responses?
Is the media’s resident scientiﬁc expertise a limitation, and should it be
supplemented by better access to impartial scientists or intermediaries?
How have journalistic norms, such as balance and source identiﬁcation,
affected coverage, and should they be modiﬁed or administered
differently?
What ownership and market pressures constrain climate science coverage,
whether through compression of formats, blurring of the news/
entertainment line, “breaking news” dynamics, “imitative cascades”
of media attention, or advertiser inﬂuence?

diagnosis


Gatekeepers not convinced. News gatekeepers such as news

editors and directors have not considered climate change a
priority. Journalists are often discouraged by their editors from
reporting on the issue. Top editors at the major U.S. papers are
particularly important because they set the agenda for the rest of
the U.S. media, and this group has yet to decide whether climate
change is a problem. Some vigorously contend that the media
reﬂect rather than set the agenda – and therefore cannot be
expected to take a leadership role in increasing climate change’s
prominence on the national agenda. Debate over the relative
autonomy and inﬂuence of the news media is on-going.


Gap in science education. Editors and journalists lack literacy in

science generally and in climate science speciﬁcally. Similarly, the
general public itself lacks the scientiﬁc education required to
understand the implications of the issue. To the extent that news
media reﬂect rather than shape society, their approach to climate
change currently mirrors the gap in science education within
society.


Disinformation campaigns. Editors and journalists appear to
have been inﬂuenced by disinformation campaigns on climate
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change, which has further exacerbated the scientiﬁc education
gap since a lack of training makes it more difﬁcult to distinguish
rigorous science from manipulated or selective representations of
the science.


A difficult story to tell. Rarely is there an anecdotal lead in a
climate change story to drive the narrative and promote a sense
of personal relevance, whether a likely victim of potential climate
change impacts, an entrepreneur with a solution or a scientisthero. Instead of human interest pegs, climate change stories tend
to contain complex and abstract scientiﬁc information and follow
a numbing structure: some event occurs (e.g., collapse of an ice
shelf), the basic climate change science is spelled out, alternative
explanations are offered, and the IPCC or some other
authoritative source is cited, implying that more research is
needed. These stories are sufﬁciently similar that the reader has
little sense that the science has advanced.



Long-term issue. Climate change is perceived by many as a long,
slow-moving process with consequences only far in the future. It
is not considered today’s story. The press does not currently have
the tools or machinery for studying and reporting on such longterm changes. Journalists are inclined to write stories that have
immediacy and obvious urgency, and so far the abrupt climate
change scenarios positing near to mid-term surprises have not
broken through sufﬁciently to change the perceived character of
the issue as a slowly unfolding one.


Projected mean temperature changes of one or two
degrees sound pleasant to some, and understanding
of the negative environmental consequences of these
changes is limited.



The international dimensions of the climate change
story appear to be of limited interest among the
American public.



The climate change story is rarely told with a villain;
in fact, to the extent that the public correctly
perceives that climate change is connected to energy
use, they may recognize their broad complicity,
which limits the conﬂict narrative further.

news media



Career incentives (and penalties). Coverage of climate change
and other complex scientiﬁc issues is not perceived as a path to
career advancement for journalists. Wars, the White House, and
other high-proﬁle stories offer much greater opportunity for
front-page or lead-off placements.



Economic pressures. The mainstream news media are increasingly

owned by large consolidated companies with a short-term earnings
focus and little or no commitment to civic journalism if it entails a
risk to proﬁts. Relative to other more easily hyped stories, they are
inclined to refrain from covering stories like climate change because
it is unlikely to attract a comparable number of viewers and
readers. The mainstream news media also, according to some, resist
coverage of issues like climate change because of actual or
anticipated pressure from the corporate advertisers or from
politicians or other inﬂuencers opposed to action on the issue.


Fear of attack. Related to, but separate from, the economic

pressures cited above, some mainstream journalists are
reportedly inhibited by fear of professional attacks from political
partisans if they do not report a scientiﬁcally discredited or outlier perspective that is favored by such partisans. Evolution and
the careful balancing using the Intelligent Design perspective
constitute an instructive example.


Few national political champions. The political pages of

newspapers are not devoting much coverage to climate change, in
part because there have been few national champions on the
issue, with some notable exceptions. Without vocal champions,
the press is more likely simply to mirror the lower priority that
society today places on addressing climate change.


Not enough news about solutions. The news media need to have

access to more newsworthy stories about solutions to the climate
change problem. In their absence, the audience may tune out on
further illustrations of the seriousness of the crisis. One of the
accurately portrayed dimensions of the issue is that even if
mitigation actions are undertaken now, we are already committed
to signiﬁcant climate change based on past emissions, a reality
that can engender futility in the audience.


Insufficient clarity about goals among issue experts. Journalists

covering climate change interview experts who often do not know
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what decision they’re trying to inﬂuence, or are not sufﬁciently
clear in communicating it. Reporters have an afﬁnity for lines of
debate and conﬂict among purposeful entities and personalities.
Those seeking greater action on climate change may be seeking
everything from policy changes to personal behavior changes in
energy conservation. These diffuse objectives may hinder coverage.


Fragmentation of viewership. Audiences have access to

increasingly narrow sources of news via the Internet as well as
niche program and station options on cable TV. Some believe
audiences tend to seek out news that reinforces, rather than
challenges, their views; but others believe the data does not
support this view and that purportedly liberal shows have evenly
split listeners between conservatives and liberals. Other
demographic attributes such as educational level may determine
choices more than ideology.


Print versus broadcast. Climate change scientists tend to

communicate through the print medium and the story arguably
lends itself to the nuance and context available via print. But
audiences increasingly gravitate to broadcast media, where the
climate story has not – to date – been told as well.


Cutting across beats. The climate issue cannot be adequately
covered by one beat, but instead cuts from the political beat to the
business beat to the science beat. Given the need for a whole cadre
of journalists to be informed on the issue, even within a single
news organization, the communications burden is greater. This,
again, reinforces the importance of efﬁciently getting to the
gatekeeper presiding over the full organization.



Catch-22. Scientists face disincentives to reach out to the media

and need to be trained to do so effectively. Journalists are unwilling
to become their tutors, seeing it as a compromise of their
objectivity. So scientists need to look elsewhere for training and
intermediaries, such as PR professionals, at some risk to their
credibility. Perhaps scientiﬁc organizations or committees, not
individuals, are best situated to enlist the services of PR
professionals, as they did in garnering successful coverage of the
Arctic Impact Assessment. However, dozens of collective scientiﬁc
statements on climate change have garnered limited coverage,
perhaps because they appear bureaucratic and consensus-driven
rather than offering the lines of debate required for a news story.

news media











United States vs. the rest of the world. According to some, the

U.S. news media vary from media abroad, to the detriment of
accurate climate change coverage in this country. The BBC in the
United Kingdom is cited as a news institution that has, in
“benevolent dictator” fashion, devoted much less coverage to
contrarian voices on climate change of dubious scientific
credibility – and that has, as a result, helped to create a stronger
societal consensus on the urgency of addressing the issue. Some
note that scientists who speak out in the U.S. media on a
contentious issue like climate change risk character assassination
in return for almost no professional upside. In some developing
countries, by contrast, it is expected that scientists will connect to
the news media as a way to inﬂuence policy in accordance with
scientiﬁc ﬁndings, so the professional risks are reduced.
Lack of support and incentives. Academic institutions do not
support outreach to news organizations by scientists. The rewards
and incentives for doing outreach are simply not present and
outreach is looked down upon as selling out by peers.
Lack of science communications training. Scientists do not
receive training in how to communicate outside of academia.
Skills such as interviewing and writing Op-Eds can be taught and
learned; however, they typically are not.
Objectivity. Objectivity is one of the core values of conventional
journalism. Journalists strive to be objective by telling both sides
of the story. When reporting on climate change, journalists often
quote contrarians to introduce “balance” to the story, which
ultimately misrepresents the scientiﬁc consensus. Some insist that
dissenters should be fully covered as an important part of the
story, provided their funding or other inﬂuences can be disclosed
and reported, and that they have something newsworthy and
timely to add. In particular, industry scientists should not – in
this view – be prematurely dismissed as vested interests; in many
cases, they are thoughtful scientists who care about the ecological
impacts of their products.
The importance of keeping scientists at arms length. Journalists
are keen as a group to know more about the scientiﬁc facts and how
to report on them. Yet journalists are also wary of being seen as
conspiring with scientists to get their story in the media. This would
be not considered objective reporting, but rather a potential conﬂict
of interest, or even an unacceptable crossover into advocacy.
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Lack of resources. Even those journalists who may want to know
more about science and how best to report it rarely have the time
or institutional support or funding to do so. The Metcalf
Institute, among others, addresses this issue by holding workshops and training sessions for journalists, but there is a need to
augment such efforts.



Tendency to rely on free media only (i.e., news media). Some
emphasize that it is important for those seeking to raise
awareness and promote action on climate change not to put all
their eggs in the news media basket. The temptation by those with
limited, non-proﬁt budgets is to do guerilla marketing that aims
to secure the so-called “free media” that comes from getting news
coverage for your statements or actions. But other vehicles for
agenda-setting and issue communication should be harnessed,
including underwriting of special projects, paid advertising, etc.

recommended actions
Recommendation #7: Educate the gatekeepers (i.e., editors). In order

to improve the communication of climate science in the news media,
foster a series of visits and conferences whereby respected journalists
and editors informed on climate change can speak to their peer editors.
The objective is to have those who can credibly talk about story ideas
and craft reach out to their peers about how to cover the climate change
issue with appropriate urgency, context, and journalistic integrity.



Orchestrate roadshows. To ensure maximum exposure to these

events for gatekeepers, it will be necessary to take the show on the
road. Presentations should be made in the newsroom, with free
lunch provided. Editors will not go elsewhere, as they lack the
time, resources, and inclination.


Focus on journalists and editors, not scientists, as messengers.

The media world is relatively insular. The most credible messengers
to news editors and directors are their peers, either other editors or
respected journalists in the ﬁeld. Scientists are considered an
interest group by some in the news media. If editors are seen
coaching scientists, that would be viewed as a form of advocacy.

news media



Target other important gatekeeper constituencies. Publishers

should also be addressed given their role in answering to
advertiser pressures.


Spotlight historical examples of news media missing a big story.

Identify and spotlight historical examples where newspapers have
apologized to readers after the fact for failing to adequately
investigate a story (e.g., the civil rights movement). Raise the
question: Is climate change today such a story? Appeal to the
historical legacy of the gatekeepers.


Identify and disseminate compelling climate change stories –
and axes of conflict – so as to better engage audience interest.

Some believe that a more pronounced effort should be made to
spotlight bad actors on the climate change issue, i.e., those vested
interests who may be muddying the science or otherwise
impeding an accurate public understanding of the issue. These
stories contain elements of conﬂict and drama and could be more
effectively highlighted in mainstream programs such as 60
Minutes and others. Investigative reporting should be expanded
on who is funding scientiﬁc work across the board, so that agendas
can be disclosed and the public can have the context it needs.


Get climate change into other newspaper sections. Seek to move

climate change from the science or environment pages into the
other sections whenever possible (e.g., foreign news, political news,
even feature coverage of personalities associated with the issue).


Get climate change on the agenda of news media associations,
conferences and other high-volume gathering points. One

example is the American Society of News Editors Annual
Conference. Similar sessions could be added to the broadcast
journalist’s conference.
Recommendation #8: Enhance the scientific competence of

journalists.
Journalists often lack scientiﬁc understanding and training in how to
communicate science in the news. The following efforts could be
undertaken to increase journalists’ scientiﬁc knowledge:


Recruit scientifically savvy journalists. News organizations
should consider recruiting more staff with science backgrounds,
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including from programs where journalism students are required
or encouraged to gain scientiﬁc training. One standout example,
and valuable recruiting ground, is the Boston University science
journalism program.


Provide scientific reporting training. Journalists are keen to learn

more about science, but typically lack the time or money to do so.
Additional training opportunities should be provided, such as
fellowships to scientific institutions. One model that was
mentioned is the Yale Law School fellowship for journalists. The
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies and other
educational and scientific institutions should provide such
fellowships to train journalists to report science and climate
change. Funds need to be made available to journalists to take up
these opportunities, as well as to attend events where they are able
to meet and engage with scientists.


Provide information clearinghouse for scientific resources.

Establish an online clearinghouse where journalists can go for
scientiﬁc resources to aid them in their story research on climatechange related topics.


Assist journalists in localizing the story. Provide local journalists

more information to use in localizing the climate change issue
whenever possible, in terms of identifying local impacts but also
ﬁnding local college scientists who can speak to local newspapers.
Trust is a local currency.


Leverage journalism school alumni. Encourage prominent
alumni of journalism schools who are concerned about the
climate change issue to reach out to journalism school deans and
encourage them to add science journalism tracks to their
curricula. Consider other access points (e.g., deans of
environment schools could reach out to their peer deans at the
journalism schools to build stronger bridges and crossregistration or even joint degree programs).



Pick the right journalists. Some contend that the potential

beneﬁts of media training of scientists may be overstated, that
talent for talking to the media is inborn, and that the world can be
divided into good talkers and bad talkers. Accordingly, one
solution could be a talent search to ﬁnd (i.e., not to train, but to
ﬁnd) the best scientiﬁc talkers and to help them do more outreach.

news media

Recommendation #9: Initiate a climate change weekly column. Find

a newspaper willing to devote a weekly column to the issue of climate
change and help them syndicate it to others – or work with one of the
large newspaper chains to provide a larger multi-newspaper platform.
Recruit a talented and ambitious writer and give him or her, in effect,
a virtually unlimited budget to pursue the story.


Secure regular outlet. Given that at least nine out of ten Op-Ed

submissions are rejected, identify ways to pre-wire an agreement
to publish an Op-Ed or other popular piece so that time-starved
research scientists can be encouraged to write by a higher
likelihood of publication. One way to do this would be to secure
a regular climate or science column. Since writing for a lay
audience is already an add-on and not in the scientist’s reward
system, long publication odds impose a compounding barrier
that might be addressed through having a reliable outlet.

Recommendation #10: Invite the media in.


Help media find the stories in the science. Some of the news
media professionals at the Yale Conference who had not
previously attended a climate change event suggested that there
may be opportunities to secure more media coverage for climate
change-related events and conferences by simply inviting more
media people (from all media and all levels, national to local) to
such meetings and then helping them ﬁnd story ideas once there.
While this may seem like an overly obvious “ﬁx” to the relative
lack of coverage of climate change, it is useful if it puts additional
onus on organizers of even specialist meetings to consider the
newsworthiness of what they are orchestrating and to engage in
more proactive advance work with the media. It is quite likely that
many specialist meetings are routinely considered not
appropriate for the news media and so the connection is never
made. In some cases, this may be warranted given the preliminary
status of ﬁndings to be presented. But even here, journalists can
be provided guidance on what is appropriate for coverage and
what isn’t, and be directed toward feature stories that humanize
the researchers and their exploits across the globe, even if speciﬁc
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data sets or ﬁndings are not similarly ready for publication. For
one thing, just having news media representatives present at a
meeting may impose useful pressure on participants to speak
clearly and accessibly so as not to be misunderstood or
misquoted. This mutual proximity and training should help, over
time, in bridging between the science and the news media.

religion & ethics

Religion & Ethics
questions
Religious organizations have long been at the forefront of environmental
protection efforts and have recently produced open letters to legislators on
climate change speciﬁcally. What impact have these efforts had, both on
policy-makers and their respective religious communities?
What role, if any, should science play in such values-based mobilization?
Are greater scientiﬁc expertise and literacy needed within the religious
community itself? If so, how can this need be met through practices that
respect the distinct dialects spoken in the scientiﬁc and religious
communities?
What role can a focal issue like climate change play in unearthing
common ground between religion and science, moving the issue forward
in the process?

diagnosis


The cross-cutting religious and moral imperative of climate
change is not yet adequately recognized. Different religious

leaders and communities, with a few encouraging and relatively
recent exceptions, have not yet found common ground on
environmental issues such as climate change. There are possible
bases for formulating common ground in the future:




For example, the “sanctity of life” commitment that
has animated the abortion debate could be
broadened to encompass risks to life from climate
change. (Some counsel against this given the policyspecific meanings already associated with those
words.)

Religious leaders do not preach on climate change. Religious

leaders rarely if ever preach on climate change, so those in their
communities do not hear about it from the authority ﬁgures they
trust the most. Sermons also often emphasize the past more than
the future, so climate change is at a special disadvantage given this
traditional focus.
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Religious distrust of science. There is a centuries-long break

between science and religion, which persists to this day in the
form of frequent though not uniform religious suspicion of the
scientiﬁc framing of climate change and other issues.






As a result, scientists are not always seen as credible
messengers by religious groups. Scientists are often
seen as portraying a meaningless, purposeless world
that is anathema to religious people. Scientists are
seen as having an insufﬁcient understanding of
God’s love and of the power of prayer. Some
scientists do bring a strong set of ethical and
religious values, but religious communities do not
perceive this as typical.

Specific legacy of evolution debate. The evolution/creationism
debate, in particular, has fueled religious distrust of scientists.


Some lament this spillover from the evolution debate
to the climate change debate, and know that political
leaders are well aware that when they comment in
favor of intelligent design or creationism, they are
signaling distrust of science more broadly, including
on issues like climate change.



Others, however, see more hope embedded in the irony
that naturalists/biologists and creationists are the two
groups that are perhaps closest to one another on the
importance of caring for nature. If they could put aside
their differences over how the world began, they might
ﬁnd surprising depths of common ground.



Some argue against conceding that evolutionary
biology is somehow morally bankrupt and view Aldo
Leopold and other Darwinists as imbued with
exceptional morality.

Religious distrust of environmentalists.


Climate change has been framed as an environmental crisis instead of a moral or spiritual crisis.
Religious constituencies are motivated especially by
spiritual and social justice appeals, and the framing
of the climate change issue has so far been limited in
tapping those dimensions.

religion & ethics





Many religious groups’ perception is that environmentalists are less concerned about human beings or
business and job loss. Some evangelicals are more
inclined to see business leaders as credible on issues
like climate change because they are measuring
actions against job loss potential, whereas scientists,
environmentalists or even economists appear to be
only theorizing about what the economic costs of
mitigation will be.



Reasons for the distrust include a view that many
environmentalists are pantheists who believe the
Earth is part of God or that the Earth is our “mother.”



Religious leaders are especially cautious about being
hijacked for someone else’s agenda, and environmentalists are among those who are perceived as
having a special interest agenda, one that is culturally
alien to many religious communities.

It just takes time. Religious communities and leaders have

embraced climate change over varying time frames. One religious
leader at the Conference, for example, described a four-year
process of coming to accept science as a truth bearer on the issue
of climate change, which only then culminated in a signiﬁcant
statement on this issue. This is a much slower process than the
accelerating march of scientiﬁc progress.


Negative emphasis of climate change message. Some feel that

the negative formulation of climate change as a threat requiring
sacriﬁce and changes in the quality of life has undermined its
ability to break through to religious communities. Evangelicals, in
particular, are often repelled by calls to work with other groups
associated with gloom-and-doom messages on things like
population control, the need for big government, etc. Could the
climate change issue be successfully reframed, one Evangelical
leader asked, as an opportunity to live a more morally and
spiritually fulfilling life and serve to overcome this deeper
resistance?


Outdated curriculum in religious schools. The coursework of many

religious training schools and institutions has changed little in
hundreds of years and has yet to make room for environmental
issues.
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Lack of “nature” in mainstream philosophy and ethics.

Environmental issues have not been treated prominently in
mainstream curricula and texts on philosophical or ethical
reasoning. This has limited the academic and literary exposure
that Americans have to it in the formative years of their critical
thinking skills, and later in their ongoing reading.


Inadequate elaboration of the climate-poverty link so far. Some

in the religious community perceive that social justice is deemphasized in the policy debate on climate change. This
perceived vacuum of concern about the well-being of
disadvantaged populations extends, interestingly, into their
interpretation of policy mechanisms such as “cap-and-trade.”
While policy proponents assert that cap-and-trade serves as a
mechanism for promoting ﬂows of capital from industrialized to
developing countries, some in the religious community see a risk
that the poor could “trade away their credits” and, in so doing,
either give up their development rights or be in a situation where
they need to pay up in the future to re-acquire them.
The poverty issue is global but also an issue inside the United
States, as revealed by Hurricane Katrina. Katrina has highlighted
how climate change may be not only an issue for elites and
environmentalists but also one of critical importance to the
disadvantaged.


Civil rights movement a model? The last great engaging

movement of the religious community was arguably in support
of social justice during the civil rights movement. Could climate
change become a similar movement?


Climate change is displaced on the agenda by other perceived
spiritual emergencies. Some religious adherents live in a state of

“spiritual emergency.” They are constantly aware of eternity and
how the sins they commit – of commission or omission – can
imperil them and risk a future in hell. Their work to establish the
“sanctity of life” that they perceive to be threatened by abortion
policies in America is in a prior and preemptive status at the top
of their list of emergency obligations. So far, climate change is not
perceived as sufﬁciently threatening (or even real by some) to
rearrange that set of priorities. A similar agenda displacement has
occurred, some suggest, among many in the Jewish community,
whose primary policy focus is on Israel’s survival.

religion & ethics



Not only is climate change displaced from the top
spot on the religious agenda, in many cases it does not
even make the top 10 list of their priorities. Some
religious communities have ranked climate change at
a similarly low position in the recent past, but then
elevated it quickly upon being confronted with the
science and immediately seeing its moral and
religious signiﬁcance. So quick turnarounds and
agenda resetting can occur.

recommended actions
The Religion & Ethics working group formulated the following
preamble to introduce their recommendations.
Preamble to Recommendations

1. The current moral imperative on climate change
articulated by many in the faith community recognizes
that:
a. Any action that risks the quality and viability of life
on earth and future generations is fundamentally an
act of destruction and morally unacceptable.
b. Changing something as fundamental as the chemistry
of the Earth’s atmosphere is morally unacceptable.
c. Any action that increases the risks to the most
vulnerable is morally unacceptable.
2. America as the world’s richest nation has historically
and currently contributed so much to the climate
change problem that it is morally obliged to take
leadership responsibility to address this problem.
The religious community could help resolve this problem by
adopting the following steps within their respective traditions,
recognizing many have already achieved great progress.
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Recommendation #11: Religious leaders and communities must
recognize the scale, urgency and moral dimension of climate change, and
the ethical unacceptability of any action that damages the quality and
viability of life on Earth, particularly for the poor and most vulnerable.


Urgency may promote commonalities. Heightening the sense of
urgency is especially important to accelerating the impulse
toward ﬁnding common understandings across the religious/
scientiﬁc divide and also between religions on issues like climate
change. Without urgency, the differences may continue to take
precedence over commonalities.



Informing urgency. Religious leaders, therefore, should be

supplied not just with basic information about climate change, but
especially information about the threat of non-linear change,
abrupt surprises, and irreversible effects such as species extinction
caused by climate change.


Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Some have called climate change a civil

rights issue for our era. One religious leader quoted King at the
Conference and helped promote focus among the participants:
“We are now faced with the fact that tomorrow is today.
We are confronted with the ﬁerce urgency of now. In this
unfolding conundrum of life and history there is such a
thing as being too late. Procrastination is still the thief of
time. Life often leaves us standing bare, naked and
dejected with a lost opportunity. The ‘tide in the affairs
of men’ does not remain at the ﬂood; it ebbs. We may cry
out desperately for time to pause in her passage, but time
is deaf to every plea and rushes on. Over the bleached
bones and jumbled residue of numerous civilizations are
written the pathetic words: ‘Too late . . .’”
Recommendation #12: Religious leaders and communities should

establish or expand religious coalitions on the environment and
convene dialogues to develop common understandings and resources
speciﬁcally on the climate change issue across different religions and
moral traditions.

religion & ethics



Tailored to individual traditions. In particular, leaders need to
generate common understandings based on principles of
stewardship, justice, protection of the vulnerable, community,
reverence for life, and respect and responsibility for future
generations. Such communication should be tailored by leaders
to individual religious traditions.



Religious rationale for U.S. to lead. Some religions are much

more attuned to traditional development agendas, including
international development, than they are to scientiﬁcally framed
issues like climate change. For them, a key ethical point is that the
United States must acknowledge its obligation to initiate action on
climate change before developing countries can be expected to –
this applied in the case of their favorable estimation of the Kyoto
Protocol and may apply to future policies under consideration.


Coordinate, but reflect unique positionings. Continue to seek to

build on and even create new models like the National Religious
Partnership for the Environment that attract and channel
resources without tainting the unique positioning of the
partnering religious groups. Such coalitions must cut out neither
conservatives nor progressives.


Religion and politics. Recognize the way that religion and politics
mirror each other in the United States, and be prepared to work
together both covertly and overtly on climate change.



Prayer. A call to action should include an emphasis on prayer,

and on asking for the strength to act in furtherance of God’s will,
but not to absolve human responsibility.


Dialogue over the Web. Some counsel that traditional dialogues

take too long to set up and execute and that modern technologies
need to be harnessed to move ahead with greater urgency. Email
and the Web could be used, as in www.faithfulamerica.org.
Recommendation #13: Religious leaders should reach deep into their
memberships to communicate the scale of the problem and the vital
moral imperative of addressing it.


Hearing from the faithful. It is important that religious people

hear about climate change from one another (including religious
scientists who present themselves as such) and their religious
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leaders. Hearing from them will hold much more persuasive and
motivational power than attempts by non-religious messengers
to inﬂuence them.


A day to preach on climate change. Religious leaders should use

sermons, youth groups and other educational venues to educate
and motivate their members on climate change. Establish a day
when churches are encouraged to preach from their pulpits about
climate change.


Be visual. They should harness visual media as well as traditional

written and oral media.


Supply model sermons. Religious leaders should be provided

with model sermons and other statements that they can use to
provide accurate information on the issue, but also the morally
and religiously appropriate context.


Word choices matter. Language choices should be carefully
attended to as each religious leader tailors messages to their own
constituency. For example, one leader might be more
comfortable talking about the “social justice” element of climate
change, while another might prefer referring to the poor as “the
least of these.”



Don’t just preach . . . listen. Leaders should ask their memberships what can be done about the climate change issue.

Recommendation #14: Religious leaders and communities should
communicate their concern for urgently addressing climate change to
the nation’s political leadership and broader public.

Recommendation #15: Recognizing that business leaders are well

positioned to promote receptivity to climate change messages among
certain religious constituencies, create new opportunities for dialogue
on climate change between business and religious leaders and
communities.


Vary the format: private and public. The format, location and

conﬁdentiality of the dialogues should be varied to suit the issue
but also the needs of the participating leaders. In some cases it is
vital that quiet, one-on-one conversations happen between senior

religion & ethics

business and religious leaders before any larger conferences are
convened. However, in many cases, larger, open conferences are
needed to broaden the circle of engagement, perhaps after the
leader meetings pave the way.
Recommendation #16: Establish religious outreach efforts on climate

change tailored speciﬁcally to certain regions of the United States and
their own religious traditions, especially the U.S. South.


Respect regional traditions. Each region of the country possesses

its own religious interpretations, including beliefs about the proper
role of the religious/political interface. Although models from past
engagements by the religious community like the civil rights
struggle could inform and provide a model for action on climate
change, it is important to respect regional religious traditions and
build on them in approaching the issue of climate change.


The South is pivotal. Religious communities in the U.S. South

might play an especially pivotal role in remedying the nation’s
science/action gap on climate change. The South, some note,
stereotypically sees the North as a “know-it-all” region that is
culturally alien. Could the South ﬁnd its own rationale for solving
the climate change challenge that is true to its religious and other
traditions? The experience of Hurricane Katrina could be part of
this.
Recommendation #17: Continue to develop and expand the ﬁeld of

Religion and Ecology, and its ability to unearth the commonalities
across religions on matters of ecology and to supply language, concepts
and textual support to religious leaders who want to articulate
environmental issues to their constituencies. (See, for example,
www.environment.harvard.edu/religion.)

Recommendation #18: Reach out to seminaries and other religious

training institutions and encourage them to incorporate climate change
into their curricula for new religious leaders. Provide education on
climate change to current clergy via continuing education and other
means.
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Recommendation #19: Establish religion-science and religionenvironmentalist partnerships on environmental issues.


Learn from successful models. There are issue-speciﬁc models of
recent success to build on in creating partnerships on climate
change. For example, scientists and religious leaders worked
together to defend the Endangered Species Act in the Noah
Alliance (www.noahalliance.org).



Inter-faith is not the only way. This kind of engagement need not
be on an inter-faith basis. Rather, given different religions’ level of
comfort with science, it might be more productive for each to
engage individually with science in the way that suits their
preferences, rather than have this engagement require a prior
inter-faith understanding or consensus.

politics

Politics
questions
How has the ﬂow of scientiﬁc information to and within the U.S. political
establishment, and to the public to which it answers, inﬂuenced policy
responses on the climate change issue?
Why has climate change become polarized along party lines?
And why, despite this polarization, has the issue been so little activated in
electoral politics?
Can climate change be transformed into a bipartisan issue and, if so,
what role might science play in facilitating this?
Would bipartisanship promote action commensurate with the problem,
or would joint bargaining lead, in the end, to inadequate steps?
Can science meaningfully narrow the range of political opinion on an
issue like climate change in an era of heightened partisanship fueled by
cultural and values-based appeals?

diagnosis


Partisanship. The climate change debate has been marked by
sharply growing partisanship, especially since the high-proﬁle
1997 debate over the Kyoto Protocol, when the Clinton
Administration was closely associated with advocacy on the issue,
and Republican resistance grew correspondingly. Polarization in
the public intensiﬁed at that time and has not abated since.


Some feel that the party leadership on Capitol Hill
has intimidated those who have sought to engage on
the climate change issue by holding hearings or
fashioning a bipartisan compromise. One anecdote: a
Senator commonly associated with the right-wing,
for example, who has grown personally convinced
that climate change threatens his state’s well-being
and that he should take action, has reportedly been
subjected to intense pressure not to act by the
enforcers of party discipline. This has made it
extraordinarily difﬁcult to ﬁnd a middle action on
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climate change. Civility and collegiality are at an
all-time low, further restricting the process of
dialogue that could allow new coalitions and policy
compromises to emerge across the partisan divide.





Despite these problems, the partisan divide on the issue
has narrowed modestly in the U.S. Senate, with the
Summer 2005 passage of a non-binding Sense of the
Senate resolution favoring mandatory, market-based
limits on greenhouse gases. No similar movement has
been evident in the U.S. House of Representatives.



Both Republican and Democratic governors and
mayors, and others at the state and local level, have
moved forward despite the federal stalemate. A key
reason is reportedly that they are genuinely concerned
that their state is vulnerable to climate change and are
also anxious not to fall behind in the race to attract
low-carbon development opportunities to their state
(e.g., alternative energy companies, projects, and jobs).

Partisan or bipartisan. There appears to be a lack of agreement

among political leaders about whether to take a partisan or
bipartisan approach to advancing this issue at the federal level. A
key obstacle to forward movement is not just the existence of
partisanship on climate change today, but disagreement among
key political leaders about whether progress on the issue depends
on intensifying or reducing this partisanship. Depending on their
view of this question, different strategies are suggested.


A partisan model would imply articulating and
perhaps expanding the distinction between the parties
on the issue, and then using this wedge to draw votes,
achieve victory and pursue a mandate to assert their
preferred policy over the objections of the other party.



A bipartisan model, on the other hand, would
suggest creating an “up the middle” policy approach
that compromises enough on all sides to establish a
basis for legislative advancements on climate change.



Which is more feasible? More likely to attain
meaningful outcomes in terms of climate change
action? The proponents of the partisan approach
note that this issue has become so intractably aligned

politics

with the partisan divide that any concessions or
compromises are unlikely to be reciprocated and will
simply further marginalize the climate change issue.
Instead, they say the only way to proceed is to
exercise raw political power, wake up the public
about the urgent nature of the issue, create a major
public demand for action comparable to that which
stimulated major environmental legislation in the
1970s, pursue outright victory at the polls, and
prompt a general realignment in Washington, D.C.




Those favoring a bipartisan approach, on the other
hand, prefer to detach the climate change issue from
any partisan agenda so that the ﬁrst and most feasible
steps toward meaningful action can be passed into
law at the earliest possible date – a “purple” strategy
(blue state and red state). Yet it is not clear which
legislators would be most amenable to a new
bipartisan consensus for climate change action,
beyond those already involved in the issue, and
whether this aproach can therefore succeed.

Not enough advance issue mobilization before election season.

Despite the active hurricane season in Florida just prior to the
2004 elections, and evidence that global warming was linked to
greater hurricane intensity, some polling in that state showed that
the public did not draw a connection between their votes and
global warming. There was awareness of global warming and even
of the scientiﬁc link between warmer waters and intensiﬁed
hurricanes, but the causal jump from voting to hurricanes was
evidently more than people were prepared to make. As a result, the
environmental advocacy group that commissioned this particular
poll did not advertise with a global warming message, but instead
focused their Florida ads on offshore oil drilling. Evidence from
2005 similarly showed that the public remained disinclined to hold
their elected leaders accountable for the potential global warming
link to extreme weather. Once an election season arrives, it is
generally considered too late to engender public understanding to
an extent that would make global warming a voting issue. If it is
going to become one in future election cycles, the ground needs to
be paved well in advance, particularly in light of the sequence of
the documented public resistance to making the links.

143

144

americans and climate change



Value divergence. Liberals and conservatives are motivated by

distinct and deeply rooted sets of values, which inﬂuence how
they interpret and often discount information and messengers.
Different characterizations of these contrasting value sets exist,
including cognitive linguist George Lakoff ’s formulation of
conservatives as favoring “strict father” values and liberals
“nurturant parent” values (see George Lakoff, Moral Politics:
How Liberals and Conservatives Think, 2nd edition, University of
Chicago Press, 2002). Typically, people do not explicitly
communicate their underlying value structures, which can lead
to underestimation of their importance in explaining political
preferences on climate change and a range of other issues.


Liberal-leaning environmentalists are often reluctant
to recognize the different value sets of conservatives
and therefore fail to frame climate change in a way
that connects with them. There is a set of so-called
“bi-conceptuals” in the population, to use Lakoff ’s
formulation, who share elements of both the liberal
and conservative value sets and could likely be
mobilized on climate change if an appropriate
approach were crafted.



Facts alone do not motivate. Environmentalists are,
in the estimation of some, among the last on the
planet to see this. One must drive rational points
more effectively into the emotional context of
people’s values and where they live. A greater focus
on how the consequences of climate change brush up
against the lives and values of those who have so far
been indifferent or opposed to action is critical to
creating a larger base of concern.



Some favoring climate change action fall into the
same trap that many other political activists do,
namely, reading the polls literally and following them
mechanically. In doing so, they miss the chance to act
authentically, based on their real concerns about this
issue – which, in the end, could be politically potent
in connecting to the values of American citizens.



An example cited at the Conference: Former
President Ronald Reagan won despite a gap between

politics

his issue stands and the public’s issue preferences.
Why? Because he was talking about issues largely as a
door to what he and many others saw as a more
important discussion on values – and on values, he
was more closely aligned with the American public.
Values are the key driver of the public’s decisionmaking and until those favoring action on climate
change do a better job of connecting to values, they
will not advance the issue.


Lack of awareness of elected leaders’ actions. Some polling

studies show that while large numbers of Americans believe
climate change is a serious or very serious problem (30-34
percent, depending on the poll), they also think – often wrongly
– that their leaders agree with them and are taking action,
whether in support of the Kyoto Protocol or otherwise.
Signiﬁcant numbers of Americans appear, based on polling, to
be unaware that the United States has been criticized for
falling short of European commitments on climate change
(www.worldpublicopinion.org).


Misguided preoccupation with the human vs. natural causation
issue. Some argue that proponents of climate change action have

allowed themselves to be drawn into a debate about whether and
to what extent observed climate change stems from natural versus
human causes. As a result, they have not seized the issue of
preparedness for and adaptation to the effects of climate change,
independent of cause.


Spillover from media incapacity. The media’s limited and often
poor coverage of climate change is sometimes blamed for political
disengagement from the climate change issue. In this view,
politicians respond to the agenda-setting function of the media.
When the media create little space for political leadership,
politicians are less likely – at least in critical mass – to step forward.



Failure on CAFE. Some elected officials have asserted that
opportunities to advance a bill on the Corporate Average Fuel
Efﬁciency (CAFE) standards have been squandered recently. Both
parties have failed to seize available legislative initiatives that
would address greenhouse gas emissions from transportation.



Little constituent pressure. Some polling of political leaders

indicates that while they personally favor action to address
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climate change, it has not risen to the top of their legislative
agenda, in part because they are unaware of their constituents’
support for action. Politicians have simply not experienced much
constituent pressure to act on climate change. As a result, there
are few champions of the issue, with acknowledged exceptions
such as Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman.


Failure to connect the problem (and the solutions) to people’s
lives. Climate change has been portrayed as an issue “out there in

the environment,” which tends to imply that it is beyond the
circle of citizens’ immediate lives. Political leaders have failed to
overcome this distancing effect by drawing the connections to
people’s personal lives. Nor have they articulated solutions that
speak to Americans’ personal responsibilities (e.g., energy use) or
aspirations (quality of life). Some state-level politicians note that
hunting is so core to people’s lives in their state that those who
want to advance the issue should – as the science warrants –
explain the implications that climate change will have on local
ecosystems and the ability to hunt in the future. If people
understand that hunting is threatened, they will pay attention.


Environmentalists’ lack of political acumen. Leaders of social

movements, including but not limited to environmentalists, tend
to be so narrowly focused on their issues that they sometimes fail
to understand how fundamental self-interest is to the politician’s
calculus. While there are exceptions, environmentalists need to be
more disciplined in evaluating how politicians ﬁlter their issues by
their electoral impact. Environmentalists must be able to generate
a constituent base, ensure issue-based media coverage and
succeed in orchestrating success in U.S. elections if they want
politicians to respond. In short, they need to reduce the risks and
accentuate the electoral beneﬁts of being associated with the issue.


Lack of trust in science. People typically rely on testimonials from

those they trust. For many constituencies, this is not experts on
climate change. Even if individuals are open to the fact that climate
change is happening and that humans can cause it, as several polls
have noted, they may not yet be willing to really evaluate and
understand what the consequences will be, perhaps in part because
they themselves don’t know what to do about the problem.
Psychologists have observed a tendency to discount a problem
when one does not believe it is possible to do anything about it.

politics



Safe seats. The prevalence of safe seats in the Congress limits the
opportunity for issue entrepreneurship on issues like climate
change. When well over 90 percent of elected members of Congress
face no plausible threat to their incumbency in the next election,
they are less inclined to respond to any constituent pressure that
can be mobilized on climate change or any other issue, to consider
the electoral implications of their inaction or to have to evaluate a
novel coalition. Translated into a diagnosis, this means that those
concerned about action on climate change may not have focused
enough on more fundamental forces on the political landscape that
shape the issue context (e.g., gerrymandering, as well as other
issues like campaign ﬁnance reform).



The sense that the environment and climate change are risky
issues electorally. In recent presidential campaigns, it appears

that the nominees who had championed the environment (and
climate change speciﬁcally) throughout their careers muted their
support because of perceived electoral downsides. Not everyone
agrees with this assessment, contending that the environment was
discussed by the campaigns but not covered much in the media.
But there was a stigma associated with these issues, and talking
about climate change in particular rendered one susceptible to
ridicule or at least to being called out of touch with the concerns
of average Americans. Against this downside, there is perceived to
be little compensating upside.




Those who have championed the environment,
especially Democrats, are conﬁdent that they will
win the votes of anyone disposed to making the
environment a driver of their vote, whereas talking a
lot about the issue risks the downside of losing other
voters, who might see economic risks from climate
change action, especially in states that have been
crucial in recent elections such as West Virginia.

Absence of boldness. Those who favor action on climate change

have not been bold enough in articulating a vision capable of
motivating Americans. They have been too literal in their reading
of polls and have crafted incrementalist policy solutions instead
of a game-changing vision.


Perception of mitigation costs as greater than costs of impacts.

Many Americans appear to believe that solutions to climate
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change will be costly and painful, and will offer little by way of
corresponding beneﬁts.


Insufficient awareness of community interests and values at
risk. Americans are generally unaware of the potential physical

impacts of climate change on their communities, so community
values and motivation are not triggered.


Lack of awareness of solutions. Even those Americans aware of

the issue of climate change often lack a grasp of what they can do
about it personally, or what actions governments or businesses
can undertake.




Skeptics with power. The forces opposing the dissemination of
climate change information are powerful. Individual
corporations and consortia of corporations have been effective at
convincing segments of the public that the science is uncertain
and that doing something will undermine the U.S. economy.


Climate change is an issue for which most citizens
must rely on testimonials from others rather than on
their own independent appraisal of the science. Many
recognize that climate change is an arena populated
by advocates, and so discount much of the evidence
quoted to them. There are few veriﬁably independent
and trusted authorities they can rely on. In this
context, the drumbeat of a small group of skeptics
can be very effective in inducing public inaction.



Skeptics have, even recently, been given inﬂuential
platforms, (e.g., novelist Michael Crichton’s 2005
testimony before the U.S. Senate’s Environment and
Public Works Committee).

Lag time in absorbing new science. Many scientiﬁc ﬁndings,

such as the impact of climate change on hurricane intensity, are
relatively new and people have not had enough time to come to
terms with their implications.


Too much Congressional strategy, too little public mobilization.

Those concerned about climate change have been operating with
what some regard as a faulty theory of social change. There has
been considerable preoccupation with crafting legislative options
(e.g., for a cap-and-trade system to limit greenhouse gas emissions)

politics

at the expense of “waking up” the American people in the
communities where they live and thereby creating a new
constituency equation to which the politics will eventually respond.


Limited credibility of environmentalists. Environmentalists lack

political credibility in many sectors and regions in the United
States. Nobody else has yet ﬁlled this credibility gap with respect
to climate change, and many Americans are therefore left with no
compelling proponents of climate action to follow.


Failure of leadership at the top. Amidst all the efforts to diagnose
reasons for the lack of climate change action, many Conference
participants noted that it is easy to overlook the simplest one: a
basic failure of leadership at the top in Washington, D.C.,
spanning multiple presidential administrations and across
changes in Congressional control. Those who championed the
issue did not always sustain this focus once elevated to higher
ofﬁce, while those who never championed it did not respond to
the imperative of action once presented with compelling data on
the risks and opportunities. There needs to be a searching
examination of why this has happened in the past and how it can
be changed in the future.

recommended actions
Recommendation #20: Design and execute a “New Vision for
Energy” campaign to encourage a national market-based transition to
alternative energy sources. Harness multiple messages tailored to
different audiences that embed the climate change issue in a larger set
of co-beneﬁt narratives, such as: reducing U.S. dependency on Middle
East oil (national security); penetrating global export markets with
American innovations (U.S. stature); boosting U.S. job growth (jobs);
and cutting local air pollution (health).


More compelling rationales for action. The climate change issue
does not yet supply sufﬁcient rationale for action on its own.
Rather, it needs to be packaged with a larger constellation of issues
that connect more easily with people’s salient concerns today and
their incentives to pursue proﬁtable opportunities (see box on page
50, entitled “A Transformative National Effort on Energy”).
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Relationship to other initiatives. Initiatives linking climate

change to energy issues are already underway, such as the
National Commission on Energy Policy, the Energy Future
Coalition Securing America’s Future Energy, and Set America
Free. These other initiatives need to be diagnosed before
launching another effort: Have they been successful so far, and if
not, why not? Do they weight climate change heavily enough in
their actions, communications and policy prescriptions? Should
any incremental effort be directed toward reinforcing these other
initiatives underway or launching a separate new campaign?


Positive vision. Sustain a positive, can-do tone in this campaign

to the extent possible.


Localize where possible. Many of the messages contained in the

larger campaign will lend themselves to identifying and
communicating local risks and beneﬁts.


Leverage-point strategy and grassroots. A leveraged strategy
focusing on political elites and opinion influencers and a
grassroots campaign are equally critical. Some are skeptical that a
true grassroots “public education” campaign on climate change is
really possible, given resource constraints, the complexity of the
issue and other factors.



Use the “purple” approach (i.e., combining red and blue states).

The bipartisan roots of environmental progress could be
highlighted much more effectively in support of this campaign,
both amidst the general public and elites. Those who know
environmental history tend to be aware that leaders in both
parties were critical to earlier successes, but the long shadow of
recent polarization may have eclipsed this fact.


Highlight market-based mechanisms. One virtue of incorporating

a cap-and-trade system into any proposed policy ﬁxes for climate
change is that it builds on the successful model of the acid rain
program that was created under a Republican administration
(George H.W. Bush), which could help moderate the partisanship
associated with such a proposed policy if highlighted properly.


Clean coal as part of the equation. Some argue that the United

States needs a major effort on clean coal and sequestration
speciﬁcally to reduce the sense of economic risk that has led the
coal industry to be generally opposed to climate change action.

politics

Recommendation #21: Recast climate change as a moral and faith

issue, not a scientiﬁc or environmental one. Catalyze a broader
coalition of allies around this moral common ground.


Moral framing. While the “new energy” vision described in

Recommendation #20 would broaden the coalition, another
distinct kind of reframing is needed to advance action on climate
change. This reframing would not seek to package climate change
with another issue set, but would treat the issue singularly and in
the context of values and morality.


Authenticity. Particularly given the current partisanship in the
United States, the moral implications of the climate change issue
need to be drawn out so that authentic, conscience-based
leadership can emerge. Values provide a basis for common ground
and ultimately are critical to underpinning action on issues like
climate change. Accordingly, this recommendation calls for
reaching across typical divides and ﬁnding a basis for collaboration
with communities, business, conservatives with environmental
interests (such as ﬁshing, hunting, hiking) and religious groups in
an effort to reshape the politics and signiﬁcantly boost public
understanding and urgency on climate change.



New voices. In recasting this issue, one intended outcome is that

politicians may hear stronger and more informed messages of
concern from newly engaged citizens and will thereby associate
climate change less with special interests or advocacy groups.


Harness the idealism of youth. Young people today are showing

increasing idealism about public service and are, in the words of
some at the Conference, “desperate for a cause.” As such, a moral
framing of climate change would be likely to harness this
motivation more than a number of alternative framings.


Avoid alarmism. The message of “urgency” on climate change

may risk a backlash in some religious communities, according to
one religious leader at the Conference. Communications about
the risks of climate change can appear to be hyped and alarmist,
and may thereby be discounted heavily among some religious
denominations. In this view, the preferred message and approach
should combine a methodical pursuit of what is feasible in today’s
power conﬁguration, along with a slower buildup of outside
support for more substantial action in the future.
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Expand boundaries over time. The route of fashioning a moral

appeal may create the greatest potential for expanding the
boundaries of what is politically possible over time.

Recommendation #22: Increase the emphasis on adaptation and

preparedness for climate change, both because it is warranted based on
climate change we are already committed to, but also because it could
be a back door to a more reality-based dialogue about mitigation.



In favor: Some believe that a preparedness agenda would trigger

actual behavior on the ground because municipalities and other
institutions charged with public safety would be prompted to
conduct evaluations and scenario analyses, and to quantify
needed resources. This activity would refocus people away from
debates over the certainty of scientiﬁc projections and toward the
what-if planning that is routine among professionals engaged in
preparedness for a variety of threats to society. This would
amount to building “national resilience,” a task that could gain
momentum from people’s desire to do something to address the
free-ﬂoating anxiety that pervades American society after 9/11
and Katrina. It would also level the playing ﬁeld so that the
frequently dramatized economic costs of policy action on climate
change can be more fairly compared with the costs of inaction,
which would include the need to scale-up adaptation activities.


Opposed: Some are concerned that a preparedness/adaptation

agenda would engender a sense of futility in the public and
therefore reduce attention to prevention/mitigation. Moreover,
some believe that the budget-constrained realities of the U.S.
Congress (and of many states) could preclude real discussion of
investing signiﬁcantly in adaptation or preparedness, thereby
inadvertently marginalizing the climate change issue.

Recommendation #23: Recruit a group of party elders from both
parties who are less ensconced in the gridlock of today’s Washington,
D.C., and would be more able to work together to promote constructive
action on climate change among the incumbents in their party.

politics



Recapture bipartisanship. Bipartisan cooperation on environ-

mental protection and many other issues is a fairly recent
phenomenon, having peaked in the 1970s in an initial burst of
legislation. One way to move toward recapturing it could be via the
strategy of identifying willing and able party elders, some of whom
participated in the 1970s legislation or bipartisan legislation since
then, to be part of a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to work with
the current ofﬁceholders in their respective parties and to mediate
joint sessions to identify actionable compromises.


Elders can help on non-legislative action, too. Identify concrete

and feasible opportunities to create bipartisan coordination that
begins outside the legislative arena, perhaps relying largely on
retired elected or other government ofﬁcials (e.g., have an
eminent individual reach out to Bill Clinton and George H.W.
Bush to consider expanding their collaboration on tsunami relief
to climate change).
Recommendation #24: Convene a group of political scientists, elected

ofﬁcials (and their staffers), and campaign operatives to conduct an
analysis and dialogue about the connections between systemic
problems in democratic governance in the United States and climate
change. For example, how do campaign ﬁnancing, redistricting and the
lack of competitive seats and other factors inﬂuence policy performance
on climate change?


Study the fundamentals. Some systemic issues, like redistricting to create non-competitive congressional seats, are
often recognized as serious by the public but are not connected
speciﬁcally to issues such as climate change. A vigorous and
detailed analysis of these connections could illuminate the basis
for gridlock on climate change and point the way toward new
strategies. For example, a seat-by-seat analysis that evaluates
both degree of competitiveness (swing district or safe seat) and
elected ofﬁcials’ positions on climate change could reveal
important patterns.
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Entertainment & Advertising
questions
Entertainment narratives, with their proven ability to engage the
emotions and reach wide audiences, can inﬂuence the public’s
understanding of climate change science. Do entertainment vehicles help
by penetrating public awareness and provoking further inquiry, or do they
undermine environmental literacy by propagating inaccurate science?
Can the entertainment industry be enlisted to advance understanding of
climate change science and its implications, while answering to its
primary goal of entertaining consumers?
Professional persuaders in the advertising and public relations industries
have mounted successful public education campaigns on many issues, and
have been employed to disseminate both information and disinformation
on climate change. How can their sophisticated tool kit best be deployed to
engender an appropriate level of public understanding and engagement
regarding climate change science?

diagnosis


Insiders talking to insiders. People concerned about climate

change seem to consist of a small community of people who just
talk to each another. There has been no consistent, large-scale or
effective strategy to broaden this circle or to reach a wider audience.


Limited public exposure to climate change science. Perhaps 80

percent of the U.S. public today gets its only scientific
information from the local weather report. And most weather
reports don’t explain how long term changes in the weather
might effect their area, or how these changes may be the result of
global warming. The public has little exposure to the mountain of
science indicating that climate change is a serious threat to their
well-being.


Yawn factor. Scientiﬁc information is critical to telling the climate

change story, but it has not been translated in an accessible or
entertaining way for non-scientists. It tends to be reported in
scientiﬁc journals that are read by a body of experts representing
a miniscule proportion of the country.
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Scientific information not reaching the most influential. There
are instances where prominent Americans have been exposed to
compelling presentations of climate change science and have
come away highly motivated to do something. But these
epiphanies have been rare. There has been a failure to convey
compelling and digestible elements of climate change science to
those who are best positioned to make a difference on the issue.
Some feel that we should not assume, however, that senior elected
ofﬁcials in Washington, who have blocked climate change action,
are unreachable or immune to inﬂuence.



It’s nobody’s job to communicate climate science. The lack of

success in communicating about climate change is not surprising,
given that it is not really anyone’s job to communicate the science
behind it on a systematic and ongoing basis. Crafting a
communications campaign on this issue may not be rocket
science, but it probably requires a centrally organized effort.
Some look to a coordinating entity or even one individual to
orchestrate a sustained and strategic messaging campaign. Others
contend that relying on one messenger or one entity would risk
narrowing the effort too much, and that different messengers and
different messages are needed to reach multiple target audiences.


Limitations of environmentalists as messengers. Many environ-

mental groups are managed by “policy wonks,” who perform
important roles on issues like climate change, but may not be up
to the daunting communications challenge ahead. Despite the
successes environmental groups have had in the past alerting the
public to speciﬁc threats, this threat may just be too massive for
any one sector to handle alone. Additionally, some of the leading
champions of action on climate change are discounted because of
their partisanship or perceived liberalism.


No neutral entity. Many feel that there is no trusted, neutral
authority on climate change science that the media and interested
constituencies can access without concerns about bias.



Inadequate resources. With few exceptions, the resources
available to communicate climate change science (money, people,
and infrastructure) have simply been inadequate, particularly in
comparison to the magnitude of the threat.



No repetition of key messages. Successful issue communications

require repetition of key messages, via multiple media, to

entertainment & advertising

effectively reach the intended recipients. Climate change
communications have been small-scale and infrequent, and have
not begun to approach the repetitive, immersive campaign that
would be needed to generate true public attention and concern.


Displacement by immediate issues. Americans routinely defer

consideration of long term issues like climate change because
others seem more immediate, more grave or more physically
threatening (e.g., terrorism). Climate change is, in fact, physically
threatening, but people have not made this connection at a
visceral level.


Past advertising efforts on climate change not connected to
action on the ground. Why didn’t a reported $12 million

television advertising campaign funded by media entrepreneur
Ted Turner succeed in “moving the needle” on public urgency
about climate change? Some draw military analogies to explain
that the campaign’s aerial campaign (i.e., television advertising)
wasn’t adequately supported by a ground offensive (i.e.,
grassroots organizing). The “I Found It” evangelical campaign in
the 1970s was suggested as a potential model for doing better. The
media portion of that campaign directed people to get in touch
with their local churches, which then executed the ultimate goals
of the campaign through personal connections.


Wall Street Journal’s position on climate change. Some single

out the adverse impact of the Wall Street Journal’s editorial
position against taking action on climate change, noting that it
has substantially limited the business community’s understanding of the issue and its motivation to act.


Co-benefits from addressing climate change have been underleveraged. There has been a striking failure to tie the issue of

climate change to more tangible threats from the same emissions
sources, such as conventional pollutants like particulates and
their impact on premature mortality. Advertising has not been
sufﬁciently creative in establishing these links in the public mind.


No mainstream vehicles. Those who have sought to

communicate climate change, like documentary ﬁlmmakers, are
relatively marginal figures in the American media and
communications universe. They are well intentioned, but do not
have a mainstream audience. Nobody is communicating about
climate change to the enormous NASCAR fan base, for example.
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Uncertainty about whether to emphasize fear or solutions. Are

people more motivated by fear or by hope? Some emphasize that
fear is vital to creating urgency, while others say either that fear
engenders counterproductive futility or that provoking fear on an
issue like climate change is not possible, given the time lag before
the worst consequences will be experienced.


Disinformation. Opponents of climate change action have
succeeded in their orchestrated campaign to undermine climate
change science, largely because that campaign has not been
discredited or overcome by a skilled, concerted and strategic
effort in support of scientiﬁc integrity broadly, and climate
change science in particular.



Not enough effort to reach out to diverse communities.

Communications on climate change may have been far too
narrow. Although there have been some advances in connecting
diverse communities to the climate change issue, the issue has still
not been the basis of an inclusive dialogue. Top-down messaging
campaigns are doomed to continued failure if those most at risk
from climate change are not listened to upfront and their voices
not incorporated.


Fragmentation of information sources on climate change.

Currently, there is no place where people can do “one-stop
shopping” for information on climate change. Instead, if they are
interested, they have to assemble information on their own to get
the big picture. Most decision-makers and the general public
don’t have the time for this, so their knowledge of the issue stays
incomplete.


Lack of agreement on goals. Messaging on climate change has

been stymied, in part, by lack of agreement on the intended goals.
For example:


Is the proper goal to inﬂuence individual consumers
to make responsible purchasing choices that lower
their personal greenhouse gas emissions or to
prompt them to exert direct political pressure on
governmental and business decision-makers to make
large-scale policy changes? Or both?



Is the target audience the general public or the elites
in government and business?
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Should the “issue public” on climate change be targeted
(i.e., the approximately 11 percent of Americans who
say they are personally concerned about climate
change, according to polling by political scientist Jon
Krosnick, and who are most prone to translate their
political views into behavior on the issue)? Should the
Roper Report’s “inﬂuentials” be targeted (i.e., the
approximately 10 percent of the population who are in
leadership positions in their local communities, such as
serving on PTAs, city councils, etc)?

The facts alone are not enough. Climate change communi-

cations have been skewed too much in favor of conveying facts,
important as they are, and too little in tapping emotions.
Insufﬁcient attention has been devoted to developing the humaninterest stories on climate change, which could offer emotional
hooks for audiences.


Limited awareness of solutions by general public. Very little has

been communicated about potential solutions to climate change.
People might be more motivated to accept the problem and act if
they think there is something speciﬁc they can do about it.


Limited awareness of solutions by business community.

Technological solutions are on the horizon, but many in the
business community have yet to recognize the proﬁt opportunities
presented by mitigation and adaptation solutions and strategies.

recommended actions
Recommendation #25: Create a new overarching communications

entity or project to design and execute a well-ﬁnanced public education
campaign on climate change science and its implications. This multifaceted campaign would leverage the latest social science ﬁndings
concerning attitude formation and change on climate change, and
would use all available media in an effort to disseminate rigorously
accurate information and to counter disinformation in real time.


Substantial resources. $50-100 million may be needed to fund

this effort, mostly for advertising creative work and ad buys, and
$2-3 million in annual costs reserved to cover the other ongoing
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functions. Required seed money to start the effort was estimated
at $100,000 over the ﬁrst year.


Broader base of messengers. The campaign would recruit a

range of messengers, from leaders in key sectors of society to
celebrities (novel voices from the professional sports world and
other popular cultural icons with credibility and prominence in
target communities).


Target leaders. Many feel that high-frequency messaging to
leaders and other elites would have more impact than a broad
campaign to the general public.



Vehicles. This multi-media campaign would include a range of
print and broadcast media (example: a $1 million buy of space on
the Op-Ed page of the Wall Street Journal – once per week for 20
weeks). Lower-cost buys in trade journals could also be inﬂuential.
Other popular culture ideas include incorporation of climate
change messages into songs, concerts, movies and other visual arts.



Repetition and simultaneity. Repeated exposure to the messages

would be especially important, and simultaneous reception from
multiple sources would favor success.


Visual drama. Dramatic visual portrayals of climate change are
persuasive, even in animated form (for example, one recently
exhibited animation has been touted for its persuasive inﬂuence
on a prominent financier: it showed reinforcing feedbacks
whereby melting arctic ice lowered the reﬂectivity of the earth’s
surface to the sun, and thereby accelerated global warming).



Message discipline. Even though different messages would be
crafted for different target audiences, it is important to discipline
the overall effort with a coordinated set of core messages so that
the impact is cumulative and reinforcing.



Pre-testing. Messages should be pre-tested, using not just
standard qualitative focus groups, but also quantitatively rigorous
methodologies. Persuasive impacts should be evaluated, along
with resiliency to counter-arguments that opposing interests
could launch in response.



Measurable outcomes. Baseline measurements of beliefs and

attitudes should be performed before the start of the effort and
measured against results afterward. The best social scientists should
be recruited to conduct surveys and other evaluative processes.
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Round-the-clock monitoring. The communications project

would continuously scan the news media, climate change science
ﬁndings, entertainment and advertising outlets and educational
materials for misinformation or disinformation on climate
change, and respond quickly to counter it.


Air and ground effort. The advertising effort should be simulta-

neously reinforced by grassroots-level activities.


No public face. The communications project entity itself would

likely have a low public proﬁle. Its key objective would be to
promote climate change science in a compelling and accurate way.
The issue of climate change science would be regarded as the client
and key resources and services of the project would be available to
all individuals and organizations working in that ﬁeld.


Avoiding duplication. It will be vital to ensure that all the key

players in all key domains are on board with this strategy and not
institutionally threatened by it. If there are parallel initiatives
already in process, it will be necessary to ﬁnd out who is involved
in these initiatives and to explore whether to collaborate in a
joint, uniﬁed effort.
Recommendation #26: Undertake systematic and rigorous projects to

test the impact of environmental communications in all media (e.g.,
advertising, documentary, feature ﬁlm) on civic engagement, public
opinion and persuasive outcomes. Use these to inform new creative
work on multi-media climate change communications.


Applied social science needed. There is a shortfall in the
application of social science methods to the understanding of the
public’s opinions on climate change. A variety of disciplines –
including psychology, linguistics, communications and political
science – have developed robust insights into the process of
attitude formation, persistence, and change. While the small subﬁeld of environmental psychology has advanced in recent years,
the amount and quality of work on climate change particularly is
extraordinarily limited in comparison to its intellectual and
practical signiﬁcance. Accordingly, more social science research is
needed on public attitudes and behavior regarding climate change.



Experimental subjects and data available. A ready subject for

analysis awaits in the form of many ﬁctional and non-ﬁctional
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creative works dedicated to increasing public understanding of
environmental issues, and climate change in particular. Some of
these have included baseline and post-hoc audience evaluations
and could offer available data for analysis. What inﬂuence have
these creative works had on the public (both at large and by
segment) as they have been disseminated? This inﬂuence should
be evaluated both in laboratory settings and in ﬁeld studies.


One page narrative. Given the overload of scientiﬁc information
about climate change, there is a need for a concise one-page,
single spaced narrative about climate change that provides a
compelling call to civic engagement. It should specify concisely
and arrestingly what has happened and what might happen as a
result of climate change, and provide solutions for what can be
done. The issue should be presented in a way that draws on the
cognitive psychological work on framing, and other disciplinary
findings. It should be made so compelling that it would
disseminate itself through email forwarding.



Yale/Sea Studios Initiative. As part of the follow-up to the
Conference, the Environmental Attitudes & Behavior Project at
Yale’s Center on Environmental Law & Policy is exploring the
creation of a joint initiative with the Sea Studios Foundation to
develop and apply social science findings about attitude
formation and change on climate change to the next phase of Sea
Studios’ acclaimed Strange Days on Planet Earth television series
and multi-media communications effort, which was done in
collaboration with National Geographic. Planning is underway
and will likely include survey work, psychology experiments and
the convening of public dialogues. Several of the scholars who
attended the Conference are likely to be involved.

Recommendation #27: Embed messages about climate change into a

variety of existing communications channels, such as weathercasting
and entertainment vehicles.


Weathercasting. Every day, 200 million people in America watch
the weather report. For 80 percent of these people, it is their only
connection with a scientiﬁc communications vehicle. Weather
reporting should go a step further in connecting weather events
to climate change in a scientiﬁcally credible and engaging way.
Efforts should be made to reach out to the major broadcast and
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Internet weather report outlets and at the American
Meteorological Association to increase reportage on climate
change.


Entertainment. Organizations such as the Environmental Media
Association are already promoting environmental messaging in
the entertainment world. These efforts should be supported,
funded and extended to ensure that the climate change message is
embedded in existing entertainment vehicles.
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Education
questions
How successful have campaigns to remediate low levels of the public’s
scientiﬁc literacy been, and what more should be done to scale up such
efforts in relation to climate change science speciﬁcally?
What forces have constrained the ability of the secondary and higher
education systems to make climate change a greater priority, and how
might they be overcome?
Should universities put greater emphasis on inter-disciplinary,
problem-oriented science driven by outcomes on issues like climate
change mitigation?
Have formal educational channels been underused as conduits for
disseminating climate change science?
What is the role of informal education settings, such as museums and
public libraries?
What blend of educational experiences are needed to provide the depth,
context and experiential immersion required for an environmentally
literate society capable of addressing complex challenges like climate
change?

diagnosis


Low environmental literacy. Despite signiﬁcant efforts and

improvements in environmental education, national environmental literacy persists at a low level and K-12 environmental
education programs are not making the impact that they should.
Weaknesses in Americans’ environmental literacy are especially
apparent in knowledge about climate change, an issue where key
causal sequences and knowledge of basic scientiﬁc principles are
essential.


Poor science education. Some note that poor environmental

literacy and limited knowledge of climate change are
manifestations of a more profound problem with the low quality
of science education in the United States. While there is
occasional Op-Ed commentary about the broader problem of our
students’ low ranking on scientiﬁc competency tests, and sporadic
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hand-wringing about what this will mean for U.S. technological
competitiveness, few have noted the implications for public
understanding and motivation on issues like climate change.


Boxed into natural sciences only. To the extent that climate
change is taught in schools, it is typically taught as a natural
science issue, rather than through various disciplinary lenses such
as ethics/morality, social studies or economics. By focusing only
on the science pathway, educators have narrowed the rich variety
of opportunities to connect climate change to individual
students’ lives. They have also made it likely that advances in
climate change understanding will proceed no faster than
advances in beleaguered science education generally.



Indoor kids. For the ﬁrst time, we are facing a generation of

children that has not spent signiﬁcant time outside, and as a
result, has a more tenuous connection to the habitats, species,
farms and other natural resources at risk from climate change.
Children today spend an average of six hours per day in front of
screens (TVs and computers). Environmental educators must
contend with this altered context for their efforts.


No emotional connection. Caring about the environment is
about the heart as well as the mind. Science and environmental
educators have frequently missed the emotional piece that is
critical for people to connect with an issue. Connecting
emotionally is especially important on climate change because
the issue is so inherently abstract.



Not cumulative. Environmental education is not sequenced so

that knowledge of issues builds on lessons from years past.
Because it is so sparse, it is generally taught randomly at different
times in the year.


Under-trained teachers. Many teachers, even science teachers, do

not understand the climate change issue or have a science
background; many are uncomfortable teaching science. Teachers
are also often focused on preparing students for national
proﬁciency tests and increasingly for the high-stakes exams
mandated under the No Child Left Behind Law. Issues such as
climate change, which are not considered necessary for science
proﬁciency, are often neglected.
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Scattershot education beyond K-12. Environmental education has

been too random in targeting various sectors of society. A challenge
for the ﬁeld of environmental education has been teaching the
issue at a community or family level. Children often inﬂuence their
parents on environmental issues, which may be more difﬁcult for a
complex, multi-tiered issue such as climate change if parents do
not have the requisite foundational knowledge.


No coordinated adult education. Efforts at working with adult

educators and their students on climate change have been sparse
and random. This includes formal degree-based education of
adults in community colleges and informal continuing education
courses, where climate change could be incorporated but largely
has not been.


Chilling effect of partisanship on climate change education.

Some teachers have been reluctant to teach climate change in the
classroom because they have become aware that the issue is
charged with partisan overtones. In light of the debates over
evolution in the classroom (e.g., the Kansas School Board case),
these teachers may be reluctant to expose themselves to charges
of teaching material that some parents object to.


Remoteness. For most Americans, climate change remains an

abstract and remote issue. Given this, it is unclear what types of
educational vehicles can best present the urgency and relevancy
of climate change.


Too much information. While it seems clear that more people

need to have access to information about climate change, how
much information is digestible? Have those seeking to educate
people about climate change loaded them up with “too much
information” – the TMI problem?


Too much reliance on formal education. It has been estimated

that schools impart only 3 to 7 percent of what the average
individual learns in a lifetime. Those seeking to educate the
populace about climate change must identify where else they can
connect with people and, in particular, ﬁnd out what people take
a natural interest in and will seek to learn themselves. A
particularly important sector is informal adult education.


Insufficient segmentation. Those seeking to educate the public

on climate change have rarely segmented their audience in a
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strategic way. Some (probably small) segment of the population
appears to want to invest in becoming truly educated on climate
change and other environmental issues – and educational
resources can usefully be invested in them. Most others can likely
be placed along a continuum from marginally interested to actively
resistant. Education may play a role in moderating resistance levels,
but is unlikely to create active learners across this spectrum. Some
environmental educators have recognized the potential value in
doing more effective targeting, for example, in aiming to educate
the “inﬂuentials,” whom Roper has characterized as those who are
active in local leadership in their community (e.g., on the PTA or
town council). One Roper Green Gauge study, which measured
conservation behavior, found that while only 1 in 10 average
Americans ﬁt into the highest environmental category of “true
blues,” a disproportionately high 4 in 10 people characterized as
“inﬂuentials” ﬁt into this category. So far, this kind of segmentation
analysis has not been adequately used by environmental educators
to allocate their resources and efforts.


Lack of teachable moments. Education is often driven by

“teachable moments” or hooks that connect to salient issues.
Climate change offers precious few of these. This is partly a
function of the relative lack of news media coverage, but it is also
intrinsic to the issue’s spatially and temporally distant impacts. It
is possible that Katrina could constitute such a “teachable
moment.” Is Katrina the Sputnik of climate change education?


Not enough local input. Climate change education has largely
been a top-down issue that allows little room for local input. While
there have been useful efforts to develop experiential learning
opportunities around local data gathering that can be submitted to
climate change scientiﬁc endeavors, these have been sporadic and
limited. As a result, educators rarely see opportunities to connect
classroom work to the climate change issue.



Collective action issue. Climate change is a collective action
issue, whereas some of the issues on which education has
succeeded offer a tighter connection between action and
outcomes (e.g., smoking, sexually transmitted diseases). Climate
change requires many causal steps from individual action to
outcome, which makes the educational task especially
challenging.

education

recommended actions
Recommendation #28: Improve K-12 students’ understanding of

climate change by promoting it as a standards-based content area
within science curricula and incorporating it into other disciplinary
curricula and teacher certiﬁcation standards. Use the occasion of the
state reviews of science standards for this purpose, which are being
prompted by the states’ need to comply with the Fall 2007 start of highstakes science testing under the No Child Left Behind Act.


A valuable window. Teachers are increasingly obligated to

concentrate on high-stakes exit exams and other standardized
tests as a result of the accountability provisions of the No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) law. In fact, after an initial focus on
mathematics and reading testing, the NCLB law will require state
testing on science starting in the fall of 2007, which adds new
priority to the improvement and application of state science
standards. State preparation for this new accountability on
science education provides a valuable window of opportunity for
promoting the incorporation of climate change content.


Develop content standards. Funding should be secured as soon

as possible for the specialized task of developing climate change
content standards and promoting their incorporation into the
state science standards.


Design climate change curricula. Climate change scientists
should be recruited to work with a selected group of leaders and
instructional designers in the K-12 curriculum ﬁeld to design
curricula that fulﬁll the proposed new climate change standards.



Recruit educational leaders. Major educational leaders and

organizations should be cultivated and recruited to this effort.
Organizations like the National Science Teachers Association,
which promotes national standards, are currently reviewing the
quality of the state science standards and helping states to
prepare. The U.S. National Research Council has set up guidance
for use by states in developing their assessment system. The
ongoing reviews reportedly accomplished a great deal in 2005 and
will continue through the start of the high-stakes testing in the
2007-2008 school year and for at least a couple of years after that.
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Engage professional associations. Leading professional
associations must also be engaged speciﬁcally to understand and
promote the climate change standards. One such association is
the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO), a
nonpartisan, nonproﬁt organization of public ofﬁcials who head
departments of elementary and secondary education in the
states. The Council is well suited for this task, given its mandate
to develop member consensus on major educational issues and
express their views to civic and professional organizations, federal
agencies, Congress, and the public. Another association that
could be pivotal to success in advancing climate change
standards, if cultivated effectively, is the Association for
Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD), a nonproﬁt,
nonpartisan organization that represents 175,000 educators
globally and includes superintendents, supervisors, principals,
teachers, professors of education, and school board members.



Train the teachers on the climate curricula. Teachers should then

be trained speciﬁcally to teach the proposed new standards-based
climate change curricula, through on-going professional
development and other means. It is also proposed that climate
change be promoted for inclusion in the teacher certiﬁcation
process.


Earth sciences and climate. By way of background, the current
state science standards address earth sciences but rarely blend in
climate change. In some states, climate change receives
parenthetical mention, but to ensure signiﬁcant student exposure
and understanding it needs to be woven in as a signiﬁcant content
or subject area. Making it part of the standards and the
curriculum rather than an optional topic will mitigate the
problem of science teachers avoiding it due to concerns that it is
partisan and will provoke a parental backlash.



Strengthen science education overall. While the priority here is

on making climate change more explicit and prominent as a
subject area, resources should also be invested in remedying the
quality of science education overall, especially the critical
thinking and analysis skills so often missing in K-12 programs.
These foundational skills are important in paving the way for a
sound, contextual understanding of speciﬁc issues like climate
change. Evidence suggests that there is substantial room for
improvement. The science standards used today in most states are
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inadequate for reasonable science literacy, and continuing efforts
to promote application of the National Science Education
Standards should be supported. The Thomas B. Fordham
Foundation published a 50-state review called the State of State
Science Standards 2005, showing that the reworking of state
science standards in a majority of U.S. states over the past ﬁve
years has not gone far enough, but that more involvement by
bench scientists, better editing and emulation of the best state
models could still yield appreciable beneﬁts.


Go beyond science to history, social studies, etc. While the

appropriate focus of this recommendation is on incorporating
climate change into science standards, the issue is inherently multidisciplinary and should also be actively considered for
incorporation into history, social studies, economics and other
curricula. This broader approach is consistent with the Conference’s
overall emphasis on moving climate change out of its customary
silos of science, environmentalism, and insider policy debate.
Recommendation #29: Organize a grassroots educational campaign

to create local narratives around climate change impacts and solutions,
while mobilizing citizen engagement and action. Kick the campaign off
with a National Climate Week that would recur on an annual basis.


Convene educational leaders. To launch this effort, convene a

major meeting of formal and informal educators, as well as other
key leaders, to identify all appropriate formats, channels and
tools. Channels could include zoos, schools, museums, and
church and summer camps.


Emphasize informal activities. While schools would be a venue

for some of the activities, this grassroots initiative would be
distinct from Recommendation #28 in that it would rely not on
formal adoption of curricula, but on informal activities in and
around schools, especially more ﬂexible, non-school venues
where so-called “free choice” learning occurs (e.g., zoos). It could
include a climate change project day in K-12 schools to harness
youth interest and to get families talking.


Not just for kids. This campaign would have children as a key

target audience, but would also reach out to adults, family units,
and especially community leaders and “inﬂuentials.”
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Hyper-local issues. To overcome the acknowledged challenges of
teaching about a long-term, global issue, this campaign would be
optimized to feature local or what some participants called
“hyper-local” issues. It would identify local topics that local
citizens are already engaged on, and link climate change to it in
scientiﬁcally appropriate ways.



Mechanisms for national integration. The effort would mix these

local elements with a coordinated national education strategy. All
participating localities would be integrated into a nationally
cohesive campaign using a variety of technology platforms,
including a richly interactive webpage, group email lists, etc.


Ubiquity. The campaign would create and distribute innovative

informational or awareness products and aim to achieve the kind
of ubiquity that Lance Armstrong “Live Strong” bracelets or AOL
startup disks did. Wearable, symbolic products should be
considered, along with distilled information devices like pocket
cards with climate change facts (e.g., 10 things everyone should
know about climate change) or light switch stickers about energy
use and climate change, etc.


National Climate Week. The National Climate Week kickoff

could be held in September during hurricane season. The week
would serve as a focal period of activity and would reduce the
burden of top-down orchestration of the grassroots campaign,
since all organizations could be urged to independently plan
events during this week.


Hands-on engagement. Emphasize engaging, hands-on projects

that employ veriﬁed methods for effective education. Identify
local competitions to devise the best and most locally appropriate
ideas for activities. Some possible projects:


Measure local watermarks and other indicators of
coastline subsidence and sea-level rise;



Chart snow frequency and snow lines;



Measure climate-sensitive ecosystem and biodiversity changes, as in local bird counts (see Operation
Ruby Throat as an example, or the annual Christmas
Audubon bird counts, which are submitted to and
analyzed by qualiﬁed ornithologists);
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Conduct mercury blood level tests (reﬂecting the cobeneﬁts of controlling for greenhouse gases and
mercury emissions from power plants and other
sources);



Initiate carbon reduction challenges for all local
community college campuses;



Map local points of climate change vulnerability and
required adaptations;



Track local indicators of seasonal timing;



Create Boy Scout or Girl Scout merit badges that
reﬂect applied knowledge and monitoring of climate
change;



Undertake carbon footprint measurements at
different levels: family footprint, city footprint, etc.



Find sponsors. Identify business or non-proﬁt sponsors who
could raise the proﬁle of, and funding available to, these projects
(e.g., local utilities that could incorporate some of the energyrelated actions into their demand-side management or socialbeneﬁt charge programs). Another potential sponsor is the
various state-wide Interfaith Power & Light organizations.



Keep winter cool. One example of a corporate-led effort is the

Aspen Skiing Company’s Keep Winter Cool campaign for skiers,
which relates climate change to both a customer/tourist and a
local economic development concern.


Agile and topical. Ideally, this effort would be agile enough to
respond to teachable moments presented by natural or political
events, such as Hurricane Katrina. Participating educators should
be ﬂexible enough to harness not only traditional teachers, but
also TV broadcasters, weather reporters and business leaders.

Recommendation #30: Identify and execute opportunities to
incorporate climate change content into instructional technologies,
devices and software products, including video games and educational
simulations such as SimCityTM.
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Target products. Ensure that the products reach across a range of

interest and skill levels. We now have much more ability to
narrowcast to reach different youth segments than when Sesame
Street became a core educational media outlet for addressing
literacy broadly and we should exploit this capability.


Desktop climate simulations. Reach out to IBM, Apple, Dell and

other original equipment manufacturers to explore bundling of
simpliﬁed climate change simulation models (General Circulation
Models) or other climate change-related tools into the educational
versions of their products. Use these platforms to expand
opportunities for “citizen-science” and experiential engagement.
One focus could be teaching how simulation models are calibrated
in relation to real-world empirical observations and inviting users
to enter local measurements into their program.

Recommendation #31: Create a variety of academic and nonacademic competitions centered on climate change, or harness existing
competitions by introducing climate change as a topic.


Debating climate change. Make climate change policy a debate

topic for established high school competitions around the
country, especially in climate-sensitive areas where natural events
have highlighted the policy or planning signiﬁcance of the issue
(e.g., Florida).


Calculating the family carbon footprint. Launch a program
whereby children and adults could participate in a competition to
learn about family energy use – their greenhouse gas “footprint,”
calculating their energy expenses, and ﬁguring out how to reduce
energy use. This competition could be judged by a local utility
and the award could be free energy.

Recommendation #32: Following the trend toward niche channels
and narrowcasting, create a TV show or entire channel dedicated to
educational and engaging coverage of all dimensions of climate change,
ranging from the natural sciences to policy developments in the United
States and abroad.

business & finance

Business & Finance
questions
How has climate change science inﬂuenced the behavior of the business
and ﬁnance sectors?
Do business leaders have adequate direct exposure to authoritative
climate change science versus intermediary translations?
Why do some businesses move down a path of voluntary action on
climate change while others resist?
How often do cases of resistance stem from genuine problems of scientiﬁc
translation versus other factors, such as an overriding imperative to stave
off regulation?
What are the key causes and elements of business confusion about climate
change science?
What role might an improved ﬂow of climate change science – including
integrated models of physical and economic costs and beneﬁts – have in
encouraging businesses not only to take voluntary action but also to cooperate
in shaping a fair regulatory response commensurate with the problem?
Are business leaders convinced by the evidence of proﬁtable business
opportunities in low-carbon technologies – and what kinds of scientiﬁc
and technical data might help close any gaps impeding broader
commercial pursuit of this segment?

diagnosis


Little clarity about timing and impacts of climate change.

Although many business leaders have a basic grasp of climate
change science, there is a pervasive lack of adequate information
on the “timing” of climate change impacts – and therefore the
timeline for a response. Without deadlines, it is difﬁcult for many
business leaders to focus. Some caution that business leaders’
familiarity with climate change science should not be
overestimated, and that many simply don’t believe what they’ve
heard. Finally, some feel that business leaders are pragmatic and
focus more on the likelihood of climate change regulation, and its
impact for their business, than on their personal beliefs about the
science.
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Perceptions of cost, but not of opportunity. Many businesses

believe that action to mitigate climate change would be
economically disruptive, and at the same time they are unaware
of the proﬁt opportunities associated with low-carbon or nocarbon products and services. Given this imbalance between
perceived threat and opportunity, they are not inclined to engage
on the climate change issue. Moreover, while many see the beneﬁt
of delaying action, few have grasped the likelihood that delay
could substantially increase costs rather than reducing them.


Lack of customer demand. Businesses are attuned, above all, to

their customers. Few businesses are hearing or experiencing
demand from their retail or wholesale customers for low-carbon
or no-carbon product offerings. The “demand pull” is not
operating yet to drive action.


Costs to most carbon-intensive sectors. The business community
is not monolithic and indeed for some especially carbonintensive sectors climate change regulation does pose a
substantially unavoidable risk to proﬁts (e.g., coal companies,
whose foreseeable proﬁt margin on coal reserves would likely be
marked down if a carbon tax or other signal were to be imposed).
Thus, while the threat/opportunity balance could usefully be
rethought in many sectors, limits exist in some sectors. Some
insist instead that higher-value uses for coal exist, other than
combustion as fuel, and that those options are not being
exploited today due to inertia and other factors.



Concerns about slippery slope to excessive regulation. Some

business leaders are concerned that acknowledging climate
change or entering into a policy dialogue to address it could lead
them down a slippery slope toward a cumbersome or overly
stringent regulatory program. The regulatory realm is one in
which their accustomed level of control is reduced, so many ﬁnd
it easier to “just say no.”


Concern about liability. Businesses have experienced or observed

the way that past waves of liability and litigation have taken a toll
on entire sectors and are reluctant to participate in making climate
change another such problem. Legally oriented NGOs and
entrepreneurial trial lawyers have undertaken lawsuits against
businesses for damages allegedly caused by climate change, and
this could expand depending on how business responsibility for
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the issue is framed by legislators, the courts and the general public.
In this context, businesses may be especially risk-averse.


Short-term focus. Most of the pressures to which businesses

respond are short-term in nature: quarterly earnings
performance, review and evaluation by securities analysts and
investors, and near-term competitive threats. Few if any of these
drivers in the decision-making context for businesses have
signaled the need for more action on climate change. For
example, utility executives have said that it is very difﬁcult to
focus on climate change unless the analysts ask them about it.


Undervaluation of risks. Businesses have limited inclination or

capacity to measure the long-term business impacts of climate
change and therefore few make a decision to disclose it as a
material exposure or liability, unless shareholder action prompts
them to do so.


Active opposition by threatened minority. Many business
leaders have been lumped in with the most threatened minority
of the business community, whether through trade associations
or an assumption by outsiders that they are part of a monolithic
block. Some say that this amounts to a variation of the “tyranny
of the minority” problem. Few business leaders have taken steps
to disassociate themselves from disinformation campaigns on
climate change science mounted by others, even when they
disagree with those campaigns.



Faith in technology (and other variants of overconfidence).

Business leaders are often inclined – due to favorable experience
with technology advances – to have faith in technology’s ability
to help society mitigate or adapt to climate change, which can
undermine the impetus to take action of other sorts. More
broadly, business leaders are among those with greatest
conﬁdence in their problem-solving ingenuity, which needs to be
turned from a basis for inaction and delay to seeing the problem
as an outlet for their skills.


Definition of climate change as an environmental problem, and
associated business/environmentalist antagonism. While some

are working to change this, the issue of climate change has long
been associated with environmentalism, which has caused it to be
subsumed within the antagonistic dynamics between business
and environmentalists.
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Perverse incentives in utility sector. Many utilities still face
perverse incentives, whereby they reduce their proﬁts if they
establish demand-side efficiency programs that reduce the
amount of energy they sell. Some state utility commissions have
addressed this by fashioning policy reforms that decouple utility
proﬁts from megawatt hours sold.



Business leaders concerned about climate change are not yet
ready to actively reach out to their peers. It would be helpful if

those business executives who have begun to address climate
change could speak to those who are neutral or resistant, including
exposing them to the science, impacts and economics. Despite the
need for this peer-to-peer dialogue, some of those most engaged on
climate change have, so far, said they are not yet ready to reach out
and enlarge the circle.


Climate change is not conceptualized and communicated
enough as, fundamentally, an issue of energy. Some argue

strongly that climate change has not adequately been equated
with energy in the minds of business leaders. As a result, the issue
has been fraught with more baggage and complexity than
necessary. Some even note that a phrase like “It’s the energy,
stupid,” would help crystallize this. Once energy is recognized as
the linchpin, the debate can be reformed as proﬁt-making
opportunities (for many but not all sectors) and interconnections
with other valued goals like energy independence, jobs, national
security, etc. can be made.


Limited business analytics for addressing environmental risks.

Businesses routinely lack a basis for integrating environmental
costs and risks – especially novel ones like climate change – into
their standard accounting and other decision-support analytics.
In cases where no price signal is yet associated with an
environmental cost – as in the lack of a price on carbon in the
United States – businesses have little systematic capacity for
anticipating and acting on these costs. Energy price volatility is
prompting a reexamination of exposures and trends in the U.S.,
a process that would beneﬁt from including related factors like
carbon price and liability anticipation.


Not enough time. Sometimes the simplest explanations are the

most powerful. The exigencies of corporate leadership leave little
time to think about issues like climate change. Immediate topics
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like the next marketing campaign or the new product roll-out
tend to be all-consuming.


Inertia, especially stranded assets. Businesses experience

considerable inertia because of normal organizational issues and
the fear of regulations that could strand long-lived capital. Once
you have invested in a huge coal-ﬁred power plant, for example,
it’s more expensive to shut it down than to keep operating it.


Lack of regulation. Some believe that there should be regulation

to create a common playing ﬁeld. Without regulation, climate
change action is impeded by a fundamental collective action
problem: Why move ﬁrst if your competitors might not? You’ll
not only risk being at a competitive disadvantage, and you won’t
really mitigate the climate change problem itself.


First-mover risks. Businesses are understandably reluctant to be
ﬁrst-movers and ﬁnd themselves at a competitive disadvantage
vis-à-vis others in their sector who are hanging back. For those
that nonetheless consider getting out ahead of their peers, there
are risks of exposing information about operations as part of a
baseline emissions inventory or other early steps on the path to
action, which then elicit unwelcome scrutiny and complaints of
timidity from NGOs.



Risks of political retaliation. The politicization of the climate

change issue has reverberated through the business community.
Some business leaders have been privately told not to take a
forthcoming stance on the issue by politicians who are important
to their ability to get things done, such as the permitting of new
facilities. This is a sort of “upside down” democracy, where
politicians are lobbying their constituents.


Lack of national U.S. leadership. Given the relative absence of

national political leadership on climate change, business leaders
have little reason to believe that a regulatory program is likely to be
applied in the near-term. Some who have invested in environmental ﬁnance opportunities abroad created by the Kyoto Protocol
say they frequently see how much the rest of the world is looking
to the United States to assume a market-shaping leadership role.


Letting business off the hook. While the lack of national political

leadership is frequently described as a key obstacle to meaningful
action on climate change, some business leaders note that a
predominant focus on the political vacuum may “let business off
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the hook.” Some even say that business needs to get together and
assume the leadership role and until it does, the government will
not move forward. So the path forward appears stymied, in part,
by the “who goes ﬁrst?” problem.


Environment seen more as a PR issue than a real one. Some

business leaders do not see climate change or other
environmental issues as arenas requiring signiﬁcant engagement
or performance, because the issues have become overly associated
with PR or other corporate reputation-enhancing activities. To
the extent that climate change is regarded as part of triple bottom
line reporting or other reputation-oriented activities, it may not
get the serious, executive consideration that the science and
economic risks indicate is warranted.


Perception that climate change impacts could actually help
business. Some business leaders in climate-sensitive sectors

anticipate that climate change could actually help their businesses
and so are especially disinclined to do anything to mitigate the
risk. For example, some in the ski industry have reportedly said
privately that slightly higher temperatures would mean more
time in the optimal temperature range for snowfall, which they
would welcome.


Inclination to wait for definitive impacts. Some in the business

community say they’re “deeply concerned” about the climate
change issue and “when it starts happening, we’ll address it.” This
approach works for many problems, but not for problems like
climate change with a long lag time between cause and effect.


Trade association dynamics often favor inaction. Trade
associations are often inclined to choose a position on issues like
climate change that will engender the least resistance from among
their membership. In this least-common-denominator calculus,
noisy opponents are often sufﬁciently inﬂuential to prevent
taking action.

business & finance

recommended actions
Recommendation #33: The Business & Finance working group at the

Conference composed the following eight-principle framework, and
proposed that it be disseminated broadly to trade associations and
individual business leaders (especially at the CEO and board level) as
a set of clear and feasible actions that businesses can and should take
on climate change.

eight principles for corporate
engagement on climate change
1.

Analyze and disclose financial risks and opportunities
related to climate change. Undertake a comprehensive

review of carbon emissions associated with products,
facilities and transportation, and analyze related ﬁnancial
risks and opportunities, including the pro forma impact on
P&Ls and balance sheets. Financial analysis will factor in
the potential costs of carbon under different scenarios.
2.

Develop company-wide plan to address climate change
risks and opportunities. Develop a plan and transparent

process for addressing and setting goals for reducing CO2
emissions. Goals must be meaningful, including taking
advantage of business opportunities. The plan must deal
with overall carbon emissions from business activities over
the short and long term, including speciﬁc plans for
products, facilities, transportation, and suppliers.
3.

Educate CEOs and board members. Provide scientiﬁc and
ﬁnancial education of CEOs and relevant corporate board
members.

4. Educate customers. Educate customers on the carbon
composition of products through websites, labels, bill
stuffers, as it relates to the relevant business.
5.

Require major suppliers to adopt principles for corporate
engagement on climate change.
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6. Engage in policy dialogue at the state, regional and national
levels. Support efforts to build a market-based, long-term plan
to address rising greenhouse gas emissions. Business leaders
should establish an internal and external dialogue to discuss
the following propositions:
a.

The scientiﬁc evidence of climate change is
sufﬁcient to justify that action be taken now, in a
planned way, in order to avoid later, deeper cuts
that could seriously damage the economy.

b. Support a long-term goal for global greenhouse
gas emissions from all segments of the U.S.
economy at or below today’s levels by 2050.
c.

Use a broad-based approach to achieve this goal,
including market-based mechanisms, innovative
technology, education, and informed and
supportive policy development.

d. Support international action, with the United
States leading the debate through diplomacy
abroad and by example at home.
e.

Continue scientiﬁc research on climate change,
and amend policy and practices as scientiﬁc
consensus warrants.

f.

Assure honest and fair deliberations in policy
debate, and take steps to limit manipulation of
scientific information or other dishonest
discourse.

7. The investment community should require clear financial
analysis related to climate change from publicly traded
companies and develop its own competency for analysis of
corporate risks associated with climate change.

8. Insurance companies should assess the financial impact of
climate-related events. Given the far-reaching impact of
climate-related claims, insurers and re-insurers should provide
historic and forward-looking risk assessment and a plan for
addressing increasing claims and adjust pricing of policy based
on revised and updated data.

business & finance

Commentary and Actions in Support of Recommendation #33


The vision. See the vision statement on page 50, entitled “A

Transformative National Effort on Energy.” Many at the
Conference agreed that this statement could serve as a highly
motivating preamble to the eight principles.


A place to begin. The level of engagement of corporate leaders on
climate change needs to be substantially intensiﬁed – now. Many
business leaders have refrained from taking steps on the issue due,
in part, to its enormity (“too big and complex”). Put simply, they
are vaguely concerned about climate change, but do not know
where to begin. Therefore, the group aspired to supply a focal set
of principles to overcome this particular start-up obstacle and
fashion a path forward.



Validating the need. One inﬂuential corporate leader said: “If I had

something that I could take to everyone in my trade association to
get them thinking about climate change, that would be great.” This
moment was a key inspiration for composing the eight principles.


Implementation guide. The group debated whether a new agency
would be helpful in disseminating the principles, but concluded
that a better approach would be to commission a neutral entity to
produce an “implementation guide” that would assist a company
in implementing some or all of the eight principles.



Coordinating approach for NGOs. Major non-governmental
organizations (for example, NGOs like Environmental Defense
and NRDC, both with considerable budgets dedicated to climate
change) could consider joining forces on the eight-principle
framework, or a comparable statement, in order to send a uniﬁed
message to business and increase the likelihood of constructive
engagement.



The Business Roundtable as a venue. There may be particular

business organizations or trade associations that could be key
agents for disseminating or creating a set of dialogues on the eight
action principles. The Business Roundtable, for example, has a
modest effort underway on climate change, and it is possible that
expanding on this could be worthwhile. A subsidiary
recommendation, then, is to take the eight principles to the
Business Roundtable and explore their interest in partnering to
promote their implementation.
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Private dialogues. Whether or not trade associations become a
platform for dialogue on the eight principles, a parallel effort
should be undertaken to orchestrate private, peer-to-peer
dialogues about them between business executives. This would
entail asking those leaders who agree to undertake
implementation of the principles to also reach out to the handful
of fellow executives to whom they are closest, encouraging them
to follow a similar process of engagement.



Segmentation into leaders and laggards? Some favor

segmentation of the business community into leaders and
laggards, so that those who are prepared to move rapidly toward
implementation of the principles can do so without being held
back by those who are resistant. A “leader strategy” could create
virtuous cycles whereby role models of engagement and
constructive action attract others to follow, whereas a “consensus
strategy” could hamper progress as the community conforms to
the least-common-denominator approach.


Dissociate from disinformation. Some want to make Principle

6(f) even more pointed, by encouraging businesses to explicitly
dissociate themselves from scientiﬁc disinformation campaigns
and also coordinated business efforts to stall or weaken formative
state and regional policy efforts such as the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative in the U.S. Northeast.


Internal or external focus? Some favor use of the principles
primarily to guide internal dialogue and action at their respective
companies, while others favor a more externally coordinated
effort to fashion a critical mass of supportive businesses.



Downside of disclosure emphasis. There is vigorous debate about

whether Principle #1’s emphasis on “disclosure” is a good idea.
Many assert that it is consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley and the
move toward greater corporate transparency regarding material
risks. Others say that “disclosure” would “turn off ” businesses
immediately and sour their readiness to engage on climate change,
especially those whose trade associations have sought to diminish
a variety of disclosure requirements. Compliance costs with
Sarbanes-Oxley have been high and unwelcome, so anything that
threatens to compound that burden and associate the climate
change issue with it should be carefully weighed. However,
disclosure was ultimately included in the set of principles, in part
because it will help businesses themselves to better understand
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their long-term risks, and other stakeholders such as investors and
analysts are anxious to obtain data that can inform their activities.


No carbon jargon. The importance of avoiding “carbon jargon” was

emphasized. Policy insiders have shaped an intricate and technical
dialogue about climate change, one that is not always accessible to
business leaders and others for whom climate change is not a fulltime preoccupation. Therefore the group sought to strip jargon out
of the eight principles and also said that subsequent dialogues based
on those principles should be similarly plain-spoken.


Package or piecemeal? Implementation of the framework could

proceed with an assumption that it is a package deal, or instead be
meted out piecemeal. Some are particularly interested in
advancing one or two of the principles in greater depth, while
others say that the packaging of an integrated framework for
business action is the critical value in this endeavor.


Partnership, not antagonism. The group widely believed that

there was a need to move away from antagonistic and combative
approaches to environmental issues and toward a partnership or
consensus-based model. Climate change, they said, is an
appropriate issue on which to exercise new forms of partnerships
with willing organizations, and the eight-principle framework is
intended to be a vehicle for advancing this model.
Recommendation #34: Create and fund an R&D organization to
undertake and disseminate credible and independent studies of the
economic impacts of climate change on business sectors and speciﬁc
businesses at a level of detail sufﬁcient to affect decision-making.
The organization would complement this data by also offering
credible information on available solutions, especially energy
efﬁciency investments with rapid paybacks and high rates of return.


A credible information base. Climate change has been an issue

fraught with relatively superﬁcial messaging battles, and it is
important to establish an information base that will allow all
players, especially business leaders, to go deeper to a level of
practical action and problem-solving. The proposed R&D
organization, if created, would be consistent with this emphasis
and would provide critical support to businesses seeking to
implement the eight principles.
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Methodologies. A variety of methodologies would be used,

including scenario analyses of different energy prices and
regulatory developments, pro forma P&Ls reﬂecting different
carbon prices, and others that would assist businesses and
investors in making more informed decisions. In particular, these
efforts should produce greater clarity on what carbon price levels
globally would trigger different strategic decisions about capital
investments, so that businesses would have greater comfort that
they understood the regulatory implications of different
outcomes (e.g., at a carbon price of $20/ton, would a given utility
ﬁnd coal gasiﬁcation plants a good investment?).


Build on high-quality work of others. On the solutions side, this
organization would promote and build on ﬁndings from creative
organizations that incubate or spotlight low-carbon alternatives,
such as the Rocky Mountain Institute and The Climate Group.



War chest to defray first costs. Some portion of the organi-

zation’s funding could be dedicated to a “war chest” for funding
grants to help speciﬁc businesses defray ﬁrst costs associated with
energy efﬁciency and other emissions-reductions investments
identiﬁed or promoted by the R&D organization. This part of the
organization’s ﬁnances could become self-funding if the initial
investment was repaid during the payback period and reinvested.
Recommendation #35: Launch a certiﬁcation program and logo

signifying climate-friendly products and services, or rationalize
such efforts already in existence in order to concentrate consumer
awareness and purchasing power on behalf of climate change
mitigation objectives.


Tie climate change to energy use. The intent of the new

certiﬁcation and logo would be to more effectively tie climate
change to energy use in the public mind. Although certiﬁcations
with retail logos do exist for energy-saving appliances, renewable
“green” power and carbon offsets, there may be room for
improvement in rationalizing these efforts, verifying their
emissions reduction value and enhancing their marketing to
maximize consumer penetration.

environmentalists & civil society

Environmentalists & Civil Society
questions
Has the organized environmental community mismanaged the climate
change issue, as some have asserted?
Should environmentalists devote more attention to building coalitions
with other constituencies, including for such purposes as communicating
credibly on scientiﬁc matters?
Why have other so-called epistemic communities (e.g., foreign policy)
largely left the climate change issue to the environmentalists?
How can social science ﬁndings and historical experiences from other
scientiﬁcally-grounded issue campaigns inform efforts to achieve citizendriven change on the climate change issue? What accounts for the gap
between state action and federal inaction?

diagnosis
The diagnoses in this category address both challenges intrinsic to the
climate change issue and ways in which environmental organizations
and civil society may not have managed the issue as effectively as
possible to date.


The science of global climate change is complex. Previous

environmental victories were based on issues involving relatively
simple and attributable chemistry or impacts. The hole in the
ozone was caused by CFCs. The Cuyahoga River caught ﬁre
because of ﬂammable contaminants in the water. Climate change
science, by contrast, is based on thermodynamics and is
profoundly more complex and encompassing. The uncertainties
and complexities of projection modeling make climate change a
far more challenging issue to comprehend and communicate. This
is compounded by the cumulative nature of the problem, the
failure to reach consensus on what can be considered safe levels of
greenhouse gases and what should be considered unsafe, as well as
the difficulty of attributing isolated weather events to the
changing climate. These uncertainties make it difﬁcult to generate
a higher level of clarity and urgency among the general
population.
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Level of urgency is unknown. Climate change is widely perceived
to be a slow, geological-scale problem. While evidence of nonlinearities indicates that changes and impacts may occur much
faster than is widely perceived, the issue remains afﬂicted by
uncertain timeframes and corresponding confusion about the
urgency of action. According to some, environmental groups in
the United States were not immune to this uncertainty and were
similarly late to wake up to the urgency of climate change, only
starting to focus on it in the late 1980s.



Issue is displaced by politics. The change in Presidential

administrations in 2001 and the political capital created by 9/11
reconfigured the power structure in Washington, D.C.
Legislative proposals by the Bush administration on the
environment have taken environmental organizations’ focus away
from championing their own new legislation on climate change
to defending the progress they have made in earlier periods.


Oppositional history has hampered needed alliances. The

general legacy of distrust between business and environmentalists
– and the specific history of the scientific disinformation
campaign on climate change sponsored by a segment of industry
– has hampered the creation of new solution-oriented alliances
across the divide.


New paradigm needed. Environmental organizations failed to

recognize the paradigmatic departure needed on climate
change. Environmentalism has evolved historically from the
conservationist ﬁrst wave, through the dust bowl push for soil
conservation, through to the Rachel Carson-inspired Earth Day
and modern environmentalism. In this context, one could see
global warming as the animating issue behind a potential new
environmentalism: one in which entire ecosystems are at risk, new
levels of integration with energy and economic planning must be
undertaken, and the relative neglect of American stewardship is
thrown into greater relief. Redeﬁning the issue in this way requires
stepping back and forging a new vision. So far, this has not
occurred in the organized environmental community.


Inadequate resource commitment. Environmental organizations
are responsible for a tangible shortage of budgetary and resource
commitments to climate change to date.
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Too top-down. Environmentalists have been prone to top-down
communications that promote their own ideas, and are not
especially effective at listening to individuals and valuing their
experiences. Some think that the public would move faster on
climate change if their experiences drove their opinions on the
issue. This is especially complicated on an issue like climate
change, where local experience is not always indicative of the
larger global patterns or trends. Yet community-based citizen
science (e.g., measuring ecosystem impacts, bird populations)
could usefully become more central to environmental groups’
mobilization strategies.



Limited self-awareness of the limits of their credibility.

Environmental groups have not fully understood how limited
their credibility is among certain target audiences. As a result,
they have not done enough to broaden their membership or to
work in quiet collaboration with others.


Lack of political savvy. With some exceptions, environmental

groups have not been especially effective at political mobilization.
Some note the high level of fragmentation among environmental
groups and compare them unfavorably to the National Riﬂe
Association, which builds and harnesses its inﬂuence through
disciplined political mobilization, allocation of resources to
defeat candidates who oppose their favored policies, and message
consistency at all levels.


International focus to the exclusion of domestic issues. While
the environmental movement is large, it tends to be engaged at
any moment on a limited set of issues. Prior to the Kyoto
Protocol, the movement concentrated largely on the
international process regarding climate change and did not
commit sufﬁcient energy to building support for a program of
domestic emissions limits. This mobilization gap has limited the
level of public engagement on the issue.



Individualist model. Environmentalism has often been based,

like many other movements, on the individual, rights-based
model that dominates legal analysis and remedies. This model is
not especially well suited to organizing on an issue like climate
change, where communities and entire nations are a more
appropriate unit. Environmentalists have not done enough to
coordinate with religious organizations, for example, which are
closely intertwined with the community level of organization.
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Professionalization of environmentalism has sapped vigor. The
environmental movement itself has been increasingly
professionalized. As a consequence, inertia has set in and some
would contend that a degree of passion has been lost. Some
environmentalists have grown less willing to think outside the box.



Climate change has not been linked to distributional and health
effects. Many successes of environmental mobilization and

policy advancement have been driven by highlighting the adverse
health effects of an issue, especially on vulnerable segments of the
population such as children or the poor (for example, the Food
Quality Protection Act passed largely due to highlighting of
exposures in children). Others include the impact of cigarettes,
diesel emissions and lead on children. Another example is the
impact of the atomic weapons’ testing program on island
populations. So far, the distributional and health impacts of
climate change have not been portrayed effectively in the United
States, leaving a motivational gap. Opportunities exist to tie
climate change and heat stress to impacts on the poor, including
interactions with local air pollution and asthma.


Narrow framing of the issue. While framed as an environmental

issue, the implications and consequences of climate change reach
beyond environmental transformations. The climate change
story has many human dimensions, including social, political and
security. Environmentalists are not necessarily the most effective
message-bearers of these interconnected issues.


Membership base not broad enough. Environmental groups

have not reached out to a sufﬁciently broad base on the climate
change issue. As a result, the impact of the movement on the
national leadership has been limited. The environmental
movement’s membership and audience may not be what is
required to secure action on the climate change issue. A radically
different base may be required.


Technocratic emphasis fails to harness moral energy. Many

environmental groups are creatures of their early successes, in that
their primary modes of action are driven by forms of policy and
legal engagement that reward technocratic expertise, but do not
harness the moral energy of the public or their leaders. Climate
change is especially well suited for moral engagement, but there is a
question whether environmental groups will be able to leverage this
dimension of the issue.
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Lacking vision, theory and models of “social change.” Success in

previous social movements has come from tapping into the
nation’s deepest hopes, convictions or moral obligations. Efforts
to mobilize Americans on climate change have done none of this,
at least not effectively. Environmental organizers have not looked
enough to successful examples like the civil rights movement.


Too “inside the beltway” and not coordinated enough on
state/local actions. Environmental groups have focused at the

federal level on speciﬁc policy and legislative issues, but have not
been as effective at deploying their top talent to support state and
local actions on climate change.




Limited sectoral focus. Many environmental groups that focus on
climate change have been focused on one or two sectors (e.g., the
oil or utility sectors) and have focused less on other important
sectors, (e.g., the automotive and service industries). This has
galvanized a degree of opposition from those concentrated
industries and has understated the multi-sectoral aspect of any
national solution.
Lack of coordination across the sectors. A fundamental

disconnect exists between the nature of the issue and the way the
movement is organized. Environmental organizations have not
done a good job of working in partnership with each other. Seen
in the big picture, the environmental movement is a loose alliance
of very small organizations. By contrast, opponents who believe
their interests are directly threatened by action on climate change
include extremely large, well-funded organizations with strong
leaders who act quickly and effectively in responding to both
internal and external challenges.


Lack of strategic communications. The communications efforts

of most environmental communities on climate change have not
been strategic and have not adequately leveraged empirical
research techniques to pre-test messages with target audiences.
Environmental groups have, with few exceptions, not done
enough to combine resources to craft a common, or at least
mutually reinforcing, message on climate change.

191

192

americans and climate change

recommended actions
Recommendation #36: Create a broad-based Climate Action
Leadership Council of 10-12 recognizable and senior eminent leaders
from all key national sectors and constituencies to serve as an
integrating mechanism for developing and delivering a cohesive
message to society about the seriousness of climate change and the
imperative of taking action. The Council would include leaders from
business, labor, academia, government, the NGO sector, the professions
(medicine, law, and public health) and community leaders. They
would be chosen on the basis of their credibility within their respective
communities, but also across society at large.


Persuasive rather than formal power. The Climate Action

Leadership Council would help to create a broader base of
national concern and support regarding climate change action,
and would judiciously consider a variety of proposed near-term
and long-term strategic actions that their various communities
could seek to undertake on the issue. The working group did not
seek to create a detailed blueprint for governance that would
clarify what, if any, organizational power the Council would have
with regard to their own organizations or others that might be
seen to fall under the Council’s umbrella, speciﬁcally on climate
change. The general emphasis appeared to be on the Council’s
persuasive inﬂuence, rather than its formal power.


The strong centralized model. At least one member of the
working group insisted that the proposed Leadership Council
model would likely perpetuate the diffusion of responsibility and
ineffectual leadership that has afﬂicted the climate change issue.
In this view, a true centralization of power and funding is needed
to prompt a real and dramatic upgrading in the handling of the
climate change issue, most likely in the form of a new
organization. This organization would be endowed with
sufficient resources and probably a non-environmentalist
leadership capable of penetrating and mobilizing new segments
of society.



The looser council model. While this proposal for a new

organization was carefully considered, the working group
appeared to lean toward the looser Leadership Council model. It
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should be noted that what the two options shared is their
emphasis on greater integration and coordination on climate
change across many constituencies, rather than the arguably
diffuse, non-cumulating efforts that have slowed progress to date.
Where the two parted company was on the degree of
centralization and resource control required for success.


Flexibility and coalitional agility. The Leadership Council model
was favored, in part, by those who thought it would maximize
strategic ﬂexibility and agility. It could, for example, reach out to
other leaders to devise political strategies to achieve agreed
outcomes but without insisting on inclusion of an overt climate
message. The group’s very diversity could discipline it to focus on
outcomes, rather than issue entrepreneurship and brandbuilding on behalf of their own organizations. For example, the
Council might reach out to coordinate with public health leaders
on messages or actions related to the risks of certain power
generation sources, or join with labor leaders on a strategy to
reinvigorate the auto industry around more competitive cars for
a low-carbon future.



Behind-the-scenes activities. Opinions on how visible the

Council should be vary. Some believe that its public proﬁle would
be critical to its persuasive impact, while others think it could
usefully perform a number of backstage coordination roles to add
coherence to what has been a fragmented effort on climate
change so far, without threatening the turf of any participating
organizations. These roles would include establishment of shared
objectives (e.g., contents of national legislation or an
international agreement they would favor), message
coordination, fundraising and recruitment of marketing talent.


Kickoff event. The kickoff event for the creation of the Climate

Leadership Council could be to convene one or more leadership
conferences among a wider group of prominent leaders to ask
and address the fundamental questions on climate change:
Whose job is it to lead? What is the solution list? What can people
do? This would air out key issues, and also provide an audition of
sorts – the strongest performers at these meetings would be
candidates to be on the Council itself.


Target audiences. Climate change is most likely to strike a chord
with those whose interests are affected by changes already
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underway that may be attributable to climate change. Messages
should be especially crafted to resonate with these groups, and
should cover multiple areas of concern, such as health, security,
the family, etc.


Link to the Earth Charter. The Council may want to consider
creating a values statement that is linked explicitly to the 1992
Earth Charter, so that it would be grounded in common global
ethics.



Common goal. The Council would specify a common goal that it

can rally around, e.g., to achieve near zero net emissions in the
United States by a speciﬁed date.


Speaker’s bureau. The Council would create and staff a speakers’
bureau to communicate effectively on climate change, with an
emphasis on recruiting locally compelling scientists and other
experts.


Benchmarking. Start by benchmarking against the

successes and learnings from previous or ongoing
efforts, such as the Greenhouse Network, a training
and speakers’ clearinghouse on climate change.
Evaluate, for example, the record and experiences of
the U.S. National Assessment on Climate Change,
which used credible local institutions as staging
grounds for their dialogues.


Messaging handbook. A glossary and message bible

should be developed to assist with communicating
climate change science and related messages to
different constituencies.


Positive messages. The group generally felt that the

void of positive messages needed to be ﬁlled to
strengthen communications on climate change.
Projections of doom-and-gloom have, on this account,
created audience fatigue, whereas more positive
framing with inspiring stories of how the problem is
being addressed have been scarcer. Put simply, the
message needs to be communicated less as the “sky is
falling” and more as the “little engine that could.”

environmentalists & civil society

Recommendation #37: In order to scale up and bring in the required

resources, expand the number of donors who understand the urgency
of climate change and work with them to identify action-oriented
grants consistent with their funding mission and style.

Recommendation #38: Create an environmental corps of college
students to lead research and action on climate change. This would
range from promoting greenhouse gas reduction pledges by their
respective colleges and universities to undertaking action beyond their
institutions.


Energy Action, a network of college organizers, has been formed
and is making impressive progress, so the recommendation
should include a plan to evaluate this and other college-level
initiatives, with an expectation that they may be augmented and
further coordinated with one another in lieu of creating a new
corps.

Recommendation #39: Create one or more competitions among the
200+ U.S. mayors who pledged to voluntarily fulﬁll the Kyoto Protocol
target, whereby their cities would seek to best one another on some
speciﬁc and measurable climate change-related metric, such as the
most compact ﬂuorescent light bulbs installed within a year.
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Summary List of
Recommendations
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
Conference on Climate Change
October 6-8, 2005
science
Recommendation #1: Create a new “bridging institution” to actively seek

out key business, religious, political, and civic leaders and the media and
deliver to them independent, reliable and credible scientiﬁc information
about climate change (including natural and economic sciences). (p. 110)
Recommendation #2: Reorient research priorities on climate change to
be more responsive to society’s information and decision-making needs,
including greater emphasis on impacts, local consequences, timing, nonlinear risks, adaptation, and solutions. (p. 115)
Recommendation #3: Strengthen citizen-science initiatives on climate
change so as to build greater public engagement with the conduct of
climate change science. (p. 116)
Recommendation #4: Identify and execute feasible, high-level actions
that could modify the ﬁnancial and reward structures within academia
most responsible for inhibiting: a) interdisciplinary and problemoriented research on large-scale, urgent issues like climate change; and b)
faculty and PhD student engagement in public communication,
policy-making and other public service arenas. Recruit key inﬂuencers to
meet with university presidents, university funders, and other inﬂuencers
in furtherance of this objective. (p. 118)
Recommendation #5: Identify mechanisms to preserve and advance the

integrity of the publicly-funded scientiﬁc research enterprise, especially
on climate change. Shine a public spotlight on the process by which the
federal science agenda is developed and funding choices are made. (p. 119)
Recommendation #6: Convene one or more dialogues free of economic

and political compromises to undertake a fundamental redeﬁnition of
the climate change challenge in light of its urgency. (p. 119)
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news media
Recommendation #7: Educate the gatekeepers (i.e., editors). In order to
improve the communication of climate science in the news media, foster
a series of visits and conferences whereby respected journalists and
editors informed on climate change can speak to their peer editors. The
objective is to have those who can credibly talk about story ideas and craft
reach out to their peers about how to cover the climate change issue with
appropriate urgency, context, and journalistic integrity. (p. 126)
Recommendation #8: Enhance the scientiﬁc competence of journalists.
(p. 127)
Recommendation #9: Initiate a climate change weekly column. Find a

newspaper willing to devote a weekly column to the issue of climate
change and help them syndicate it to others – or work with one of the
large newspaper chains to provide a larger multi-newspaper platform.
Recruit a talented and ambitious writer and give him or her, in effect, a
virtually unlimited budget to pursue the story. (p. 129)
Recommendation #10: Invite the media in. (p. 129)

religion & ethics
Recommendation #11: Religious leaders and communities must

recognize the scale, urgency and moral dimension of climate change, and
the ethical unacceptability of any action that damages the quality and
viability of life on Earth, particularly for the poor and most vulnerable.
(p. 136)
Recommendation #12: Religious leaders and communities should
establish or expand religious coalitions on the environment and convene
dialogues to develop common understandings and resources speciﬁcally
on the climate change issue across different religions and moral
traditions. (p. 136)
Recommendation #13: Religious leaders should reach deep into their
memberships to communicate the scale of the problem and the vital
moral imperative of addressing it. (p. 137)
Recommendation #14: Religious leaders and communities should

communicate their concern for urgently addressing climate change to the
nation’s political leadership and broader public. (p. 138)
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Recommendation #15: Recognizing that business leaders are well

positioned to promote receptivity to climate change messages among
certain religious constituencies, create new opportunities for dialogue on
climate change between business and religious leaders and communities.
(p. 138)
Recommendation #16: Establish religious outreach efforts on climate
change tailored speciﬁcally to certain regions of the United States and
their own religious traditions, especially the U.S. South. (p. 139)
Recommendation #17: Continue to develop and expand the ﬁeld
of Religion and Ecology, and its ability to unearth the commonalities
across religions on matters of ecology and to supply language,
concepts and textual support to religious leaders who want to articulate
environmental issues to their constituencies. (See, for example,
www.environment.harvard.edu/religion.) (p. 139)
Recommendation #18: Reach out to seminaries and other religious
training institutions and encourage them to incorporate climate change
into their curricula for new religious leaders. Provide education on climate
change to current clergy via continuing education and other means. (p. 139)
Recommendation #19: Establish religion-science and religionenvironmentalist partnerships on environmental issues. (p. 140)

politics
Recommendation #20: Design and execute a “New Vision for Energy”
campaign to encourage a national market-based transition to alternative
energy sources. Harness multiple messages tailored to different audiences
that embed the climate change issue in a larger set of co-beneﬁt
narratives, such as: reducing U.S. dependency on Middle East oil
(national security); penetrating global export markets with American
innovations (U.S. stature); boosting U.S. job growth (jobs); and cutting
local air pollution (health). (p. 149)
Recommendation #21: Recast climate change as a moral and faith issue,
not a scientiﬁc or environmental one. Catalyze a broader coalition of
allies around this moral common ground. (p. 151)
Recommendation #22: Increase the emphasis on adaptation and

preparedness for climate change, both because it is warranted based on
climate change we are already committed to, but also because it could be
a back door to a more reality-based dialogue about mitigation. (p. 152)
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Recommendation #23: Recruit a group of party elders from both parties
who are less ensconced in the gridlock of today’s Washington, D.C., and
would be more able to work together to promote constructive action on
climate change among the incumbents in their party. (p. 152)
Recommendation #24: Convene a group of political scientists, elected

ofﬁcials (and their staffers), and campaign operatives to conduct an
analysis and dialogue about the connections between systemic problems in
democratic governance in the United States and climate change. For
example, how do campaign ﬁnancing, redistricting and the lack of
competitive seats and other factors inﬂuence policy performance on
climate change? (p. 153)

entertainment & advertising
Recommendation #25: Create a new overarching communications

entity or project to design and execute a well-ﬁnanced public education
campaign on climate change science and its implications. This multifaceted campaign would leverage the latest social science ﬁndings
concerning attitude formation and change on climate change, and would
use all available media in an effort to disseminate rigorously accurate
information, and to counter disinformation in real time. (p. 159)
Recommendation #26: Undertake systematic and rigorous projects to

test the impact of environmental communications in all media (e.g.,
advertising, documentary, feature ﬁlm) on civic engagement, public
opinion and persuasive outcomes. Use these to inform new creative work
on multi-media climate change communications. (p. 161)
Recommendation #27: Embed messages about climate change into a

variety of existing communications channels, such as weathercasting and
entertainment vehicles. (p. 162)

education
Recommendation #28: Improve K-12 students’ understanding of

climate change by promoting it as a standards-based content area within
science curricula and incorporating it into other disciplinary curricula
and teacher certiﬁcation standards. Use the occasion of the state reviews
of science standards for this purpose, which are being prompted by the
states’ need to comply with the Fall 2007 start of high-stakes science
testing under the No Child Left Behind Act. (p. 169)
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Recommendation #29: Organize a grassroots educational campaign to

create local narratives around climate change impacts and solutions,
while mobilizing citizen engagement and action. Kick the campaign off
with a National Climate Week that would recur on an annual basis. (p. 171)
Recommendation #30: Identify and execute opportunities to

incorporate climate change content into instructional technologies,
devices and software products, including video games and educational
simulations such as SimCityTM. (p. 173)
Recommendation #31: Create a variety of academic and non-academic

competitions centered on climate change, or harness existing
competitions by introducing climate change as a topic. (p. 174)
Recommendation #32: Following the trend toward niche channels and

narrowcasting, create a TV show or entire channel dedicated to
educational and engaging coverage of all dimensions of climate change,
ranging from the natural sciences to policy developments in the United
States and abroad. (p. 174)

business & finance
Recommendation #33: The Business & Finance working group at the

Conference composed an eight-principle framework, and proposed that
it be disseminated broadly to trade associations and individual business
leaders (especially at the CEO and board level) as a set of clear and
feasible actions that businesses can and should take on climate change.
(p. 181)
Recommendation #34: Create and fund an R&D organization to

undertake and disseminate credible and independent studies of the
economic impacts of climate change on business sectors and speciﬁc
businesses at a level of detail sufﬁcient to affect decision-making. The
organization would complement this data by also offering credible
information on available solutions, especially energy efficiency
investments with rapid paybacks and high rates of return. (p. 185)
Recommendation #35: Launch a certification program and logo

signifying climate-friendly products and services, or rationalize such efforts
already in existence in order to concentrate consumer awareness and
purchasing power on behalf of climate change mitigation objectives. (p. 186)
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Recommendation #36: Create a broad-based Climate Action Leadership

Council of 10-12 recognizable and senior eminent leaders from all key
national sectors and constituencies to serve as an integrating mechanism
for developing and delivering a cohesive message to society about the
seriousness of climate change and the imperative of taking action. The
Council would include leaders from business, labor, academia,
government, the NGO sector, the professions (medicine, law, and public
health) and community leaders. They would be chosen on the basis of
their credibility within their respective communities, but also across
society at large. (p. 192)
Recommendation #37: In order to scale up and bring in the required

resources, expand the number of donors who understand the urgency of
climate change and work with them to identify action-oriented grants
consistent with their funding mission and style. (p. 195)
Recommendation #38: Create an environmental corps of college students

to lead research and action on climate change. This would range from
promoting greenhouse gas reduction pledges by their respective colleges
and universities to undertaking action beyond their institutions. (p. 195)
Recommendation #39: Create one or more competitions among the

200+ U.S. mayors who pledged to voluntarily fulﬁll the Kyoto Protocol
target, whereby their cities would seek to best one another on some
speciﬁc and measurable climate change-related metric, such as the most
compact ﬂuorescent light bulbs installed within a year. (p. 195)
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Closing the Gap Between Science and Action

“The Conference brought together the best and the brightest from key sectors to listen, learn and work
together. Most importantly, it gave us an opportunity to come up with clear and specific action for
taking on one of the biggest challenges of our time.”
james e. rogers, chairman and ceo, cinergy corp.

“A major recommendation to emerge from the breakthrough dialogue described here is that global
warming must now be viewed fundamentally as a moral and spiritual issue. This will change the nature
of the debate, and draw in believers of all faiths, particularly evangelical Christians, who have heretofore regarded it as an “environmental” matter only. The 86 leaders who recently signed the “Evangelical
Climate Initiative” agree with this basic assumption. That some religious leaders disagree only makes
this report more significant. If one reads and studies these pages, the inescapable conclusion is that we
must all come together as Americans to act in responsible ways to solve this crisis.”
reverend richard cizik, vice president of government affairs, national association of evangelicals

“This conference, unlike most, was able to combine both the clarification of a macro challenge and the
key action steps needed to help resolve that challenge with its complex overlay of political, scientific,
and attitudinal dimensions. One thing stands out: the stakes on climate change are simply too high for
us to continue approaching it as a partisan issue. Republicans and Democrats need to get together on
this as Americans above all. Read this insightful report and let’s get started.”
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Closing the Gap Between Science and Action

With a Foreword by James Gustave Speth

richard b. wirthlin, chief strategist to president ronald reagan; founder, wirthlin worldwide

“The world desperately needs to know what we scientists are learning from our research endeavors.
We can no longer afford to talk principally to each other, in a language understandable only to us. This
illuminating report arose from a path-breaking conference and outlines concrete steps that will help
scientists better explain the real-life implications of our research on climate change to decision-makers
and the public so that needed action can be taken — and not a moment too soon.”
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Climate Change

“This report makes clear that the science is now in: global warming is for real. Climate change cannot
be understood or responsibly dealt with if either science or environmental concerns are politicized.”
“Addressing the global threat of climate change requires more than just scientific consensus. This
conference allowed the time and resources for exactly the type of meeting of industry, government,
and civil society leaders that is needed if we are to move past talking about this growing threat, and
start taking action. Quite frankly, the future of our economy and our way of life depend on it.”
mindy s. lubber, president, ceres

“This important contribution reflects a unique coalition-building effort. What emerged was a wide
recognition of the opportunities that would result for the United States and the world if only our
government would lead and recognize the reality of global climate change.”
timothy e. wirth, president, united nations foundation and better world fund, former u.s. senator (d-co)

“A fresh approach to the complex and often-controversial issue of global climate change — a collaborative effort, united by a simple, straightforward goal, namely to get things done. Daniel Abbasi does a
skillful job of weaving together divergent views — those of science, business, government, and the
media — so that a framework for change begins to take shape. A wonderfully put together book.”
eileen claussen, president, pew center on global climate change
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